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THE ECONOMY OF TIME: 
HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA ON 
ARISTOTLE, TIME AND METAPHYSICS 
This dissertation explores the main texts of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida on the relation 
of the so-called "straight-line" theory of time to the so-called "metaphysical tradition." In Being 
and Time Heidegger states that a determination of Being as presence characterizes metaphysics 
and that such a determination of Being can be found in Aristotle's theory of time. Derrida 
examines how such a characterization of metaphysics affects Heidegger's project. 
Chapter I explores in detail how Derrida's essay "Ousia and Gramme" posits a "formal 
rule" that implies the "haunting" of time by space in any discourse that attempts to ground 
spatiality in temporality. Chapter II shows how the disseminative economy of Sinn in the 
Seinsfrage in Being and Time installs an irreducible spatiality in Heidegger's description of 
temporality, precisely as Derrida's "formal rule" had predicted. Chapter Ill concludes the 
dissertation by showing how Heidegger's extended treatment of Aristotle in The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology also conforms to Derrida's "formal rule.• 
INTRODUCTION 
Space and time have always been among the primary topics for philosophical 
discussion. The classical treatments include Plato's Timaeus, Aristotle's Physics, Plotinus' 
Enneads, Augustine's Confessions, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Hegel's Encyclopedia, 
Bergson's Essay on the Immediate Givens of Consciousness, and Husserl's Phenomenology of 
Internal Time-Consciousness--in other words, works by virtually every major philosopher of the 
Western tradition. Besides the philosophic treatments, early modern science debated the status 
of space and time, the Leibniz-Clarke debate shaping consequent scientific discussions on the 
issue of the absoluteness of space and time. 1 Today, contemporary physics uses concepts of 
space/time, which analytic philosophy of science attempts to explain.2 
In the continental tradition, the twentieth-century talk of the end of philosophy has 
not lessened interest in space and time; if anything, it has increased it. Given such a huge 
tradition any dissertation on this topic can only hope to carve out a tiny area of expertise. I 
therefore restrict myself to examining some of the most important writings on time of the men 
I take to be two of the three most important European philosophers of our century-Martin 
Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. 3 Since the confrontation with the tradition has always been 
integral to their main task, I take up their readings of Aristotle's treatise on time in Physics 4.10-
14. The Heideggerian and Derridean texts examine the relation of the so-called "straight-line" 
theory of time to the so-called "metaphysical tradition.· I call the articulation of these discursive 
fields "the economy of time.· 
I take "economy" in the widest sense to mean "range of interpretative possibilities" 
for a word, concept, or text. These possibilities are governed by rules particular to each word, 
concept, or text. Yet this particularity is not so abstract as to prevent a minimal structural identity 
2 
that allows for intertextual grafting whereby a family resemblance of texts governed by the 
"same" set of rules can be recognized. These governing rules may be called an "economy" in 
a narrower sense. 
The feature of the economy of time upon which I focus in this dissertation is that 
an irreducible spatiality haunts the discourse of time. I display this feature by showing how any 
discourse on time contains terms that can also be Iterated in a discourse on space. Hence those 
terms are undecidably spatial/temporal. Such undecidability is the basis for the analogy of time 
and the line from which the "straight-line· theory of time gets Its name. Confronted with such 
undecidability, an author may attempt to settle the undecidability by determining a proper 
(temporal) and improper (spatial) sense for them, but such strategy fails in the discussion of 
time, for a determination of sense-or at least Heidegger's determinations--is caught in what I call 
the "question of sense.· In German, the "question of sense· would be the Sinnsfrage-a play on 
Heidegger's phrase "the question of Being· (the Seinsfrage). The economy of the Sinnsfrage 
Itself contains an irreducible spatial moment so that temporal discourse cannot be purified of 
spatial terms via a determination of proper sense, because "sense• is irreducibly spatial. To be 
more precise, the possibility of Iterating Sinn in a spatial context (i.e., a context other than that 
determined by Heidegger as properly temporal) cannot be reduced. Similarly, the infection of 
temporal discourse by terms capable of Iteration in spatial discourse cannot be controlled by 
appeal to the concept of "metaphor.· That is, language cannot be said to be dominated by 
spatial terms which function as metaphors for a properly intended temporal sense because 
"metaphor" is Itself a "metaphor" of "meta-pherein, • and thus contains an irreducible reference 
to spatial motion. 
For Its most basic argument, then, the dissertation relies on Derrida's related 
notions of "Iteration• and "dissemination.• As Derrida explains in "Signature Event Context" 
"Iteration" comes from the Sanskrit itara, meaning "other . ..4 Iteration refers to the play of identity 
and difference in the repeated inscriptions of a mark. Each inscription--"iteration" -of a mark Is 
different from the other inscriptions yet maintains a minimal recognizability as an inscription of 
the same mark. Derrida shows in his Introduction to Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry how 
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such (material) inscription is necessary for ideality. 5 Derrida shows that for Husser1 a mark must 
be able to function in the possible absence of a controlling intention-hence the talk of the "death 
of the author.• But the possibility of function beyond intention is also the condition Husser1 
analyzes as "crisis.• Writing, Derrida's term for durable inscription in any medium, is thus the life 
and death of thought. 
Iteration then produces dissemination as its effect. Meaning produced by iterations 
functioning beyond controlling intention is not the end of meaning but the beginning of too much 
meaning. Meaning spills out from under the boundaries set by intention, and a fortiori, from 
under the boundaries of that which one might wish to interpret as the author's intention. Such 
spilling is what Derrida names "dissemination: As with many of Derrida's terms, this one 
combines performative and indicative functions-that is, it does what it says. It produces meaning 
from a fortuitous combination of marks-semen and ~-that have no real etymological 
connection, yet produce a meaning-effect. 6 
It is also Important to realize, however, that dissemination does not mean the end 
of all authorial control-although it does entail giving up dreams of complete control. As Derrida 
explains in "Signature Event Context,• his writings do not imply that intentions are useless. 
Rather, intentions will still produce effects even if one accounts for dissemination, but these 
effects will be produced within a system that is not fully controlled by intention. To what can one 
appeal then in claiming that one reading is a "misreading"? Derrida makes it clear In the 
"Afterword" to Limited Inc that appeal can only be made to historically determined, and hence 
only relatively stable, contexts--such as the profession of academic philosophy in the latter 20th 
century. The relative stability of such a context makes possible appeals to standards of evidence 
in reading texts, but does not imply that an author's intention can or even should be the~ 
guideline in producing a reading. 
In the rest of this introduction I shall a) provide a brief historical background for the 
issue of straight-line time and metaphysics; b) explain some key terms and assumptions involved 
in this issue: c) give a brief outline of my dissertation; d) mention some of the special method-
ological issues involved; and finally, e) review the literature relevant to my project. 
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Since Immanuel Kant's work in the 1780s many European philosophers have been 
concerned with the rules that govern that certain type of philosophical discourse traditionally 
called "metaphysical. "7 A useful first approximation to the contemporary continental sense of 
this most vexing concept can be found in Heidegger's "The End of Philosophy and the Task of 
Thinking . ..a In this essay Heidegger defines philosophy as metaphysics, that mode of thought 
that thinks the whole of beings with regard to their Being in the manner of a grounding 
representation [begrOndenden Vorstellens]. Metaphysical thought thinks Being as the ground 
of beings. As such a ground, Being plays an active role; it brings [bringt] beings into their 
presencing [Anwesen]. Metaphysics is further characterized by its thinking the ground as 
presence [Anwesenheit]. Thought metaphysically, then, the present ground is responsible for 
the presencing of beings, in that presence produces [hervorbringt] beings into their presencing 
for a while. As the ground of this production, presence has itself a temporal present [Gegenwart] 
in its bringing presencing things [Anwesende] into presence. The characteristic mark of 
metaphysics then for Heidegger in this essay is that it conceives of the process of presencing 
as the production by one present ground of the presencing of all other presencing things.9 
Thus Heidegger's discourse seeks to articulate the rules governing metaphysics. 
How does Heidegger characterize metaphysics in Being and Time? There he claims that a 
certain "straight-line" notion of time characterizes "metaphysical• texts.10 According to Heidegger, 
metaphysics conceives time as a sequence of present moments best represented by a straight 
line: hence the term "straight-line theory of time"). This claim has provided one of the most 
profound stimuli to philosophical thinking in this century. 
But my dissertation is not just on Heidegger, but also on the series of interpretations 
of his work offered by Jacques Derrida, many of whose most influential essays are devoted to 
the issues raised in Heidegger's work. Derrida is also the one responsible for my often having 
put the word "metaphysics" in quotation marks throughout this introduction. Let me explain this 
typographical device. Derrida is concerned in his writings on Heidegger to explicate the economy 
of Heidegger's discourse on the linking of the straight-line theory of time and metaphysics. For 
example, Derrida will show that Aristotle's text on time, which Heidegger in his 1927 work Sein 
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_ynd Zeit seems to "blame" for starting metaphysics because of its being the first formulation of 
a straight-line theory of time, also contains other conceptual possibilities than those of 
metaphysical thought, even the ones that enable Heidegger to thematize the link of the straight-
line theory and metaphysics. Th1,;0 after Derrida it is difficult to call any one text "metaphysical," 
for he shows that what seemed to be the very epitome of a metaphysical text, namely Aristotle's, 
also contains elements of other-than-metaphysical thought. 
What then is metaphysics for Derrida? In the period of Maraes Derrida sees 
metaphysics as the attempt to order a field of marks (a "text") by a mark that claims to be 
outside the field. Contrary to some overwrought critics, in thus characterizing metaphysics while 
also claiming that the isolation of the governing mark is impossible ("there is no out-text"), 
Derrida does not leave us adrift in these fields. He recognizes we must pattern our texts, and 
this recognition on his part forces us to recognize the radical political import of Derrida's thought. 
Texts must be structured, but not necessarily as hierarchies of exploitation or domination. If we 
then see structuring as a necessary structure, we must by the same token recognize that any 
particular structure-as particular, historical, contingent--is also destabilizable. 111 other words, 
what has been constructed can be de-constructed. Professional philosophers specialize in 
detecting metaphysical pretensions in philosophical texts, but the structures also script life, as 
institutional patternings, discursive formations, etc. We must see here the role of force, as 
twisting the conceptual possibilities of what Derrida calls the "general text" into the hierarchies 
that pattern specific institutional texts. 
With the preceding as its context, the dissertation will show that while metaphysics 
has always seen itself as beyond (meta) physics, Heidegger's work, when it seeks to characterize 
metaphysics, does not provide another level, that is, is not a "meta-metaphysics,• or "3rd level" 
discourse that would be radically purified of metaphysics, but instead provides a breakthrough 
to a thought somehow "other" than that of metaphysics. Similarly, Derrida's discourse, which 
seeks to explain Heidegger's explanation of how metaphysics orders the general text (seemingly 
from outside), is not a "4th level" discourse, but rather one that explicitly thematizes the economy 
(that is, the interplay of metaphysics and an exceeding of metaphysics), of the "other" thought 
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by which Heidegger's text can characterize metaphysics as the thought of Being as presence. 
Derrida precludes characterizing his writings on Heidegger as "critique" by showing that his 
discourse is only possible due to the way its subject matter Is hinted at in Heidegger's discourse. 
Thus Derrida does not operate from a level above Heidegger's text, but in~tP.ad radicalizes and 
thematizes certain tendencies in Heidegger's own text, playing one off against the other. The 
main task of the dissertation, then, is to explore the relations between the two discourses of 
Heidegger and Derrida on time and metaphysics, the one a breakthrough into a thought "other" 
than metaphysical, the other the explicit thematization of the mechanisms and consequences of 
that breakthrough. 
The dissertation will also provide a framework for discussing Derrida's reading of 
Heidegger's career path, that most vexed of issues, so often confused with the so-called "turn.• 
The dissertation prepares the way for such a reading, which would focus on the move from time 
to time/space. In the Marburg period Heidegger's thesis that a straight-line, or "vulgar" concept 
of time characterizes metaphysics gave him a clue in his destruction of the handed-down content 
of ancient ontology. 11 In the course of the project of fundamental ontology Heidegger thus 
sought a primordial temporality of Dasein, one that would ground the primordial spatiality of 
Dasein, as a preliminary to posing time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being, 
die Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein i.iberhaupt. In the middle of his career, while researching 
the "history /sending of Being,• the Seinsgeschichte. Heidegger admitted the failure of the project 
of fundamental ontology in placing the blame on the constraints of the metaphysical concept of 
language within which his work moved at the time. 12 Finally, at the end of his career, Heidegger 
admitted that the attempt to ground Dasein's spatiality in its temporality was ill-conceived, and 
that one must think time-space as the "open!13 However, one can still discern a subordination 
of space in Heidegger's insistence on naming the granting of this "open• as "authentic time."14 
The Derridean-inspired questions that guide this dissertation, then are: What is the link in 
Heidegger's text of language and space/time, or more precisely, metaphysical language and the 
attempt to isolate a temporality of Oasein that grounds its spatiality? How do spatial terms haunt 
the attempt to purify the language of temporality? How does this haunting of the allegedly 
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purified language relate to the metaphysical straight-line time concept? I try to draw together all 
these questions in what I call "the economy of time.· 
In spelling out the economy of time I am mostly concerned with Derrida's early 
writing--up to and including Maraes de la Philosophie (1972). Derrida's readings of Heidegger 
have informed his career from the beginning. One could trace something of the following path: 
In Of Grammatology (1967) Derrida focuses upon the question of Being in discussing the 
"priority'' of differance to the ontological difference.15 In "Ousia and Gramme" (1969) the focus 
on the question of Being shifts to an examination of the form of the question as a question of 
sense (sens or Sinn) as this form of the question relates to Heidegger's change to examining the 
epochality of Being.16 In The Post Card (1980) and "Sending: On Representation" (1978) Derrida 
takes up the Heideggerian reading of the history sending of Being in discussing the Seinsqes-
chichte.17 Finally, in Of Spirit (1986) Derrida takes up the question of the question itself as it 
relates to epochality.18 
These points bring me to the outline of my dissertation. Briefly stated, Chapter I 
will lay out the economy of time, by showing how Derrida's formal rule, arrived at in a reading 
of Heidegger's note on Aristotle, predicts a haunting of time by space, or in other words, an 
irreducible spatial moment in the economy of time. Chapter II shows how the Sinnsfrage is 
implicated in the economy of time, by showing how Sein und Zeit cannot purify the discourse 
of temporality of all spatial reference because Sinn as directionality is iterated in both spatial and 
temporal discourses. Chapter Ill shows how Heidegger's reading of Aristotle proceeds via an 
attempted purification of Aristotle's time discourse through skewing several economies Aristotle 
leaves undecidable. Heidegger attempts these skewings via a determination of the proper (non-
spatial) sense of key terms. I show how this strategy is limited by the Sinnsfrage. Chapter Ill also 
shows how another Heideggerian strategy of regulating undecidable economies in attempting 
to purify time discourses fails. This is the strategy of naming terms undecidable across the 
ontico-ontological difference "ontic images.· This strategy falls under the economy of time, and 
specifically the Aristotelian economy, since "met~phor" is itself a "metaphor" of meta-pherein, and 
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hence includes an irreducible reference to .Qb.Qrg, the Aristotelian term for spatial motion. 
Let me now give a bit more detail for each chapter. Chapter I details Derrida reading 
Heideg~er reading Aristotle. Thus the dissertation does not proceed chronologically, but will first 
examine Derrida's 1969 essay "Ousla and Gramme," in which Derrida articulates the economy 
of Heidegger's discourse in his 1927 Sein ynd Zeit concerning Aristotle's significance as the first 
formulator of a straight-line theory of time for the metaphysical tradition. Chapter I explores in 
detail how Derrida's essay examines the constraints under which Heidegger's reading of 
Aristotle's significance for the tradition (e.g., the way Hegel paraphrased Aristotle and thus was 
the apotheosis of the "vulgar concept of time") operated in the famous note in Sein und Zeit #82. 
These constraints make up what Derrida calls the "epoch(e)" of Sein und Zeit. "Ousia and 
Gramme" shows that Aristotle's text on time also contains other conceptual possibilities than 
those of metaphysical thought, even the ones that enable Heidegger to thematize the link of the 
straight-line theory and metaphysics. Derrida also shows that his discourse, which may seem a 
criticism of Heidegger directed from a higher level, is rmly possible due to the way it is hinted 
at in Heidegger's discourse. Thus there is no infinite regress of levels of discourse, for Derrida's 
discourse operates from within Heidegger's breakthrough, explaining both how Heidegger's text 
operates and how the total fulfillment of its project of developing a discourse on temporality 
purified of all spatial reference is impossible. In this way Derrida does not operate from above 
Heidegger's project, but instead radicalizes and thematizes certain tendencies in Heidegger's 
own text. 
I set up the analyses of Chapter II by showing how "Ousia and Gramme" reads the 
textual effects of Heidegger's posing of the queston of Being in terms of the Sinn of Being. In 
attempting to show how asking the question of Being in terms of Sinn keeps to the system of 
presence, that is, the system in which Aristotle asks about the Being of time on the basis of a 
predetermination of the sense of Being in terms of a specific sense of time, viz. the present, 
Derrida tries to show how the resultant "formal rule" limits any attempt to escape metaphysics 
to a shaking from within. In my terms, the formal rule articulates the marginality of any text to 
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the system of (desire for) presence. Now the formal rule of marginality is linked to the structure 
of the re-mark. As with several of the other essays of Margins, Derrida shows in "Ousia and 
Gramme" how any attempt to isolate a single concept from a field in an attempt to dominate that 
field will always result in a supplementary fold or re· mark that comes to double the isolated term, 
as in the famous "metaphor of metaphor" around which turns the analysis of 'White Mythology: 
The doubling of the re-mark Is formally similar to what I call "haunting• in cases of conceptual 
pairs, such as time-space. In Heidegger's case the concept to be isolated from its partner is that 
of time, the original time that grounds the vulgar (i.e. spatially-conceived) time that characterizes 
metaphysics. In attempting to isolate a purified notion of time, Heidegger's discourse finds itself 
haunted by the repressed member of the pair time/space. If a spatialized concept of time Is 
(Heidegger's) hallmark of metaphysics, and if Heidegger can be said to be attempting to escape 
metaphysics by a notion of time purified of spatial reference, we must admit that he nonetheless 
uses terms iterable in spatial contexts, so we must say his discourse is pulled back into 
metaphysics-as he defines it in terms of spatialized time. But let us add that it is not totally 
pulled back-Heidegger's discourse is marginal to metaphysics as defined by allegiance to the 
system of (desire for) presence, for his use of terms that can be iterated in spatial contexts is in 
the discussion of schemata that direct the ecstases of ecstatic temporality, an analysis that 
cannot be assimilated to metaphysics defined In terms of presence. 
In my second chapter I return to Sein und Zelt to ask whether Derrida In "Ousia and 
Gramme" takes "seriously" enough this work's attempted transgressions of the metaphysical 
tradition. Here I examine what I call the Sinnstrage as it comes to limit the Seinsfrage when 
posed as die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein Oberhaypt. Derrida writes of Heidegger's attempt 
at dismantling metaphysics with "the thought of Being as presence," a dismantling that operates 
by posing the question of the Sinn des Seins: for Derrida, such a questlon--in so far as it is a 
question about Sinn-remains tied to metaphysics. What are we to make of this seemingly flat 
claim about the metaphysicalness of Sinn. when Derrida himself reminds us that there are no 
metaphysical concepts~. for all depends upon the use to which they are put? 19 
To what use Is Sinn put in Sein und Zeit? The textual performance of Sein und Zeit 
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twists several acceptations historically sedimented in the mark "Sinn,• viz. the sensuous, 
linguistic, and directional, into each iteration of "Sinn.· Such sedimentations open possibilities of 
iteration that cannot be totally controlled, even though Heidegger attempts to rewrite the 
historical sedimentation of Sinn as "linguistic meaning• from noematic correlate to pivot of 2n 
existential projection of Dasein In its Being-in-the-wor1d. These uncontrollable possibilities of 
iteration result in a twisting of the question of Being. So while the Seinsfrage cannot be 
considered a simple subjectivizing, an inquiry into a concept of Being in the sense of a 
representation, neither can it totally escape from such a "misunderstanding,· about which 
Heidegger complained in the "Letter on Humanism. "20 On the other hand, it is no longer so 
clearcut, as Derrida seems to imply, that the textual work of Sein und Zeit does not disrupt the 
system of presence, even as the historical sedimentations of Sinn open it to iteration in contexts 
Heidegger would wish to name subjectivistic misunderstanding. Derrida does seem correct 
however in his analysis of the haunting of the allegedly purified temporal terms by terms 
Heidegger also uses in discussion of space. Even though Heidegger is aware of the "haunting" 
he still casts it in terms of misunderstanding by attempting to identify the proper Sinn for such 
terms; however, this move results in the Sinnsfrage. The important thing for us is not to give up 
the concern for following an author's attempts at terminological control, but to see the economy 
of possible Interpretations here, and the inability of an author to control fully the dlsseminative 
drift. The drift brings us to see the possible iteration of Sinn as direction as an irreducible spatial 
moment in the economy of time, since Heidegger iterates Sinn as direction (Richtung) in 
discussslons of both space and time. 
In my third chapter I take up Heidegger's extended treatment of Aristotle in his 1927 
lecture course now known as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. This text was not 
published until after Derrida pubished "Ousia and Gramme" so I will be able to test whether what 
Derrida says about the way Heidegger wrote during the "epoch" of Sein und Zeit holds as well 
for this contemporaneous work. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger tries to 
show how the usual interpretation of Aristotle as the father of the straight--line concept is a 
"misunderstandlng"--though perhaps a necessary one due to Dasein's falling, which causes it to 
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couch its interpretation in terms oriented toward things encountered in the world. In pursuing this 
reading Heidegger must subvert several Aristotelian economies: that of metabole, proteron kai 
husteron and kinesis. Heidegger must equate metabole and kinesis, ignore Aristotle's privileging 
of topos in the economy of proteron kai husteron and similarly ignore the privilege of phora in 
the economy of kinesis. Heidegger skews Aristotle's three economies, but his reading rests on 
distinguishing proper~. a strategy disrupted by the Sinnstraae. Heidegger must attempt 
such overturnings in order to reduce space in Aristotle's time notion so he can read it as a clue 
to Dasein's temporality. But key terms in Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, such as 
Oberaang, are iterated in contexts of both time and space. Confronted with such undecidability 
Heidegger tries to manage their economies by determining their proper (non-spatial) Sinn, but 
this strategy is embroiled in the Sinnsfrage. 
Now Heidegger does seem to broach a trace-structure in the transition character 
of the now, but the word he uses, Obergang, is iterated in both temporal contexts-in the 
economy of the now-and in spatial contexts-in the economy of kinesis. The spatial economy 
is itself undecidable, as Heidegger uses Oberaang both generically (as the character of all 
metabole) and specifically (as the character of J2!:1Q.ra). All these economies which hinge on 
undecidable terms could only be managed by positing a proper Sinn for certain key terms, but 
this attempt runs into the Sinnsfrage. 
At this point, let me mention that a few special procedural concerns present 
themselves in my project. I will be interpreting in my dissertation the changing interpretations 
developed by Heidegger and Derrida of the relation of the metaphysical tradition to various 
notions of time. I must therefore be especially careful to note this doubled interpreting of 
interpretative possibilities, and thereby take into account the ways in which Heidegger and 
Derrida account for the possibility of various interpretative stances, even as I take them up in 
interpreting their texts. 
Only two books have broached this issue, neither in the detail it requires. David 
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Wood's The Deconstruction of Time does not discuss either "Ousia and Gramme" or The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology with an eye to their relation. Herman Rappaport's Heidegger and 
Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language ignores Derrida's notion of the ''formal rule" in favor 
of focusing upon the var!~us rhetorical schemes to be found in the respective texts. 21 
Heidegger's work has provoked an enormous amount of commentary, with much 
of Derrida's own work, which has provoked considerable Interest on its own accord, able to be 
counted therein. Among the major interpreters of Heidegger on the issue of time and 
metaphysics, several, namely Richardson,22 Peggeler,23 and W. Marx24 published their major 
works before Derrida's publishing career began. Others, such as Bernasconi, 25 Kockelmans, 26 
Schurmann, 27 and Sheehan, 28 either do not treat of Derrida or dismiss him polemically. A few 
approach Heidegger with greater or lesser appreciations of Derrida, such as Caputo,29 F6ti,30 
Gasche,31 Greisch,32 Kockelmans,33 and Sallis.34 Several of these at least mention the texts I 
will examine, so I will note their works whenever appropriate, pointing out as much as possible 
their contributions to my study. My work will differ from theirs mostly in scope, in that they have 
written articles about a few specific textual interconnections, while I will attempt to articulate a 
much broader network. 
Most commentators on Derrida cannot avoid mentioning his relation to Heidegger, 
inasmuch as Derrida himself constantly writes of the importance of Heidegger for his own work. 
Harvey,35 Uewelyn,36 and Wood are only marginally relevant to my project, but Gasche's37 work 
will be very important in informing my reading of Derrida in general as wel! providing insights into 
specific textual interconnections. My work will differ from his in both direction and scope. His 
articles do not treat directly of the time and metaphysics issue, while The Tain of the Mirror is 
an explication of Derrida that treats of Heidegger only in passing. 
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CHAPTER I 
DERRIDA ON HEIDEGGER ON ARISTOTLE: 
A READING OF "OUSIA AND GRAMME" 
Introduction 
As Derrida himself has written, "the task proposed here is enormous and difficult." In 
this chapter I will begin the articulation of the economy of time by examining "Ousia and 
Gramme,"1 the essay in which Derrida reads Heidegger's reading in Sein und Zeit of the 
paradigmatic force of Aristotle's thesis on time for the metaphysical tradition. In "Ousia and 
Gramme" Derrida writes of the "epoch of Sein und Zeit" (72/62), which includes for essential 
reasons Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. The epoch in question is one in which 
Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology seeks to develop time as the transcendental horizon 
for the question of Being. This project necessitates a destruction of what remains of the history 
of ontology, 2 a destruction guided by the thesis that the tradition has, without thematizing it, 
determined the meaning (or sense) of Being-the Sinn von Sein, the sens de retre-by means of 
nnly one determination of time, that of presence. The intricate problems of translating Sinn with 
"sens." "meaning• or •sense• will be addressed in Chapter II of this dissertation. In this chapter 
I will provisionally translate "Sinn van Sein" and "sens de l'etre" as "sense of Being" rather than 
the usual "meaning of Being.· In Chapter Ill of this dissertation I will address the further question 
of whether or not one can include The Basic Problems of Phenomenology in this epoch, even 
though it falls chronologically between Sein und Zeit and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. 
For Derrida, the delimiting of metaphysics accomplished in Sein und Zeit, and 
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specifically in Heidegger's note on the texts of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Bergson, is itself 
situated by its failure to open the "hidden passageway that makes the problem of presence 
communicate with the problem of the written trace" (37 /34). We cannot, of course, simply render 
the Heideggerian text in terms of his thought of "presence,• as Derrida notes in proprising that 
one might read "Ousia and Gramme" as "a timid prolegomena to a problem of transla-
tion" (35n.2/33n.6). The nexus of the terms Vorhandenheit, Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Gegenwart, 
Prasenz traverses the entire history of Heidegger's text, and they undergo crucial shifts in 
determination as Heidegger moves toward thinking the history of Being. Thus "Ousia and 
Gramme" does not deal solely with the epoch of Sein und Zeit, but poses the question of the 
development of Heidegger's thought (which is not to be contused with the "turn,• already 
operative in Sein und Zeit).3 "Ousia and Gramme" thus questions an epoch of Heidegger's 
thought prior to the question of the epochality of Being. Posing the question in such terms 
indicates that I will use "epoch" not only in its chronological sense, but also in the sense 
Heidegger uses in his discussions of the history of Being. That sense, the one intended here by 
Derrida, is derived from the Greek epoche, to hold back. My question then becomes, what does 
Derrida think is held back in order to allow the text of Sein und Zeit to function? In answering 
this question over the course of this dissertation I will show the relation of the trace to the 
question of presence as well to the withdrawal of Being. 
Posing the question of the epoch(e) of Sein und Zeit is tar from what anyone could 
call a "criticism" of Heidegger,4 but rather records Derrida's attempt to show the rules governing 
any attempt to delimit metaphysics. Derrida thus writes of a "formal rule tor anyone wishing !Q. 
read the texts of the history of metaphysics,• a rule that formalizes the "play of submission and 
subtraction" with regard to the determination of Being as presence (72/62). Such a play, as 
formalized by Derrida, articulates the furrowed margin of the metaphysical text, for which the 
image of an inside governed by presence that is simply enclosed by an opposing outside 
governed by absence is inadequate. All the texts one would wish to label "metaphysical,· Derrida 
claims, and all concepts within these texts, both are and are not governed by presence, that is, 
they are submitted to the system of concepts governed by the desire for simple self-presence 
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but also at the same time subtracted from that very system. Thus, for example, any attempt to 
isolate a concept of time as characteristic of metaphysics in order to delimit the field of 
metaphysics and thereby assure oneself of the purity of one's position beyond metaphysics will 
find itself anticipated by even the most classic of "metaphysical" texts. 5 As Derrida writes in 
·ousia and Gramme": 
... every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for example, both the so-called 'vulgar' 
concept of time ~ the resources that will be borrowed from the system of 
metaphysics in order to criticize that concept. (70 /60) 
If there is no simple escape from metaphysics, what is the relation of "metaphysics" 
to "other-than-metaphysical" thought? As Derrida shows again and again, presence and absence 
are articulated at the margins of philosophy according to various "graphics" (e.g., the 
supplement, the pharmakon, differance. the trace) rather than by a Hegelian logic of opposition. 
The formal rule of submission and subtraction articulated in "Ousia and Gramme" is imaged in 
the "graphic• of the trace, as Derrida shows In his analysis of "The Anaximander Fragment" at the 
conclusion of his essay. Reading "Ousia and Gramme• thus allows one to see how the formal 
rule of the margin governs any attempt to escape from metaphysics by means of thematizing 
the previously unthought determination of Being as presence (72/62), thus limiting any attempt 
to escape metaphysics to a shaking of metaphysical security from "within." Heidegger's 
"destruction• of the sedimented remains of the history of ontology6 must then be able to be read 
as governed by this formal rule. Derrida is thus attempting to show in "Ousia and Gramme• the 
extent to which Sein und Zeit had to operate by means of 
certain propositions or conclusions within which the Heideggerian breakthrough has had 
to constrain itself ... For example, the reading of Aristotle and Hegel during the epoch 
of Sein und Zeit. (72/62) 
These readings are those in which the relation of metaphysics to that which exceeds the 
determination of Being as presence (from which metaphysics lives), is addressed by Heidegger 
in terms not suited to the graphic of the trace, but in terms of Sinn. As we will see in Chapter 
II, Sinn--as it functions in the textual performance of Sein und Zeit-can itself articulate a 
economy marginal to metaphysics, that is, an economy at once disruptive and conforming to the 
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telos of self-identical presence. However, the marginal economy of Sinn disrupts the 
metaphysical answers to the question of Being without being able to inscribe the graphic of the 
trace. We can thus call the holding back that allows Sein ynd Zeit to function an epoche of the 
trace. Since Derrida shows that the trace is inscribed in "The Anaximander Fragment"--in the 
thought of the epochality of Being-we can also say that Sein ynd Zeit is governed by an epoche 
of epochality. Now one should also realize that the elucidation of the formal rule of the 
margin is one of the abiding themes of Margins of Philosophy, from "Tympan" through "Ousia 
and Gramme,• "Form and Meaning," "The Linguistic Circle of Geneva," "The Supplement of 
Copula,· and 'White Mythology."7 The question of the margin appears in all these essays via 
Derrida's analyses of attempts to isolate a single concept or group of concepts--drawn from the 
general fund of metaphysical predicates, the "general text• --by a specific science-such as 
linguistics, "metaphorology, • or indeed, fundamental ontology--in order to "dominate• or 
characterize that general text univocally. Such attempts always result in the structure of the re-
mark, in which there Is always one mark too many or too few missing from the to-be-dominated 
field, such as the "category of category" ("The Supplement of Copula") or the "metaphor of 
metaphor" ('White Mythology"). We can say that such a doubling "haunts" the attempted 
domination of the field. 8 
In this chapter I will work out the analogy between the formal law of the re-mark and 
the formal rule of submission and subtraction necessary for reading the metaphysical text. Doing 
so articulates the economy of time. Thus I will show a move to a prior undecidable (time-space, 
or "differance") analogous to the move to the re-mark as a response to the attempt to isolate a 
concept from its "original" pairing, 9 as Derrida focuses on the textual effects of isolating iime• 
from its quasi-transcendental "origin" in time-space, or "differance. •10 "Ousia and Gramme" can 
thus be read as Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's attempt to dominate the metaphysical text by 
isolating time as the transcendental horizon of Being, and the consequent destruction of the 
history of ontology on the basis of its unthematized determination of Being as presence. 
Derrida's formal rule of "submission and subtraction" with regard to the determination of Being 
as presence reveals how Heidegger's attempt to think a primordial temporality of Dasein 
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preparatory to the isolation of time as the transcendental horizon of Being remains caught in the 
graphic of the margin, that is, is both inside and outside metaphysics. This marginality is 
indicated by the way the supposedly purified description of primordial temporality, which would 
enable Heidegger to delimit the metaphysical time conce;'.lt as one oriented to the falling 
temporality that allows for the encountering of the spatial present-at-hand, is itself "haunted" by 
"spatialized" language. 
Let me pause for a minute to explain what I mean by the term "spatialized 
language.· I do not mean that some terms are essentially or inherently spatial-that is, have a 
spatial sense-but that the discourse that seeks to purify the description of time or temporality 
of space functions by means of terms iterable in discourses on space. Now the possibility of 
such iteration cannot be reduced; thus such terms are haunted. 11 Such haunting betrays the 
repression of one member of the pair "time-space· from which Heidegger must draw the 
conceptual resources for such an attempt. In Chapter 111 show how Heidegger's attempt in Sein 
und Zeit to determine a proper (non-spatial) sense for the terms of the discourse on temporality 
founders on what I call the Slnnsfrage, the economy of which contains an irreducible spatial 
. moment. Chapter Ill will then show how the Sinnsfrage disrupts Heidegger's reading of Aristotle 
in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. One cannot call such haunting a spatial "metaphor,• 
that is, one cannot attempt to understand it as a spatial "image• subsequently coming to invade 
a previously pure temporal flow without becoming enmeshed in the absyssal structure Derrida 
analyzes as "metaphoricity" in "White Mythology." Thus the dissertation shows how Heidegger 
is caught by the formal rule that operates whenever the sign "time" is used, a formal rule that 
makes time the name of the evasion by metaphysics of the thought of the trace, an evasion 
marked by Aristotle's determination of "gramme" in the system of dynamis and energeia-as 
gramme in act. 
The Contexts of ·ousia and Gramme• 
The rest of this chapter will take the form of a commentary on "Ousia and Gramme.• 
Let us first consider the French title: "Ousia et Gramme.• We can begin our reading by 
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considering the title as a rejoinder to Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. We thus have two pairs of 
words, Sein and ousia, plus Zeit and gramme, as well as a pair of conjunctions, und and et. The 
first pair is not a perfect match. Ousia, which Heidegger tells us •ontologically-temporally sig-
nifies [bedeutet] Anwesenhelt," was a determination of the Sinn van Sein. 12 Heidegger further tells 
us that this determination is the •outer document• for the fact that the Greek understanding of 
Being was gained from "Zeit."13 As I will show in Chapter II, Heidegger places Zeit in quotation 
marks to mark its derivation from ·original time,• the Zeitllchkeit of Dasein. The pairing of the 
words Zeit and gramme suggests that the relation of what goes by the name of ''time" to a 
certain determination of gramme will be the focus of "Ousia et Gramme.· Derrida will name 
•gramme" that which Is elided in the determination of gramme that constitutes the metaphysical 
concept of 9time. • Alan Bass, the English translator of "Ousia et Gramme,• explains the relation 
of the Greek "gramme" to Derrida's French neologism "gramme": 
It should be noted, however, that there is a difference between the Greek gramme and the 
French gramme. Thus, for example, the title of this essay is "Ousia and Gramme,· roughly, 
"presence and line,· while the last two subtitles are "Gramme and Number" and "The 
Closure of the Gramme and the Trace of Differance." Derrida uses "gramme." which of 
course "derives" from gramme Qine, trace), and reminds us of gramma Qetter), as a 
neologism related to the concept of differance, as is evident in the last subtitle, which 
makes this relationship specific. Like differance it is best left untranslated. (Margins, 
English translation, p. 34) 
Thus gramme and differance, and hence 9the possibility of th~ trace in general" (69/60), are 
occluded by the determination of gramme that allows for 9time" to determine the Sinn von Sein 
in the system of metaphysics. Thus "Ousia and Gramme,• so close to the title, says "Being and 
that which allows time to determine Being; or in other words, "Being and Trace."14 
The complexity of the essay is further revealed when we note that "Ousia and 
Gramme,• which poses the question of an epoch at the beginning of Heidegger's career, has for 
an epigraph an excerpt from "Zeit und Sein," 15 a work that appeared close to the end of Heideg-
ger's publishing career, bringing it around full circle, as It were, from the epoch of Sein und Zeit. 
The excerpt, quoted in German by Derrida, reads: 
Am bedrangendsten zeigt sich uns das Weitreichende des Anwesens dann, wenn wir 
bedenken. dass auch and gerade das Abwesen durch ein bisweilen ins Unheimliche 
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gesteigertes Anwesen bestimmt bleibt. 16 
This sentence, bearing on the determination of absencing by presencing, occurs 
in the context of Heidegger's discussion of the destiny of Being as logocentrism, that ls, our 
being bound to a determination (Pragung. stamping) of Being as Anwesen. from "the beginning 
of the unconcealment of Being as something that can be said, that is, can be thought. "17 Such 
a determination of Being as Anwesen, initiated by the Greeks, holds as well for modern 
technology, in the way in which entities come to presence for us in the sense of calculable 
property (das Sein als Anwesen im Sinne des berechenbaren Bestandes). We needn't think back 
to the Greeks to apprehend (vemehmen) Anwesen, however, because we can see it in any 
simple, sufficiently unprejudiced reflection on presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. However, 
to pick up the point of the epigraph, Anwesen shows itself most oppressively when it determines 
even Abwesen. In this context Heidegger goes on to develop the motif of Seinsgeschichte as he 
gives a list of the ways in which Anwesen has shown itself in the abundance of its metaphysical 
transformations (WandlungsfOlle). However, the Geschichte of Being is not history in the way 
cities and people have history, but Is determined by the way Being is given Cwle Es Sein gibt), 
which Is a fateful sending, a destiny, Geschick. 
Thus the context of the epigraph outlines virtually the whole of Heidegger's 
itinerary, 16 from the attempt to apprehend Anwesen on the basis of a reflection on Vorhand-
enheit and Zuhandenheit-a transformation of the Marburg period project to thematize time as 
the transcendental horizon, or sense. of Being--through the examination of the Greek beginning 
of metaphyics from the perspective of the Seinsgeschichte--to the last attempt at a topology of 
Being in terms of Ereignls/Enteignis that would situate the Geschichte of Being in a sending that 
withdraws, an entziehende Schickung. The epigraph itself, which opens Derrida's essay 
examining the first period, names the pivot between these last two periods, the questioning of 
the determining of absenclng by presencing that enables us to think the non-present/non-absent 
"source" that regulates such determination, or in Heidegger's terms, that which grants Anwesen 
such binding power. 19 
Thus "Ousia and Gramme• opens by questioning the last period of Heidegger's 
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thought, and, as we will see, concludes by questioning his first period by way of his second. We 
can clearly see that ·ousia and Gramme• deals with the first period of Heidegger's thought by 
way of the entirety of his thought by following the path of Derrida's notes, the first of which 
(34/31) deals with the early Kant an;i the Problem of Metaphysics, the second of which (35/33) 
opens the question of the history of the Heideggerian text by considering the "privileged" 
example of the middle-period "Anaximander Fragment: and the fourth of which (37 /34) refers 
us, by way of a mention of the "problem of the written trace• to Derrida's essay "The Ends of 
Man." In this essay we find, instead of an explicit discussion of the written trace, the issue of 
Oasein's self-proximity being examined in terms of supplement {148/124) and metaphoricity 
(156-58/130-32). At this point In "The Ends of Man: in the course of a discussion of the 
Heideggerian thought of the presence of the present in terms of metaphoricity, Derrida refers us 
by way of a note (158 n.19/131 n.35) to the play of the proper (eigentliche) four-dimensional 
time/space in "Zeit und Sein,• which Heidegger names as a reaching that holds the dimensions 
of time apart in their "nearness• CNahheit).20 Derrida then asks us in the text of "The Ends of 
Man• to regard Heidegger's thinking of "le proche et le propre"21 according to the opening of 
espacement. which "belongs neither to time nor to space, and which dislocates, while producing 
it, any presence of the present• (159-60 / 132-33).22 
Where are we at the end of this labyrinth of notes on notes? What indeed is the 
"hidden passageway" (passage dissimylft) opening the problem of presence, that is, metaphysics, 
to the problem of the written trace? What connects the trace to metaphor, and metaphor to the 
opening of space and time, and thus metaphor to the problem of presence? That is, finally, what 
connects metaphor to metaphysics? Is it Indeed a "passageway" in the sense of a tunnel we are 
dealing with here, or rather the passage around the perimeter of a circle connecting all these? 
I continue my reading of "Ousia and Gram me,· then, at the point where Derrida asks 
us to take up the chain of interdependent concepts (ousia. oarousia. Anwesenheit. Gegenwart. 
gegenwartigen. Vorhandenheit) as they are "deposited" at the beginning of Sein und Zeit and 
then taken up again at the point of interruption of the text in Heidegger's note on the "vulgar 
concept of time.• This note offers itself to several readings, Derrida continues, but he wishes to 
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restrict himself to extending it a bit according to two motifs. The first is the "highly determined 
form" of the question in Sein ynd Zeit about the determination of the sense of Being by 
ontotheology as presence. The key here for understanding Derrida is to emphasize the two types 
of "determination• in his sentence: "To read in it, such as it is announced in r.ighly determined 
form, the Heideggerian question about presence as the ontotheological determination of the 
sense of Being• (35-36/34-35). We should note that the question of Being in Sein ynd Zeit is 
itself determined-by its epocM of the epochality of Being. Such an epocM enables the question 
of Being to focus on the determining of Being as presence In the history of Being. For Heidegger 
in Sein ynd Zeit the question of Being Is asked In terms of Sinn. However, if the question of 
Being is to become the question of the Selnsgeschichte. that is, if it is to ask what grants Being 
in sending and withdrawal, then this question can only be posed in terms of the trace, not In 
terms of Sinn. Thus ·ousia and Gramme• says that the delimitation of metaphysics produced by 
thematizlng the previously unthought determination of the sense of Being as Anwesen-
heitfYorhandenheit remains subject to the formal rule, that is, remains within metaphysics, even 
though it subjects metaphysics to a powerful shaking. That Vorhandenheit is itself put into 
question by Heidegger's analyses of Zyhandenheit In Sein und Zeit, as John Sallis correctly 
points out,23 is not Derrida's point. Derrida need not deny the transgressive opening of the 
analyses of wortdhood and significance in order to focus on the form of the question about the 
sense of Being, and point out the economy of such a delimitation in what he calls the "formal 
rule." All this will be spelled out in more detail in Chapter II. 
Heidegger does indeed transgress metaphysics in his question about the 
determination of Being as presence, Derrida claims, but asking about such determination in 
terms of the sense of Being articulates an economy that contains an irreducibly metaphysical 
moment. As we have noted before in anticipating Chapter II, the text of Sein und Zeit establishes 
a economy marginal to metaphysics for the mark Sinn, an economy both disruptive and 
conforming, and hence not to be condemned prima facie. To modify slightly Derrida's position, 
we can say that metaphysics is transgressed in a more forceful way when Heidegger's texts 
Inscribe the trace as the form of a meditation on the bending back upon the limit of metaphys-
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ics to examine the epocM of Being, than when the transgression takes the form of a question 
of the Sinn von Sein. The inscription of the trace as the margin of metaphysics allows us to 
think that which hides itself in the movement of its presentation, that is, that which allows itself 
to be determined as presence while exceeding such determination (36/34). Such a thought of 
presence as sent, as determined by a movement beyond presence, would transgress meta-
physics, for metaphysics could never thematlze what serves it as the very element of evidence 
in determining even the (absent) past and future as past and future presents, as the passage 
used as the epigraph mentioned above suggests. This first motif according to which Derrida 
reads Heidegger thus sets as its task the situating-by the notion of epochality-the delimiting of 
metaphysics. That is, it seeks to determine how Heidegger's first attempt to delimit metaphysics 
by means of the working out of the sense of Being as T emporalitat-which reveals the previously 
unthematized determination of Being as presence--implies the movement of epochality. That such 
movement was hidden from Heidegger in Sein und Zeit is the meaning of Derrida's phrase 
•epoch of Sein und Zeit." 
Derrida's second motif considers the question of the written trace, the gramme, as 
It leads us to a center and a margin of Aristotle's text.. Derrida is not certain that the concepts 
involved in a thought of the gramme are dominated by the concepts Heidegger fixes as decisive 
in Sein und Zeit's note on Aristotle (37-38/34-35). My task in this chapter is to show how these 
two motifs-the epoche of epochality and the trace--are related. 
Derrida next calls attention to the context of the note in the last chapter of Sein und 
Zeit, entitled: "Temporality and within-time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Concept of 
Time.• The note asks whether Hegel's affirmation of a fall of history into time indicates, by way 
of the displacement of Hegel by fundamental ontology, that Hegel's formulation remains (merely) 
the most radical formulation of the vulgar concept of time. Derrida notes that for Heidegger this 
is not a criticism, but a sharpening of differences between fundamental and classical ontology 
(38-39/35-36). 
Derrida reproduces the note in toto, then remarks that the note's calling attention 
to the "extraordinary right" of the present: to the impossibility of thinking outside the present as 
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self-evidence, amounts to a shaking of the metaphysical closure by thinking the link between 
truth and presence. 24 This shaking must not be considered a positing of absence as another 
center from which to think, for such a positing would be a movement subject to incorporation 
by dialectic::-1 negativity in a movement which would negate the first center in yielding another, 
higher, truth. The situating of truth-the tying of it to a determined philosophical, and in fact, 
vulgar, concept of time--is a thought that •henceforth may no longer need to be either~ or 
gresent, and for which the meaning and value of truth are put into question in a way impos-
sible for any intraphilosophical moment, especially for skepticism and everything that is 
systematic with it• (42/38). 
After this first sketch of the relation between metaphysics and a thought that would 
shake metaphysics as proposed in Sein und Zeit, Derrida moves on in the section entitled '1"he 
Exoteric" to ask about the contact between the concept of vulgarity and Aristotle's aporetic treat-
ment of time. Specifically, the question concerns the connection of vulgarity with the 
"exotericness• of Aristotle's.l.Q.gQ§ (43/39).25 Aristotle's aporetic is the question about the being 
and non-being of time according to an exoteric .!QgQ3. That is, Aristotle will deal with what 
appears to common sense, what appears as self-evident. We have just seen above that the 
privilege of the present is self-evidence itself. Thus our question becomes: What connects 
Aristotle's aporia to presence? 
Aristotle's Aporetic and Its History 
In its most formal terms, Aristotle's aporetic states that time Is what is not: time must 
appear as the now, yet the now appears as •no longer" and ·not yet.· As such, as containing ".YD 
certain ne-ant,• time cannot participate in presence, substance, "etantite" itself (Qyfilg) 
(43/39-40). To reach this conclusion, the aporetic has two phases: in the first, time is divisible 
into parts, yet no now ( = part) is in the present; while in the second, the now is not a part, so 
time is not composed of nows. The now is thus seen as the atemporal kernel of time, its form. In 
order to be, the now must remain present: ousia, presence, Is what is. So far Derrida's reading 
of Aristotle conforms to what one would suspect Heidegger would think. 26 
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In the next section, however, entitled "The Paraphrase,· Derrida begins to develop 
his thought of the formal rule we mentioned above, the rule whose formulation depends on a 
recognition of the margin furrowing all ("metaphysical•) texts. Derrida shows the way in which 
Hegel's repetition of Aristotle in the Encyclopedia27 net only cannot be seen under the rhetorical 
schema of the "paraphrase,• as Heidegger would have it, but also includes Hegel's own critique 
of intratemporality, a critique that is in a way •analogous· to Heidegger's critique in Sein und 
Zeit.28 This Hegelian critique must be seen in terms of metaphoricity,29 so Hegel's texts on time-
-as including both a repetition of Aristotle and a critique of intratemporality--seem furrowed by 
the margin of metaphysics, seem to be at once inside and outside metaphysics. 
Derrida's characterization of Hegel's text proceeds as follows: Hegel's repetition of 
Aristotle occurs in the section on "Mechanics" where space and time are categories of the Idea 
as immediately, that Is, abstractly and indeterminately, outside itself. In Hegel's text space is pure 
exterlority which must be determined by a self-negation in the point. The point negates and 
retains itself In lifting itself into the line, and the line in turn becomes the plane. This process is 
circular; we could start with concretely determined space and proceed inversely to indifferent 
abstraction. What of time in this account? Derrida reminds us that time has already appeared, 
in that space Is a process of self-negation: time is required in the Aufhebung as the work of 
space spacing itself; in Derrida's words, "le temps est espacement" (47 /43). 30 We will see the 
significance of this dialectic of time and space when Derrida examines the •dialectic of the 
gramme" that enables Aristotle's text to function while never resolving its central aporia. 
We next move to the section of "Ousia and Gramme" entitled -What the Question 
Evades.• Here Derrida will show that what Heidegger considers the Kantian breakthrough--a 
breaking with the Aristotelian tradition via a thinking of time as the condition of possibility of 
experience--ls possible only by means of a development of Aristotle, who both •establishes" and 
"critiques" metaphysical security in anticipating the concept of the nonsensuous sensuous 
(55-56/48-49). Derrida here refers to Physics 219a 3-4: hama gar kineseOs aisthanometha kai 
chronou. Such an Aristotelian anticipation of Kant is enough for Derrida to establish the 
"marginality" of Aristotle's text. 
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Derrida will also claim here that Heidegger's shaking of metaphysics by an appeal 
to the sense of Being is also implicated in metaphysical conceptuality due to the irreducible 
binding of sens, sense, to presence (58/51).31 As I have already made clear, Derrida does not 
here take into account the marginal economy instigated by Sinn in Sein und Zeit, an economy 
that exceeds metaphysics in one of its moments without, however, inscribing the graphic of the 
trace. Most importantly for his purposes, Derrida is on his way to showing that the texts of 
Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel are all furrowed by the margin of metaphysics-a marginality that the 
note under examination in Sein und Zeit does not thematize. The marginality of Aristotle and 
Hegel escapes the note, Derrida claims, because it does not see the "problem of the written 
trace" and its relation to the circle and the line. 
In explicating this claim for the importance of the written trace in thematizing the 
marginality of metaphysics, Derrida's question here is this: In demonstrating that the now is not 
a part of time, that is, in overturning the first hypothesis of the aporia, does Aristotle extract time 
from the "spatial" concepts of part and whole (52/46-47)? We must recall that Aristotle never 
settles the aporia: unlike the treatise on place, which precedes the discussion of time in Physics 
IV, he does not offer here a critical, non-exoteric level of discussion, but moves on past the 
aporia of the being of time to consider the~ of time, whose belonging to being remains 
undecided.32 
Now, explicating Sein und Zelt, Derrida emphasizes that metaphysics is posited precisely 
by this evasion of the question of the Being of time, or rather, by asking the question in terms 
of the belonging of time to Being already determined as~. presence, Vorhandenhelt. 33 Thus 
Aristotle's treatise contains an unexamined determination of the now as a (present) entity. In 
other words, It evades the question: How is Being already determined in investigating (the Being 
of) time? Sein und Zelt brings to light, Derrida points out, this omission by posing the question 
of the transcendental horizon for Being, that is, time as the transcendental horizon for any 
possible understanding of Being. In this way, Derrida notes, Sein und Zeit is thus a decisive step 
"au-dela ou en deca" metaphysics. 34 The relation of "on that side" to "on this side" is precisely 
what is articulated in the "formal rule: 
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Metaphysics as the effect of this evasion is seen not only in the determination of time as 
nothingness or accident prior to Kant, Derrida continues, but also in what is "least metaphysical" 
in Kant, the notion of time as the pure form of inner sensiblity (53/48). For Kant, it is because 
time is not a being that it must be made into a pure form of sensibility: this move belongs to 
metaphysics in that it was made possible by the evaded question that predetermined Being as 
presence and thus enabled Kant to conclude that time was not a being. Thus Aristotle can be 
seen as having prepared the Kantian break with metaphysics that Heidegger lauds in Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics, but that he denies to Aristotle and Hegel in the epoch of Sein und 
Zelt (54/48). 
What is the link of Aristotle to Kant? For Derrida, time as the form of inner sense 
still seems "rigorously prescribed" in the famous Aristotelian phrase of 2198: hama gar kineseos 
aisthanometha !<al chronou. Derrida reads Aristotle as saying here that time and movement are 
united in aisthesis, a sensibility that functions even in the dark, when the only movement is in the 
soul. 35 Thus time is the form of movement, even that movement that can occur only in the soul, 
thereby preceeding any objectivity; that is, time is the form of all phenomena in general, a 
formulation identical to Kant's (54-56/48-49).36 Derrida concludes: 
What Aristotle has set down, then, is both traditional metaphysical security, and, in its 
inaugural ambiguity, the critique of this security. In anticipating the concept of the 
nonsensuous sensuous, Aristotle furnishes the premises of a thought of time no longer 
dominated simply by the present ... (56/49) 
The question of ·ousia and Gramme,• then, is whether Sein und Zeit has arrested these 
possibilities of an inaugural break by means of its reading of Aristotle, that is, in its epocM of the 
trace, which forces it, because of Its use of the concept of "time: to repress the other member 
of the undecidable pair time/space, a pair whose articulation can only be thought in the graphic 
of differance. 
Thus we seem to have arrived at a paradox: that Kant's breakthrough transgresses 
vulgar time only by making explicit the possibility of a break hinted at in Aristotle's very 
establishing of the possiblity of the vulgar concept of time. Thus the formal rule is first sketched 
by Derrida in claiming that •at a certain point, then, the destruction of metaphysics remains within 
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metaphysics, only making explicit its principles• (54/48). 
Derrida next shows that the breakthrough of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, as it is 
retrieved in the question of the sense of Being, is also subject to the "formal rule.· As Derrida 
puts it: "Making explicit the ~vaded guestion always and necessarily keeps to the system of 
what is evaded" (57 /50). This necessity follows from the fact that time is thought on the basis 
of the present as nontlme, as not yet or no longer, that is, on the basis of the silent predeter-
mination of the question of the Being of time in terms of ousia and Vorhandenheit. 
Now as we will see in Chapter II, "sense"-in terms of which Heidegger poses the 
Being question in Sein und Zeit--is bound to an economy marginal to presence. Derrida spells 
out the consequence of this bond in a note part of which runs as follows: 
And if time has a meaning (sens) in general, it is difficult to see how it could be extracted 
from onto-theo-logy .... It Is not any given determination of the meaning (sens) of time that 
belongs to onto-theo-teleology, but it is the anticipation of its meaning (sens). Time already 
has been suppressed at the moment one asks the question of its meaning, when one 
relates it to appearing, truth, presence, or essence in general. (60n/ 52n)37 
Thus if the question of sense in general must be posed within the closure of metaphysics, then 
the economy of the question of the sense of Being would retain a moment that remained within 
such a closure, no matter the "force, necessity and value (irruptive as well as fundamental) of 
such a question" (58-59/51-52). 
The formal rule, which in its narrow sense concerns the thought of Being as 
presence, articulates the marginality of all metaphysical texts, which Derrida demonstrates here 
in the case of Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel does not interrupt Aristotle in that "the concept as 
absolute subjectivity itself thinks itself, is for itself and near itself, has no exterior, and it 
assembles, erasing them, its time and its difference in self-presence· (59-60/52). On the other 
hand, we are drawn to the definition of time at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit: time is 
what erases (!!!gt) time. However, this erasure Is a writing that maintains time, enables It to be 
read while erasing it: thus Hegel ends with time as the Inscription of a circle, infinitely 
self-reflective, and as Derrida reminds us, the circle is also the Aristotelian model tor thinking time 
and the gramme (Physics IV 223b) (60n./52n.). From this we can conclude that Hegel is both . 
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"inside" and "outside" metaphysics: he thinks absolute spirit as self-presence, but thinks time in 
terms of self-erasing writing. 
We now move to the section of ·ousia and Gramme" entitled "The Pivot of 
Essence.• Here Derrida calls attention to the fact that the aporetic form of the question of the 
~ of time is never questioned by Aristotle. What Is this form? How do number and gramme 
intervene dialectically here? We recall that the formal structure of Aristotle's time aporla depends 
on defining time as composed of parts (the now), then realizing that the now is not a part of time 
because the unity and identity of the now in relation to time do not accord with the relation 
part/whole. 
What is the dialectic of the gramme that resolves the aporia? Time is affirmed by 
Aristotle as the line, the solution of the contradiction of the point, which is a nonspatial 
spatiality. Yet time is not the line, for the nows are not points, since they destroy each other in 
a way that points do not. These contradictions are taken up and affirmed together as the~ 
of time. However, the dialectic of the gramme is governed by the potentiality/act distinction, 
which itself is governed by a teleology of presence, that Is, the determination of energeia as 
ousia (62/54). 
Let us follow the way Derrida develops the dialectic of the gramme. At first it seems, 
he claims, that Aristotle rejects representing time by the gramme, but this is only the gramme 
in the sense of a linear inscription in space; he will later accept time as gramme in the sense of 
the circle in act. At first, then, time is different than space, for time is successive, not co-
existent: the nows destroy each other as points do not, so that noncoexlstence is the essence 
of the now as presence. However, the now must be the same in its essence as the other now 
it destroys, so that time is an "Impossible possiblity" (63/55), the synthesis of identity and 
difference in the same.36 On this first level space is also different from time, in that space is the 
space of possible coexistence. However, this simultaneity can only appear in a synthetic relating 
of two points, that is, the temporal synthesis shown above in Derrida's discussion of Hegel 
(63-64/55). Thus space implies time, which in turn implies the possibility of space: in order to 
relate points to themselves in dialectical self-negation, the nows--as now-must be simultaneous, 
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that is, must coexist, which is the definition of space. 
So we must conclude that space and time must be thought together, which Derrida 
remarks is what Hegel and Heidegger remind us (64/55). I point out here, anticipating Chapter 
11, that Heidegger does not speak of the necessity of a concept of space/time in Sein und Zeit, 
where there is precisely an attempt to ground spatiality in the temporality of Dasein, but only later 
in "Zeit und Sein.· Derrida here makes the regression to the quasi-transcendental "time/space• 
by showing how Aristotle gives the difference between space and time as already constituted; 
the articulation of this difference, the l:!9.!:!:lii, would then reveal an undecidable that Derrida calls 
"differance" or timespace. As the articulation of same and other in the "difference" of time and 
space, "Being-together" as "the very production of Being,· the hama would reveal "the common 
origin of time and space" (64-5/56).39 In other words, the determination of Being (in Aristotle's 
case, ousia) as presence depends upon a mode of time, the present, but time itself is 
undecidably articulated with space: thus~ is "produced" by time/space. Here the demand 
is made for us to think differance as that which, In exceeding it, allows for the determination of 
Being as presence. 
Differance 
How are we to clarify this most difficult point? A brief detour to the "Differance" 
essay, following the lead of Rodolphe Gasche's analysis in The Tain of the Mirror. can help here. 
In trying to explain the neologism "differance, • which Is "neither a word or a concept" Derrida 
shows its construction from the Latin differre by way of the French differer (8/7). In so doing he 
shows how one meaning is that of delaying or deferring, which he names "temporization" 
(temporisation). Differance as temporization names the constitution of the present on the basis 
of a relation to an "absolute" past and future: 
It is because of differance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-
called "present" element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to 
something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and 
already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace 
being related no less to what Is called the future than to what Is called the past, and 
constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what 
it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present. (13/13). 
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In discussing the constitution of any present element, such as the "now,· Derrida brings to bear 
the graphic of the trace, which bears a certain resemblence to the Hegelian logic of self and 
othor.40 The relation to a "radical" or "absolute" alterity is necessary for the constitution of a self-
identity, even of that self-identity, the present, in which all other identities would be registered in 
a classically determined subjectivity. This alterity constitutive of identity, when considered in the 
context of the constitution of "time• as thought on the basis of the present, is the becoming-
time of space. How so? According to the graphic of the trace, "space,· the exterior, the other of 
time, "becomes,• that is, constitutes, "time.· This becoming-time of space is also a becoming-
space of time, writes Derrida, an equation to which we now turn. 
Derrida links the moment of delay, temporization, of differance to the moment of 
active differing with an astonishing sentence: 
In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called 
spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (temporization). And 
it is this constitution of the present, as an "originary" and irreducibly nonsimple (and 
therefore, stricto sensy nonoriglnary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and 
protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and 
transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to 
call archl-writing, archi-trace, or differance. Which (is} (simultaneously} spacing (and} 
temporization. (13-14/13) 
Spacing is, in the language of Of Grammatology "the opening of the first exteriority in general. .41 
Spacing, espacement, is the becomlng..:space of time in which the present, the pure interior ls 
opened out by the alterity that constitutes it in its self-identity. Spacing is then the interval within 
the present that allows it to bend back upon itself in auto-affection as well as the opening to the 
"outside.• 
Differance, then, includes within its scope two becomings, the becoming-space of 
time and the becoming-time of space. Temporization and spacing make possible "time· thought 
on the basis of the present--but they also make this "time" impossible by producing presence as 
the effect of an absolutely other pas~ and future. Now if time is always already becoming space, 
and space always already becoming time, this Implies that any attempt to isolate one member 
of the undecidable pair "time/space" will find itself becoming its "opposite: That Is, to take the 
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instance most relevant for us, any attempt to isolate, or describe in purely temporal terms, "time· 
will find itself becoming "space,• that is, will find its description haunted by "spatial" terms.42 
We can see Derrida working out an example of this haunting most clearly in Speech 
and Phenomena. He writes concerning Hussert's descriptions in The Phenomenology of Internal 
Time-Consciousness that "there is a duration to the blink [the AygenblickJ, and it closes the 
eye. -43 Here Derrida demonstrates that Husserl's descriptions of temporal constitution betray that 
the moment of self-presence is invaded by alterity. Here the conceptual series time:pre-
sence:identity-space:absence:difference is worked out by Derrida as it functions in Husserl's 
text. Now we must not think of the invasion of time by space as temporally subsequent, as an 
unhappy accident befalling an previously pure essence, especially when at issue is the very 
constitution of time. The •outside,• "space,· has always already invaded the "inside," "time: 
constituting it from within. Derrida writes: 
Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, the openness 
upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not •one's own,• etc., .!tl§ 
temporalization of sense Is. from the outset. a "soaclng. • As soon as we admit spacing 
both as "interval" or difference and as openness upon the outside, there can no longer be 
any absolute inside, for the "outside" has insinuated itself into the movement by which the 
inside of the nonspatial, which is called "time," appears, is constituted, is "presented.• 
Space is "in" time; it is time's pure leaving-itself; it is the "outside-itself' as the self-relation 
of time.44 
Here we see that spacing makes possible the temporalization of sense. That Is, if the supposedly 
pure stratum of interior monologue is invaded by time, this temporalizing cannot be ac-
complished by a "time" that would be a pure time without any spatial reference. 45 If the 
temporalizing of sense is only possible because space is always already within time, then "time• 
as thought on the basis of the present as pure self-identity must be rethought: 
But what we are calling time must be given a different name-for "time" has always 
designated a movement conceived in terms of the present, and can mean nothing else. 
Is not the concept of pure solitude-of the monad in the phenomenological sense-
undermined by its own origin, by the very condition of its self-presence, that is, by "time," 
to be conceived anew on the basis now of difference within auto-affection. on the basis 
of identifying identity and nonidentity within the "sameness" of the Im selben Augenblick?46 
How are we then to think the relation of differance and the "time" thought on the basis of the 
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present? Derrida, in keeping with the graphic of supplementarity that structures texts that attempt 
to determine origins, names the final chapter of Speech and Phenomena "The Supplement of 
Origin.• Of perhaps more interest to this dissertation, however, is his naming of time a 
•metaphor.· In discussing Husserl's descriptions of the pure movement of temporal const!+ution, 
about which Husserl claims that "for all this names fail us, •47 Derrida points out that Husserl 
nonetheless names It "flux,• thus taking up a name from the level of experience that the temporal 
synthesis makes possible. This transfer of a name is a ·metaphor,· writes Derrida, but this must 
be understood in terms of his notion of metaphoricity as analyzed in 'White Mythology.• Derrida 
writes: 
We speak metaphorically as soon as we introduce a determinate being into the description 
of this "movement"; we talk about "movement• in the very terms that movement makes 
possible. But we have been always already adrift In antic metaphor; temporallzation here 
is the root of a metaphor that can only be primordial. 48 
The transfer of this name, "flux,· from conditioned to condition, cannot be the same as the 
transfer of names from one thing to another, the traditional definition of metaphor, but must be 
seen as a "primordial metaphor.• We cannot understand the oxymoronic phrase, "primordial 
metaphor; except in terms of Oerridean metaphorlcity. Recognizing something like metaphor-
icity is no doubt why Heidegger will write about Zeitlichkeit that it is not a being, that it "is" not, 
but that Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt. 49 
Derrida continues on the issue of the metaphoricity of iime": 
The word "time" itself, as it has always been understood in the history of metaphysics, is 
a metaphor which at the same time both Indicates and dissimulates the "movemenr of this 
auto-affection. All the concepts of metaphysics-in particular those of activity and passivity, 
will and nonwill, and therefore those of affection or auto-affection, purity and impurity, etc.-
·cover up the strange "movement" of this difference.50 
"Time" thus names, via metaphoricity, differance, which in turn names "under erasure" the 
undecidable pair time/space. For a gloss on this sentence, risking an explanation of the obscure 
by the more obscure, I refer to the section in Of Grammatology entitled "The Hinge": "Origin of 
the experience of space and time, this writing of difference, this fabric of the trace, . permits the 
difference between space and time to be artlculated ... ..s1 The "fabric of the trace,· that is, 
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.Qjfferance, can permit the articulation of the difference between space and time because it says 
the undecidable pair time/space. 
Let us recall that besides time/space, differance also names the play of differences 
within which the general text is structured: 
The same, precisely, Is differance (with an -9) as the displaced and equivocal passage of 
one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other. Thus one could 
reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our 
discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that 
each of the terms must appear as the differance of the other, as the other different and 
deterred. (18/17) 
Thus differance, which names the "possibility of conceptuality" ( 11/11) as the systematicity of the 
general text52 -the relation of any pair to each other and all other pairs-also names the relation 
of one particular pair of concepts. For Instance, the relation of time to space and space to time, 
which as we have seen, Derrida calls alternatively "spacing" or "temporization: As irreducibly 
linked in this primordially undecidable pair, any attempt to isolate one side from the other will 
result In a haunting, In which the language used in the allegedly purified description will betray 
the repression of the other member of the pair, just as any attempt to isolate a concept from the 
general text will be haunted by a re-mark. Thus the haunting of time by space is formally similar 
to the way a re-mark, such as "metaphor of metaphor,· comes to haunt any attempt to isolate 
a single concept from the general text.53 In this way we see the place "Ousia and Gramme" holds 
in the investigations into the margins of philosophy in the book of the same name. "Ousia and 
Gramme,• like the other essays in Margins, investigates the textual effects of the attempt to 
isolate concepts, either from their (repressed) partner, or from the general text as a wlio!e. As 
Derrida says in "Signature Eyent Context, ..s4 all conceptual oppositions are hierarchies, so any 
attempt at isolation involves repression of the other member of the pair, a repression that results 
in a haunting. 
"Time" and the Gramme 
Let us now move on to the penultimate section of "Ousia and Gramme,· "Gramme 
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and Number.· Derrida claims here that the aporia prevents Aristotle from identifying time with 
the gramme as mathematical movement along a line, the "cinematographic concept of time" 
denounced by Bergson (66/57). Although Aristotle rejects the gramme as series of points, as 
a composition of part!" each of which would be a limit, the distinction between potency and act 
comes in here: the point as limit is only potential; it takes its existence only from the line in act, 
so one can preserve the analogy of time/line on the basis of the line in act, that is, thought on 
the basis of its extremities (ta eskhata) present to themselves. Thus fully completed, the line, in 
act, is the circle, the finite movement of the circle repeating itself indefinitely. Derrida concludes 
that the gramme Is "comprehended" by metaphysics between the point and the circle, between 
potency and act, so that any critique of the spatialization of time must operate in terms of the 
gramme thought in terms of presence. That is, one comes to criticize a "spatialized" time in terms 
of ''time" thought on the basis of presence-on the basis of the epoche of the trace. "Time" must 
be rethought as differance-as time/space--Derrida tells us, so that one cannot give a "critique· 
of a description of time that uses spatial terms, as if this were a contigent failure of a specific 
author that might be subsequently improved upon in giving a purified description of a pure time. 
Instead, one must instead see this spatializing as a "haunting" necessitated by the very attempt 
at a pure description of time. 
Thus Derrida charges that metaphysics can only think the gramme, which he now 
links with the "possibility of trace in general," in terms of presence, that is, in a way that cannot 
inscribe its peculiar graphic (69/60). This inability of metaphysics to think the trace in general 
other than in terms of presence is one of Derrida's recurrent topics. Here in "Ousia and Gramme" 
this necessarily limited comprehension of the gramme will mark the limits of the epoch of Sein 
und Zeit. 
We begin to see this use of the thought of the gramme as trace, when we read that 
for Derrida "time" becomes the name of these limits, potency and act, within which the gramme 
is comprehended. That is, time can only be thought on the basis of Being as presence since the 
question of the Being of time is posed by the evaded question, which presupposes ousia as 
presence, Vorhandenheit. Thus differance, "that which is related to time, but is not time" is indeed 
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to be thought beyond the determination of Being as presence, but cannot still be called time 
(69/60).55 Derrida is thus claiming that Heidegger's attempt to describe a primordial temporality 
in Sein und Zeit is caught by the formal rule that operates whenever the sign "time" is used, a 
formal rule that makes time the name of the evasion by metaphrics of the thought of the trace, 
an evasion marked by the determination of •gramme• in the system of dynamis and enerqeia. 
Such an evasion returns as the haunting of any attempt to purify a temporal description of all 
spatial elements, as Derrida shows Is the case with Aristotle's hama. In Chapter II of this 
dissertation I will show how Heidegger's description of Dasein's primordial temporality, which 
Heidegger calls "original time,• is similar1y haunted by spatiality. 
Because of the necessity of thinking time according to presence, Derrida contends, 
to criticize any one of the concepts of metaphysics is to go around in circles, reconstituting the 
same system. This circle will then, a priori, envelop any delimitation one thinks applicable to a 
"past" text. As Derrida puts It: "More simply, every text of metaphysics carries within itself, for 
example, ..bQ!b the so-called 'vulgar' concept of time .snQ the resources that will be borrowed 
from the system of metaphysics In order to criticize that concept" (70 /61 ). Thus Derrida claims 
that Aristotle can be read as confirming Heidegger's delimitation, for he does think Being as 
presence depending on the now as point, yet one could also read Aristotle in a way that would 
repeat both this limitation and its opposite (what opposes the now as point-the gramme), and 
make it appear that the de-limitation (Heidegger) is still governed by the same concepts as the . 
limitation (Aristotle) (70/61 ). 
Derrida makes these claims by reading two Aristotelian texts of the time discussion, 
220a and 222a. In his reading of 220a, Derrida shows that the now is a constitutive part of time 
and a number foreign to time as well as the fact that the now is a constitutive part of time and 
an accidental part of time (as limit) (71 /61 ). The difference that here allows such contradictory 
determinations is the difference between act and potency. In his reading of Physics IV, 222a, 
which is organized by the definition of kinesis as M tau dynatou. hei dynaton. entelecheia at 
Physics Ill, 201 b 4, Derrida shows that time, as number of movement, is potential; Being in act, 
entelecheia, is not time but eternal presence. On the other hand, though, time is not non-Be-
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ing, and non-Beings are not in time, for potentialities are in movement toward act. Thus 
movement and time are neither (present) beings nor (absent) non-beings (72/62). 
With this conclusion Derrida is ready to formulate his "formal rule." The non-pre-
sence /non-absence of movement and time implies that the desire for presence (dynamis as 
movement toward energeia) and time (which is thought according to this movement) in 
Aristotle's text are ·submitted and subtractecr (72/62). Submitted and subtracted with regard 
to what? Derrida must mean with regard to the determination of Being as presence. He says 
movement and time, which are neither present nor absent, belong "as much to• the de-limitation 
of metaphysics (Heidegger's gesture in Sein ynd Zeit. which operates by the thought of the 
present, of the presence of the present) as to the simple overturning of metaphysics (that is, 
thinking absence as another center, which will just end up in dialectics). 
Thus Derrida can claim that the play of submission and subtraction (to the 
determination of Being as presence) is the formal rule for "anyone wishing to read the texts of 
the history of metaphysics· (72/62). Derrida's emphasis alerts us that the formal rule governs 
the reading of texts: as such, it should not be equated with, although it conforms to, the 
metaphoricity that articulates the formation of the thereby "marginalized" texts themselves In the 
relation of philsophy to non-philosophy. Thus the formal rule situates the delimitation of 
metaphysics wrought by the thought of presence, showing that it must operate, as Derrida notes 
at M 70 /61, with the same concepts as the Aristotelian foundation of a metaphysics of presence. 
This means we can read the history of metaphysics within the opening of the (1st) Heideggerian 
breakthrough, that is, the thought of the sense of Being as presence, but must also read them 
beyond the constraints of this 1st breakthrough, that is, the constraints that form the epoch of 
Sein und Zeit, the occlusion of the problematic of the written trace. Derrida then concludes that 
the formal rule must be able to guide our reading of the entire Heideggerian text. 
As Derrida notes, this implies that we can see the inscription within the formal rule 
of the epoch of Sein und Zeit Does this mean that we must also be able to read the inscription 
of the middle period, for instance, 9The Anaximander Fragment" within the formal rule? Or is it 
that 9The Anaximander Fragment" is Heidegger's inscription of the formal rule, so that by reading 
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''The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of the trace--whose possibities of legibility are denied by 
the metaphysical comprehension of the gramme--Derrida is able to situate the early Heidegger, 
by means of the formal rule, in terms of an occlusion of the gramme? Entertaining this latter 
possibility implies that we can be moved to destroy what remains of the history of metaphysics 
by an imperative made possible by the thought of Being as presence, but that we can be called 
to read the Seinsgeschichte as the result of an sichentziehende Schickung only on the basis of 
this play of submission and subtraction, that is, on basis of the trace which Heidegger sees in 
Anaximander. 
The Conclusions of "Ousia and Gramme" 
Let us try to see these dynamics at work in the last section of "Ousia and Gramme,· 
entitled "The Closure of the Gramme and the Trace of Difference." Derrida numbers his 
conclusions here. In the first he spells out how the formal rule regulates the question of the sense 
of Being in the text of Sein und Zeit; in the second he shows how a second gesture of 
Heidegger's--that of questioning the determination of the sense of Being as presence in terms 
of epochality--situates the epoch of Sein und Zeit; finally in the third he describes the movement 
of the trace in ''The Anaximander Fragment" in terms of differance. 
When we consider Derrida's first conclusion we must keep in mind that this is only 
his first conclusion. That this is only the first move in a long and complex conclusion to a long 
and complex essay situated by a series of interlocking notes to other long and complex essays 
in Margins and other texts renders immediately suspect any easy protest over this as the site of 
one of Derrida's "misreadings,• or "critiques" of Heidegger. Here Derrida writes that Heidegger 
cannot oppose another, originary concept of time to the vulgar, for the so-called originary 
concept would also rely on metaphysical concepts for its formulation (73/63). Derrida wants 
here to enforce his notion of marginality, and the impossibility of simply leaving metaphysics 
behind. In other words, a simple reading of Sein und Zeit as beyond metaphysics ignores the 
formal rule that regulates the attempts to shake metaphysics from within, or better, which forces 
one to regard the attempted destruction of metaphysics as precisely a shaking from within. Der-
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rida writes that one could multiply questions about the irreducible ties to metaphysical 
conceptuality of fallenness and origin-the concepts that dominate the two types of temporality 
Heidegger opposes to one another--around the notions of finitude or the proximity to itself of 
oasein. We have noted above that this "enigmatic" proximity to itself of Dasein is the focus of 
Derrida's "The Ends of Man.· Why does Derrida make no reference to his essay at this point? It 
must be that because nowhere-not here, nor in "The Ends of Man• --is Derrida interested in 
simply showing the adherence of Heidegger. or anyone else, to metaphysics. This move would 
indeed be a "critique; but we must remember that "The Ends of Man· asks its question in terms 
of metaphoricity, which as a "marginal" notion obviates any questions of a simple inside or 
outside of metaphysics. 
Derrida next asserts that his question remains within Heidegger's thought. Derrida's 
question is that of situating the relation of ordinary to primordial time, so he is calling attention 
to the development from the first period of Heidegger's thought, dominated by the issue of 
Dasein's temporality, to the second period, which situates this thought by means of the 
epochality of Being. Derrida notes that Hedegger Interrupts Sein und Zeit to ask whether 
orlginary temporality leads to the sense of Being; in finding himself unable to answer this 
question Heidegger found himself forced to change horizons, and ask about the epochality of 
Being (74/64). 
Derrida situates the change in horizon by paying attention to the terms governing 
the concept of presence in Heidegger. In Sein und Zeit and Kant and the Pro!:>lem of 
Metaphysics, Derrida claims, "presence· is interchangeably expressed as Anwesenheit and 
Gegenwartigkeit. Beyond Sein und Zeit, however, Derrida continues, Gegenwartigkeit appears 
as a restriction of Anwesenheit, and Prasenz will be another narrowing of Anwesen under the 
heading of subjectivity and representation (75/64). 56 Derrida concludes from this movement that 
the Heideggerian delimitation of metaphysics must be thought of as two gestures: one subject 
to the formal rule and hence caught in an economy that remains metaphysical though capable 
of shaking metaphysics, and one that, in inscribing the trace, would transgress metaphysics by 
articulating the formal rule of its very margin in showing how Being is determined as presence. 
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The first gesture consists of an appeal from a more narrow to a less narrow 
determination of presence-from the present as Gegenwart to the thought of Being as presence, 
Anwesenheit. Now this move, the imperative in Sein und Zeit to destroy the history of ontology, 
•. . . se tiendraient a l'interieur de la metaphysique (de la presence) en genera.l."57 Since 
delimiting metaphysics is possible only by the thought of presence, as Derrida's parentheses 
claim, Sein und Zeit is subject to the formal rule of submission and subtraction with regard to 
the thought of Being as presence; it can only shake metaphysics from within, by developing the 
posslblities laid down in Aristotle. 
The second gesture consists in questioning the determination of Being as presence 
Itself as the closure of Western metaphysics. This is the gesture of the epigraph, the pivot 
between the 2nd and 3rd Heideggerian periods, which situates the Anaxlmander fragment by 
thinking a "Wesen that would not yet even be Anwesen" (75/65). Indeed, Heidegger writes that 
to khreon is that which Anaximander "als das Wesende Im Anwesen denkt."56 We might try here 
to say that the attempt to think to khreon as what abides In Anwesen is the thinking of what 
allows the determination of Being as presence, a thinking that leads us to think the Seins-
geschlchte as the result of a withdrawing sending. Now this second gesture Is Heidegger's "more 
difficult" gesture, Derrida claims, and he continues by stating that it can only be sketched out 
from its announcement In "certain calculated fissures of the metaphysical text" -as we will see, 
in the thought of the trace. In other words, then, thinking what gives Being must be done in 
terms of the trace. Here an enormous projP.ct announces itself: thinking sending and with-
drawing, the active differing of the Unter-Schied. the revealing-concealing Austrag of Identity and 
Difference. In terms of the trace, and the granting of such difference in the es gibt of Ereignis in 
terms of differance. 
Such a project would no doubt involve Derrida's essay "The Retrait of Metaphor,• 
in which he analyzes the withdrawal of Being in terms of metaphoriclty. Derrida writes that the 
inscription of the trait of the incision, "marks the Ereiqnis, • in such a manner "as I have at-
tempted to articulate It in the trace or In differance."59 The self-withdrawing of the Ereignis-
which allows the sending and withdrawal of Being, and the reaching that withholds and denies 
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in the play of timespace--is here thought as the movement of differance. Derrida later confirms 
such a reading when he writes that: 
We thus have recognized the relation between the _m.. of retrait [the movement thought 
above as trace or differance] ... and the Ereignen of the Es gibt ... in precisely this trait 
whereby the Enteignen ... happens to empty out all Ereignis. 50 
The third point of Derrida's condusion sketches a reading of "The Anaximander 
Fragmenr in terms of the trace and differance. The two Heideggerian gestures Derrida outlined 
above are said to be "together simultaneously and separately" (as are time and space, we 
recall). What then is the relation of the two texts of Heidegger, the delimitation and the 
transgression? Derrida will name this relation "trace,· for he says the relation between the text 
of the question of presence in general-the first gesture, the question of the sense of Being as 
Anwesenheit--and the text of the question of what exceeds Anwesenheit "at the daybreak or on 
the other side of (a la veille ou au-deta)"61 Greece-the second Heideggerian gesture-cannot be 
a relation of presence or absence (which would either give us nothing to think, or would be 
thought as merely an absent presence, not yet or no longer) (75-76/65). Yet this relation must 
still signify; it must still be legible-that is, it must be an inscribed trace: here we see the reason 
for the focus on the gramme, the •problem of the written trace.• The gramme is precisely that 
which gives us the opportunity to think the relation of the two texts as an inscription other than 
in the mode of presence. But to think this other mode of inscription is to think what exceeds 
metaphysics-which means to think the second text as the one that poses the question of what 
enables metaphysics-that granting which determines that Being will be thought as presence for 
metaphysics. As we will see in Chapter II-but as Derrida apparently does not--Heidegger's 
question of the Sinn von Sein poses the question of the determination of Being as presence, but 
is subject to such violent twisting that its disruption of metaphysical answers to the Seinsfrage 
necessitates the move to thinking the Seinsgeschichte (in terms of the trace). The trace names 
the relation of the delimitation of metaphysics to the thought of what exceeds metaphysics, thus 
situating the delimitation bound to the formal law. What is at stake here is the development in 
Heidegger's thought from a scien~e of Being that would delimit metaphysics by isolating (by way 
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of a destruction of what remains of the history of ontology) time as the transcendental horizon of 
Being. to the thought of the Seinsgeschichte as a Geschick, as the gift of a self-withdrawing 
giving. 
T.,e mode of inscription of such a trace is the erasure of the trace in its own 
production (76/65), which, as we noted above, "The~ of Metaphor" asks us to think as the 
movement of Being in its self -withdrawal. The first stage In reading Heidegger this way is to note 
that it is the forgetting of the ontological difference .M difference that enables metaphysics, that 
is, the forgetting that Being withdraws so that it can be determined as Anwesenheit. and 
Anwesenheit as Gegenwartigkeit, (and later as Prasenz). Now this withdrawal is so complete that 
there is no trace of it. Since difference (is) (itself) trace, then the trace of the trace has 
disappeared (76/65-66).62 Here we see a structure of triple concealment in which even the 
forgetting of withdrawal is forgotten, so Being Is no longer questionable. This structure of 
concealment seems to correspond, writes Derrida, to that in "The Anax:imander Fragment,• 
where the early trace of distinction Is obliterated when Anwesen appears as the highest An-
wesende. However, the erasure of the trace must be traced in the text of metaphysics, so that 
it must still be legible, must still be able to be read as •presence,• so that presence is now read 
as the trace of the erasure of trace (76-n /65-66). In Heidegger's text on Anax:lmander, the 
distinction between Sein and Selenden can be experienced only with its unveiling with the 
Anwesen des Anwesendes. This implies that the difference as difference, which is the 
self-concealing granting of Being, must have left a trace which is preserved in Anax:imander. In 
other words, to khreon Is not the Heideggerian Sache. but the Sache has left a trace in to khreon 
which we are to read in order to think the~. 
Derrida does not quote this passage from "The Anax:imander Fragment,· but we are 
led to it in this context. It should be compared with the passage from the "Logos• essay noted 
above. Heidegger's German relies on the plays of~ and .!.l.!.lliH. Geschick and Geschichte: 
The translation [Obersetzung] of to khreon as •usage• has not resulted from a 
preoccupation with etymologies and dictio~ary meanings [Oberlegung]. The choice of 
the word stems from a prior crossing .2Yfil l.!.l.bfiLrsetzen) of a thinking which tries to think 
the distinction in the essence of Being in the fateful [geschlcklichen] beginning of Being's 
oblivion. The word "usage• is dictated to thinking in the experience of Being's oblivion. 
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What properly remains to be thought in the word "usage• has presumably left a trace 
[Spur] in to khreon. This trace quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being [im Geschick des ~which unfolds in world history (weltgeschlchtlich) as Western metaphysics:63 
Thus all the names of this trace, that is, all the ways in which the self-effacing 
difference that grants Being has been determined as the Being of beings, starting with to khreon 
and on through mm, ~. ~. energeia. are all metaphysical names. This is a very difficult 
point. Does not Heidegger think to khreon as a word dictated to early thinking, before the turn 
into metaphysics with Plato and Aristotle? Any number of texts could be marshalled to support 
this claim. However, "The Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture Time and Being• tells us we 
must move away from what is still metaphysical in the ontological difference: not that Being is 
thought as ground, as in "classical" metaphysics, but that Being is "subjugated" to beings. 64 The 
point Is not to forget the relation of Being to beings, but to think it as a "letting,· an • Anwesen..: 
!assen: thought In the manner of Ereignls". 65 Thus to khreon. thought through the kata which 
refers Irreducibly to a higher that has a lower under it, 66 would be "metaphysical" in the second 
of the above senses. Of course the relation of the "Summary of a Seminar" to the rest of 
Heidegger's thought remains problematic; here I follow SchOrmann's lead in his chapter "A 
Theory of the Texts.• In any event, we must ask how we are to think the relation of Anaximaner's 
thought of "das Wesende Im Anwesen• to the thought of Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato and 
Aristotle of the "Grundzug des Anwesens· in the following passage from "The Anaximander 
Fragment": 
The energeia. which Aristotle thinks as the fundamental character of presencing [Grundzug 
des Anwesens], of §Q!!, the~ which Plato thinks as the fundamental character of 
presencing, the Looos which Heraclitus thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, 
the Moira which Parmenides thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the 
Khreon which Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing [als das Wesende Im 
Anwesen]--all these name the Same. In the concealed richness of the Same the unity of 
the unifying One, the Hen, is thought by each thinker in his own way. 67 
All these names belong to the text of metaphysics, Derrida would claim, not to the trace "itself,• 
for there is no trace "itselr that can be named. Is this not what Heidegger himself says? Here we 
touch upon the controversial ending to Derrida's essay "Differance• where he quotes Heidegger 
from "The Anaximander Fragmeni- about the quest for the single word, the proper name of 
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Being, which he names "Heideggerian hope• (29/27). Without wishing to advance any final 
judgments here, we can note that Derrida omits the last sentence of the paragraph he quotes; 
restoring this sentence might lead us to think that the quest for the single word is metaphysics' 
quest. not that of eigentliche Denken. which, we might venture with the help of "The Retrait of 
Metaphor,· is a thinking that recognizes metaphoricity. I quote the paragraph in its entirety, and 
ask the reader to note that the relation of the phrases Wesen des Anwesens and das Wesende 
des Seins to das Sein setbst, and the attempt to think das Sein selbst als Ereignis in Zeit und 
Sein, which also finds itself faced with the problem of language-in terms of what the "Summary 
of a Seminar" calls the issue of "antic models"-is worthy of much scrutiny for its relation to the 
Derridean notion of metaphoricity. 
The relation to what is present that rules in the essence of presencing itself is a unique 
one, altogether incomparable to any other relation. It belongs to the uniqueness of Being 
itself. Therefore, In order to name the essential nature of Being, language would have to 
find a single word, the unique word. From this we can gather how daring every thoughtful 
word addressed to Being is. Nevertheless such daring is not impossible, since Being 
speaks always and everywhere throughout language. The difficulty lies not so much in 
finding in thought the word for Being as in retaining purely In genuine thinking the word 
found. 68 
Now if all naming is a naming of presence \only presence is mastered" Derrida says 
above at 76/65), then all the names of difference are metaphysical too, not just the difference 
between Anwesen and Anwesende but also the difference between ~ and Seiende 
(77 /67). Thus difference is older than Being itself, if Being has always let itself be determined as 
a being (n'a jamais voulu dire gue l'etant). That Is, if as Heidegger says in "The Anaxlmander 
Fragment: "Die Sache des Seins ist es, das Sein ~ Seienden zu sein . ..s9 Now Heidegger 
attaches two notes to this sentence in the 1950 edition of Holzwege, the first aking us to consider 
"Sache" as "Geschick, • and the second telling us that the entire sentence is a hint to regard the 
ontological difference. Thus the destiny of Being is to be the Being of beings and thus open to 
determination as a being. Now "Geschick" gives us to think the withdrawing sending, whose 
structure we noted above is thought by Derrida In terms of the trace. Now, that difference is 
older than the Being of beings is what Heidegger tells us in another note from the 1950 edi-
tion: "Der Unter-Schied ist unendlich verschieden von allem Sein, das Sein ~ Seienden 
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bleibt. Daher bleibt es ungemass, den Unter-schied noch mit 'Sein'--sei es mit, sei es ohne y--zu 
benennen. • The extent to which difference is older than Being itself (which might be Ereignis) 
is another issue, to be analyzed--as we noted above-by means of the relation of the 
Heideggerian thought of "antic models" -which arises when we attempt to think Being itself as 
Ereignis-to the Derridean notion of metaphoricity. 
Derrida then moves, at the very end of "Ousia and Gramme· to name the difference 
which is beyond Being and beings, which traces itself by itself, differance (78/67). Differance 
would then let us think writing beyond the metaphysical comprehension of the gramme between 
point and circle, that is, in a teleology of presence. We asked earlier about the oassage 
dissimule opening the problem of presence to the problem of the written trace. Now that we 
have reached the end of "Ousia and Gramme• we can hazard some guesses. One can attempt 
to go beyond metaphysics only by first marking off its limits by a thought of Being as 
presence. This attempt, in its questioning after the sense of Being as presence, remains within 
an economy that includes an irreducibly metaphysical moment. To overcome metaphysics in 
the Heideggerian fashion, Derrida would conclude, one must not just ask about the sense of 
Being as presence, but about the granting that determines that Being be so thought throughout 
the history of metaphysics. For Derrida, such a granting that withdraws cannot be thought on 
the basis of the Sinn van Sein, but only as trace, or differance, which, as the spacing and timing 
of the text, can only be thought beyond presence. Such a textual movement, a trace that erases 
itself in its own production, can only be called an inscription beyond presence. It is hence 
unthinkable for metaphysics, which precisely is sustained by its comprehension of the gramme 
within the limits of a teleology of presence, that is, by its blindness to the movement of 
inscription, the trace in general, differance. 
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NOTES 
1.All references to "Ousla and Gramme" in this chapter will be in the text, with the French page 
number given first. 
2.Heidegger does not seek, as Is often written, to destroy the history of ontology, but instead to 
destroy the sedimented remains (Ober1ieferten Bestandes) which cover over the history of the 
Seinstrage (Sein und Zeit, p. 22). In the next paragraph Heidegger specifies that his target is not 
the past but the contemporary dominant ways of interpreting the history of ontology. 
3.David Krell's Intimations of Mortality (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1986) provides a very strong account of the "turn" that should lay to rest any further attempts to 
think it chronologically rather than structurally, that is, as having structured Heidegger's text from 
the very beginning. Briefly, the "turn• Is best thought not as the move from Dasein to Being, or 
from phenomenological ontology to a meditation on the history of Being, but as the step back 
from the metaphysical determination of the being of beings, the Sein des Seienden, to what 
enables such a determination. Such enabling was at first thought by Heidegger to be a 
transcendental horizon, hence the formulation of the project of scientific philosophy, or 
phenomenological ontology, as the working out of die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt. 
4.Slnce Derrida's relation to Heidegger Is precisely what is in question here, I think it best to 
avoid any characterization of that relation as "critique.· Both Kantian critique and ideology critique 
imply a standing outside a textual object and discovering its condition of possibility in a totally 
different arena, thereby finding the truth of the error under critique. Deconstruction, on the other 
hand, intervenes in a social text by situating it in the general text, thereby exposing the force 
Investments of its construction. Deconstructive Intervention thus changes the balance of a field 
of forces by robbing the examined text of its aura of naturalness and (pure) reasonableness. 
5.Whether or not "Heidegger" (that is, the unity of those hermeneutical determinations of the 
author's intention of those texts signed by the man Martin Heidegger) was under any illuslons 
concerning the purity of his position vis-a-vis metaphysics, such a schema is useful in directing 
our readings of Heidegger. 
6. See note 3 above. 
7.See "Tympan," In Maraes: "Therefore, if they appear marginal to some of the great texts in the 
history of philosophy, these ten writings In fact ask the question of the margin" (xviii-xix/xxiii). 
8.0n the structure of the re-mark see Derrida's "The Double Session" in Dissemination. tr. 
Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). The best readings of this most 
difficult point can be found in GascM's The Tain of the Mirror, as well as his "Non-Totalization 
without Spuriousness: Derrida and Hegel on the Bad Infinite," Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, 17, 3 (October 1986), pp. 289-307. 
9.0n the relation of the trace to differance as time/space see the section of Of Grammatology 
entitled "The Hinge," as well as Irene Harvey's commentary on it in her Derrida and the Economy 
of Differance. 
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1o.Rodolphe Gasche has developed the term "quasi-transcendental" in The Tain of the Mirror to 
describe the way in which any mark in a textual field can assume a position of domination of that 
field (and thus as ordering the field seem exterior or transcendent to it) and yet still remain a 
member of the field. Such a structure always results in the "haunting• of which ''the metaphor of 
metaphor" described in 'White Mythology" is perhaps the best example. 
11. Derrida discusses the impossibility of controlling iteration, of limiting iteration to contexts 
deemed appropriate by an author, under the rubric of "dissemination." See "Signature Event 
Context" in Margins; Limited Inc; and "The Double Session" in Dissemination. 
12.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 25. 
13.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 25. Heidegger's quotation marks. 
14.I am indebted to Lawrence Waxman for helping me see the significance of the title, as indeed 
I am for many more points that must go otherwise unacknowledged. 
15.Martin Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein,• in Zur Sache des Denkens. 
16.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 7. 
17.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens. p. 6. It is of course much too precipitous to simply 
equate the Heideggerian thought of the history of Being and the Derridean notions of 
logocentrism (and phonocentrism). A complex move at the end of Heidegger's essay 
"Logos (Heraclitus, B 50)* renders any simple readings of his notions of the connections of the 
Greek logos, metaphysics, and the privilege of the voice extremely problematic, as he poses 
them explicitly in terms of the trace, or more suggestively, in terms of a non-trace, what has not 
left a trace, a trace that has erased itself: 
The Greeks do experience saying In this way. But, Heraclitus included, they never 
think the essence of language (das Wesen der Sprache) expressly as the Loaos, as the 
Laying that gathers. 
What would have come to pass (sich erelgnet) had Heraclitus-and all the Greeks 
after him-thought the essence of language expressly as Logos, as the Laying that 
gathers! Nothing less than this: the Greeks would have thought the essence of language 
from the essence of Being--indeed, as this itself. For ho Logos is the name for the Being 
of beings. Yet none of this came to pass Cereignete sich nicht). Nowhere do we find a 
trace (§Qur) of the Greek's having thought the essence of language directly from the 
essence of Being. Instead, language came to be represented--indeed first of all with the 
Greeks-as vocalization, ~. as sound and voice, hence phonetically. . .. Once, 
however, in the beginning of Western thinking, the essence of language flashed (blltzte) 
in the light of Being-once, when Heraclitus thought the Logos as his guiding word, so as 
to think in this word the Being of beings. But the lightning abruptly vanished (ver1osch 
jah). No one held onto its streak of light and the nearness~ of what it illuminated. 
Nortrage und Aufsatze [Pfullingen: Neske, 1961, pp. 24-25; Ear1y Greek Thinking, pp. 77-
78.) 
I will later examine Derrida's reading of Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment• in terms of the 
trace. 
18.This account of the development of Heidegger's thought is indebted to Reiner SchOrmann's 
Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy. which was in turn influenced by 
Werner Marx's Heidegger and the Tradition. 
19.Although I find SchOrmann's reading of Heidegger extremely enlightening, such that I will use 
his three-fold schema throughout, the distinction between "Heidegger 2· and "Heidegger 3• 
seems extremely hard to draw. And Indeed Derrida in this essay does not seem to recognize 
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such a distinction. For instance, "The Anaxirnander Fragment,• the centerpiece of the 
.§einsgeschichte period, speaks of the beginning of the sending of Being in terms of Ereignis: 
The oblivion of the distinction [Unterschiedes], with which the destiny of Being [Geschick 
des SeinsJ begins, and which will carry through to completion, is all the same not a lack, 
but rather the richest and most prodigious event [Ereignis]: in it the history of the Western 
world comes to be borne out [zum Austrag kommt]. It is the event [Ereignis] of 
metaphysics. What now is stands in the shadow of the already forgone destiny of Being's 
oblivion. (Holzwege. p. 336/51) 
For that matter, Heidegger's letter to Richardson complicates any thought of a simple turn from 
"Heidegger 1 • to "Heidegger 2, • as the following sentences show: 
As a result, even in the initial steps of the Beingquestion in Being and Time thought is 
called upon to undergo a change whose movement car-responds with the reversal 
... only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is 
to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only 
if it is contained in Heidegger 11· (Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, xviii, 
xxii). 
But Heidegger himself would never ask us to unquestioningly accept any author's self-interpret-
ation, so let us continue examining Derrida's reading of the changes in Heidegger's focus. 
20.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 16/15. 
21. "Le proche et le propre• should be read as "the near and the proper,• not ''the near and the 
far,• as Bass mistranslates it. 
22.We will note several times Derrida's reading of espacement as that which grants pre-
sence. Here we must carefully note Heidegger's insistence on moving away from "production" 
models in describing this process: "Thus the character of effecting [Bewirkens] is removed from 
the letting in letting-presence [Anwesenlassen]" (Zur Sache des Denkens, 50/47). Derrida takes 
no fewer precautions in insisting that differance be thought of as neither passive nor active, as 
this passage from "Differance" shows: 
Thus one comes to posit presence ... no longer as the absolutely central form of Being 
but as a "determination" and as an "effect.• A determination or an effect within a system 
which is no longer that of presence but of differance, a system that no longer tolerates the 
opposition of activity and passivity, nor that of cause and effect ... (17 /16) 
23.See for example, "The End of Metaphysics,· p. 26, and "Heidegger /Derrida - Presence,• 
p. 144, in Delimitations. 
24.I am indebted here, as indeed in much of this dissertation, to stimulating discussions with 
Charles Scott on "Ousia and Gramme" at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Perugia, Italy, 
during the summers of 1987 and 1989. 
25.E. Martineau applauds Derrida for noticing Aristotle's awareness of the exoteric nature of the 
.!.QgQ§ under examination in his "Conception vulgaire et conception aristotelicienne du temps: 
Note sur Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie de Heidegger,· Archives de Philosophie, 43 
(1980), pp. 99-120. 
26.Recall here that the Basic Problems were unavailable at the time Derrida wrote "Ousia and 
Gramme.· I will address this point in Chapter 3, since this is obviously one point at which a 
reading of Basic Problems of Phenomenology would be critical. Derrida does refer us here to 
the privilege of the 3rd person present active indicative of the infinitive "to be,· as Heidegger 
mentions it in EinfOhrung in die Metaphysik (TObingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953); (English translation, 
Introduction to Metaphysics, by Ralph Mannheim [New York: Doubleday, 1962]) and as Derrida 
takes it up in his essay "The Supplement of Copula,• Marges. 
51 
21.GWF Hegel, Enzyklopadie der Philosophische Wissenschaften im Grundriss (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner. 1969), # 257. English translation by A.V. Miller, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1970). 
2a.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 49. 
29.ln a note at this point in his text, Derrida refers us to 'White Mythology," Marges. 
30.Derrida's analysis of the Hegelian relation of time and space figures in "The Pit and the 
Pyramid," Maraes. 
31.Derrida writes: ·sense (in whatever sense it is understood: as essence, as the meaning of 
discourse, as the orientation of movement between~ and~ has never been conceivable, 
within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as presence,• 
Marges (58/51). This quote will be one of the foci of Chapter 2. 
32.0n the aporiai of Aristotle seen as a positive method, see Pierre Aubenque, Le probleme de 
l'etre chez Aristote (Paris: PUF, 1962). As I will discuss in Chapter Ill, Heidegger does claim in 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology that Aristotle does in fact present a solution to the aporia 
of time's belonging to beings in Physics IV.14. See here Martineau's discussion of the point. 
33.See also the conclusion to Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik. 
34.Bass' "within" for ·en deca" seems problematic in the context of a thought attempting to 
exceed metaphysics. 
35.ln Chapter Ill I discuss this point in relation to the Heideggerian and Derridean notions of self-
affection. 
36.Derrida remarks here (Marges 49/55) that Kant also relates while distinguishing time to 
movement and change. He refers in a note to the Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of 
Time as it appears in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The Kantian move also takes off, Derrida 
continues. from the "analogy constituted by what is traced determined as line (gramme. Linie), • 
as does Aristotle. 
37.As Rodolphe Gasche remarks on this point, the irreducible tie of the question of the meaning 
of time to the system of presence suppresses the thought of differance as temporalization, the 
spacing and timing of a text of traces. See his The Tai:i of the Mirror. p. 197. 
38.Derrida spells this out In more detail in his analysis of Husserl in La voix et le pMnomene 
(Paris: PUF, 1967); (English translation, Speech and Phenomena and other essays on Husserl's 
Theory of Signs, David Allison [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973]). This analysis 
relies heavily on Heidegger's ldentitat und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957); (English 
translation, Identity and Difference, Joan Stambaugh [New York: Doubleday, 1961]), to which 
Derrida will allude shortly in "Ousia and Gramme.· 
39.Here there seems an explicit reference to Identity and Difference. Derrida's full sentence at 
Marges 64 /56 reads: 
Now, if Aristotle gives himself the difference between time and space (for example, in the 
distinction between nun and stigme) as a constituted difference, the enigmatic articulation 
of this difference is lodged in his text, hidden, sheltered, but operating within complicity, 
within the complicity of the same and the other, with the with or the together, with the 
slmul In which Being-together Is not a determination of Being, but the very production of 
Being. 
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To think the belonging-together of identity and difference in the same as the granting of Being 
is Heidegger's project in Identity and Difference. 
40.I cannot even begin to explore the relation of Derrida's graphics [plural and lower-case] to 
Hegel's J:Q.giQ [singular and capital(izing)] here. Derrida himself acknowledges his "almost 
absolute proximity to Hegel" in Positions, p. 44, even as he distinguishes differance from 
Hegelian Unterschied at the point where Hegel "d9termines difference as contradiction only in 
order to resolve it .. ." See John Uewelyn, "A Point of Almost Absolute Proximity to Hegel" in 
Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
41.Derrida, Grammatologie. p. 90/70. 
42.0f course, "spatial• must be put between quotation marks as well, for similar reasons. As I 
make clear in the Introduction, I explain the undecidable spatialjtemporal status of specific terms 
by virtue of the irreducible possibility of their iteration in both spatial and temporal contexts. More 
precisely put, in contexts one might wish to denominate as "purely spatial or temporal, but 
whose denomination as such Is haunted. 
43.Derrida, La voix et le pMnomene. p. 73/65. 
44.Derrida, La voix, 96/86. This ls of course exactly what Heidegger says about the ecstatic 
nature of temporality. Derrida's complaint, as we will see in Chapter II, Is with Heidegger's 
naming of temporality as "original time" and thinking the description of this time could be kept 
pure of spatial reference. 
45.My use of "reference" here perhaps calls for some explanation. Just as marks refer to the 
other marks of the field via traces, so does one iteration of a mark refer to all the other iterations 
of that "same" mark. To say that a pure time Is impossible without any spatial reference is to say 
that any discourse on time must make use of marks which refer to their possible iteration in 
spatial contexts. 
46.Derrida, La voix. n /68. 
47.Hussert, Vorlesungen zur PMnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewussteins, #36. Ed. Martin 
Heidegger, in Jahrbuch fOr Phanomenologie, 9 (1928). English translation by James Churchill, 
The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1964). 
48.Derrida, La voix, 95/85. 
49.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 328. 
SO.Derrida, La voix, 95/85. 
51.Derrida, Grammatologie, p. 83/65-66. 
52.0f course, Derrida is no simple structuralist, as the emphasis on "system" might seem to 
imply. See here his ·structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences; and ·Force and 
Signification" in Writing and Difference. 
53.Gasche articulates the strange intertocking of these and all other quasi-transcendentals. 
Differance can seem to order the field of quasi-transcendentals from which it is drawn, thus 
appearing as a master name, Derrida's fundamental concept, and so on, only to be itself subject 
to a re-marking. Likewise, the re-mark relates itself to other quasi-transcendentals according to 
differance. that is, for example, as the supplement different and deferred. 
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54.Derrida, Marges, 392/329. 
55.As indeed Heidegger recognizes, when he speaks in "Zeit und Sein" of that which grants time, 
but is not temporal, even though its "movement" is one of withdrawal (Zur Sache des Denkens, 
18/17). 
56. As Schurmann warns us on this point, we have to be careful equating Anwesenheit a.rid 
Anwesen, as Derrida seems to do here, without taking into account the difference between the 
phrase Anwesen des Anwesenden, which as similar to Sein des Seiendes seems indeed to be 
the same as Anwesenheit, and the meaning of Anwesen that would be analogous to das Sein 
selbst. To make matters even more complex, Heidegger uses the phrases das Wesende des 
Seins, and das Wesende des Anwesen in the "Anaximander Fragment." Also, Prasenz appears 
in Basic Problems of Phenomenology as the horizon of everydayness, the "handiness of the 
handy." p. 438/308. 
57.Bass' "would remain within the metaphysics of presence in general" eliminates the emphasis 
of the parentheses. 
58.Heidegger, Holzwege. p. 340; EGT. p. 54. 
59.Derrida, "Le Retrait de la Metaphore," Poesie 7 (1978); English translation, "The Retrait of 
Metaphor,• Enclitic 11, no. 2 (Fall 1978). 
60. Derrida, "Le Retrait, • 123 /29-30. 
61.Bass' "before or beyond" misses the "vigilance," the "keeping watch," connotations of "a la 
vielle" that Derrida thematizes in "Plato's Pharmacy,• the sense that the constitution of 
metaphysics requires a vigilance to insure the success of its repressive gestures, as well as the 
plays on Greece as the dawn of the evening-land, die Fruhe des Abend-Landes in Heidegger, 
e.g. Holzwege, pp. 300-302. 
62.Derrida here writes "is" under erasure, for at issue here is precisely the relation of difference 
to Being. If difference is "older" than Being, it could never be a being about which one could say 
it. •. • IS. 
63.Heidegger, Holzweqe, p. 340/54. 
64.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 36/33. 
65.Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 40/37. 
66.Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 334/49. 
67.Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 342/56. 
68.Heidegger, Holzwege, pp. 337-38/52. 
69.Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 335/50. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SINNSFRAGE AND THE SEINSFRAGE 
Introduction 
As we have seen in beginning the articulation of the economy of time in Chapter 
I, Derrida's "Ousia and Gramme" reads the constraints within which operates Heidegger's reading 
in Sein und Zeit of Aristotle's relation to the metaphysical tradition. For Derrida, Heidegger's 
attempt to isolate Temporalitat1 as the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt remains tied, via the marker 
"Sinn," to the system of metaphysical conceptuality oriented by the desire for self-presence. The 
accompanying attempt to destroy what remains of the history of ontology thus produces textual 
effects which can be analyzed according to what Derrida calls a formal rule of "submission and 
subtraction" with regard to the system of the evaded question, that is, to the determination of 
Being as presence as it serves to delimit metaphysics. "Time," which Heidegger wishes to isolate 
as the horizon for any understanding of Being, for Derrida serves as a mark of the epoche of the 
trace, that is, as an indication of metaphysics' necessary occlusion of "differance" as time/space. 
"Ousia and Gramme," via its posing of the "formal rule" as the articulation of the textual effects 
of using a notion of ''time,· will thus enable us to understand how Heidegger's attempt to isolate 
"time" as the transcendental horizon of Being is haunted by "spatial" terms. Such a haunting also 
explains the necessity to use quotation marks in this context. As I have explained in the 
Introduction, such haunting is the result of the irreducible possibility of iterating the terms of 
temporal discourse in spatial contexts. 
At question here is Heidegger's move from a science of Being to the history of 
Being, a move often confused with the Heideggerian "turn. "2 John Sallis asks in his recent essay 
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"Twisting Free" --regarding the foundering of the project of Sein und Zeit-whether "an analysis 
of temporality could ever suffice for developing the question of the meaning of Being. "3 
Continuing along this line of questioning, we can see the larger context of my task: What were 
the constraints that led 1-'eidegger at the end of his career, in Zur Sache des Denkens, to end 
up speaking about Ereignis/Enteignis in terms of time/space, explicitly backing away from Sein 
und Zeit's attempt to ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality on the way to isolating time 
as the the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt? What was it about the working out of the project of 
fundamental ontology announced In Sein und Zeit that led Heidegger, as Derrida puts it, "to 
change horizons" and move from the question of the Sinn van Sein to take up the question of 
the Seinsgeschichte? 
In moving toward an answer to these questions, in this chapter I will focus upon the 
effect that what I will call the "Sinnsfrage" -the question of the sense of sense, or the Sinn von 
Sinn-has upon the Seinstrage, the question of the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. I will show that 
posing the Seinsfrage in terms of Temporalitat as the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt does not remain 
simply tied to the system of presence, as Derrida seems to claim, but articulates an economy 
marginal to the system of presence. However, I will also show that the transgression of 
metaphysics wrought by the economy of the Sinnsfrage / Seinsfrage is a dead-end street, so 
to speak, one that necessitates the change to the graphic of the trace that Heidegger later 
comes to inscribe in his text in the question of the Seinsgeschichte. The move from Temporalitat 
as the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt to the inscription of the graphic of the trace in the ~ 
geschlchte Is thus a move from time to time/space. 
It is now time to give a first Indication of the focus of this chapter, the Sinnsfrage 
as it is at work in Sein und Zeit. The Sinnsfrage arises through two mechanisms. In the first, 
various historically sedimented acceptations of the mark "Sinn" are intertwined in each iteration 
of "Sinn." In the second mechanism of the Sinnsfrage, Heidegger attempts a double rewriting 
of the historical sedimentation of one acceptation-that of Sinn as "meaning.• Here Heidegger 
takes as the most common acceptation-the one he assumes most readers would adopt-the 
metaphysical notion of an intentum expressible in a statement. I call this a metaphysical notion 
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because it seems bound to a notion of a stable, self-present subject who aims a flashlight-like 
ray of intentionality at a mental object. Heidegger will first-and only provisionally--rewrite the 
notion of meaning as intentum as the "pivot"4 of an existential projection of Dasein in its Being-
in-the-world. Later, in the temporal recapitulation, he will rewrite the notion of "pivot" as the 
direction of Dasein's movement (Beweatheit). 
Thus, via these two mechanisms of historical sedimentation and attempted rewriting, 
the textual performance of Sein und Zeit twists several acceptations of the mark "Sinn,• viz. the 
sensuous (the bodily "senses"), linguistic (the "sense· or meaning of a phrase), and directional 
(the "sense" of a river),5 into each iteration of "Sinn." Now, as Derrida has shown in his analyses 
of dissemination, 6 to be recognizable as a mark "Sinn,• like all marks, must be citable in contexts 
other than the ones a hermeneusis could specify as corresponding to the author's intention. The 
meaning of "Sinn• hence drifts back and forth among all its senses, haunted by the ones it tries 
to delimit. As a result of its haunted drifting, the Sinnsfrage poses a marginal economy of the 
Seinsfrage, the Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. 
By accounting for the haunted drifting the Sinnsfrage sets loose in Sein und Zeit, 
we arrive at the following economy of possible interpretations of the question of Being as it is 
posed in terms of Sinn in Sein und Zeit. While it cannot be considered solely a simple 
subjectivizing-an inquiry into a concept qua representation of Being, a concept discoverable by 
investigating the use of the word-family gathered under the infinitive "to be" -neither can it totally 
escape from such an understanding, about which Heidegger complained in the "Letter on 
Humanism. "7 On the other hand, it is no longer so clearcut--as Derrida seems to imply-that Sinn 
in Sein und Zeit remains hopelessly caught within a metaphysical pattern. As I will show, the 
textual work of Sein und Zeit installs a moment in the economy of possible interpretation of the 
mark Sinn as it functions in the question of the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt that is refractory to the 
system of presence. Such refraction, however, functions even as the historical sedimentations 
of the marker "Sinn" open the question of Being to subjectivistic misunderstanding. The 
economy of Sinn in the Seinsfrage that is Sein und Zeit is thus marginal to metaphysical 
patterning. It includes readings that do and do not cohere with metaphysical patterns. 
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Recognizing the marginality that the Sinnsfrage installs in the Seinsfrage of Sein und 
Zeit is what allows my reading to differ substantially from that of Derrida. Derrida claims that 
the Seinsfrage, when posed in terms of Sinn. is inherently metaphysical, as the following 
quotation from "Ousia and Gramme" shows: 
The determination of beingness (Qy.filW as energeia or entelekheia, as the act and end of 
movement, is inseparable from the determination of time. The sens of time is thought on 
the basis of the present as nontime. And this could not be otherwise: any sens (in 
whatever sens it is understood: as essence, as the meaning [signification] of discourse, 
as the orientation of the movement between arche and telos) has never been conceivable, 
within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence and as 
presence. The concept of sens Is governed by the entire system of determinations that 
we are pointing out here, and every time that a question of sens [Derrida's emphasis] is 
posed, it must be posed within the closure of metaphysics. To put it quite summarily, 
one seeks in vain to extract the question of sens (of time or of anything else) as such from 
metaphysics, or from the system of the so-called "vulgar" concepts. Such also would be 
the case, therefore, for a question of Being determined, as it is at the beginning of Sein 
und Zeit, as a question of the sens de l'etre, whatever the force, necessity, and value 
(irruptive as well as fundamental) of such a question. Heidegger doubtless would 
acknowledge that as a question of sens, the question of Being is already linked, at its 
point of departure, to the (lexical and grammatical) discourse of the metaphysics whose 
destruction it has undertaken. In a certain manner, as Bataille gives us to think, the 
question of~. the project of preserving sens, is "vulgar." This is his word too.8 
However, this seems rather a flat condemnation of Sinn / sens by Derrida, one not quite as 
nuanced as other of his writings. 9 For instance, at the end of Margins he writes: ''there is no 
metaphysical concept in itself, only a work performed in conceptual systems. •10 If Derrida does 
not then seem justified in simply condemning prima facie any inscription of Sinn/sens, we then 
need to ask: What work does Sinn perform in Sein und Zeit? 
As we will see, Sinn sets up an economy marginal to the telos of self-presence, and 
hence inscribes Sein und Zeit at the margin of metaphysics. It doP.s all this, however, without 
inscribing the graphic of the trace. The useful thing about "Ousia and Gramme" for our purposes 
is that Derrida does seem correct in his analysis of the haunting of the allegedly purified temporal 
terms by "spatial" "metaphors." Thus, using Derrida's lead in "Ousia and Gramme," as I have 
interpreted it in Chapter I, I will explain how the moment of the economy of the Sinnsfrage in 
which Sinn functions as "direction" shows the spatial haunting of the allegedly purified language 
about time. Now, this means that that which disrupts any metaphysical interpretations of several 
analyses in Sein und Zeit--the rewriting of Sinn as the direction of ecstatic self-movement--is both 
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haunted by Sinn as meaning and installs a spatiality at the heart of Heidegger's descriptions of 
Zeitlichkeit. Such a spatiality limits Heidegger's attempt to isolate Zeitlichkeit as the ground of 
oasein's spatiality on the way to exhibiting Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt, and 
'1ence time, redeemed from the vulgar concept, as the horizon for any possible Seinsverstandnis. 
Thus two hauntings will need to be articulated with each other: the haunting of time 
by space and that of .filnn as direction by Sinn as meaning. These hauntings, along with others 
centered on the Sinn of sight as it is redetermined by Heidegger from bodily to understandingly 
disclosive, could only be disentangled by asking about the proper Sinn for the mark "Sinn.• Even 
though Heidegger is aware of these "hauntings" he casts them in terms of misunderstanding; the 
important thing for us to see is the economy of possible interpretations here, and the inability 
of an author to control fully the disseminative drift to which his or her terminology is subject, 
even as he or she analyzes its conditions of possibility, as Heidegger does in Sein und Zeit.11 
The two hauntings are related in the following way: On the way to determining 
Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Oberhauct Heidegger tries to rewrite Sinn as he rewrites 
understanding in the temporal recapitulation whereby projection becomes Dasein's Bewegtheit. 
The "upon-which" of a projection then becomes the unity of horizonal schemata that provide 
direction to Dasein's ecstatic movement. Projection can thus no longer be seen as a subjective 
intending, so that the image for "understanding" becomes one of thrownness into the clearing, 
not that of a flashlight shining from a fixed point. Now, in order that Zeitlichkeit be kept pure of 
the vulgar time concept, Heidegger tries to keei:i the Bedeutung of several temporal marks free 
of any spatialized acceptation. But Heidegger never succeeds in fully breaking free of the 
historically sedimented "spatial" terms. The "temporal" terms employed by Heidegger are "spatial" 
as well: movingness, which Heidegger attempts to define as the Beweatheit of Dasein as 
opposed to the Bewegung of present-at-hand entities, is still described in back and forth terms, 
directional terms. Heidegger's struggle is with such a historically sedimented spatial language, 
a sedimentation that opens possibilities of iteration he makes a last attempt to manage by 
claiming it is brought about by Dasein's falling self-interpretation in terms of present entities en-
countered within the world.12 
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At this point one might be tempted to say that Heidegger intends a purified original 
time-Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn of care--as the Sinn of his discourse, but is betrayed by the 
language at his disposal, so that "spatial representations" occur only at the level of expression. 
This attempt would however bring up the problem of metaphoricity analyzed in 'White 
Mythology.• I will show in the rest of this chapter that Heidegger's being forced to use what he 
acknowledges as a language dominated by "spatial representations· (369) to talk about 
Zeitlichkeit is not contingent failure, but rather the inscription of a haunting that limits the alleged 
purity of its description by recalling its birth in time/space. In other words, the inevitability, even 
in a highly sophisticated and self-conscious text like Sein und Zeit, of "spatial representations" 
in describing a primordial time constitutes what I call the "haunting• predicted by the formal rule 
articulated by Derrida in ·ousia and Gramme.· My question will be, following Derrida, if spatial 
representations are the result of falling temporality, and falling is a necessary structure of Dasein, 
why call it "falling" and "inauthentic,• and why not account positively for the way spatial terms 
inhabit the description of temporality? I call such a positive account "the economy of time." 
Now, one cannot avoid the positive account by calling this necessary spatializing a metaphor 
without risking an abyssal reduplication-or an endless proliferation of scare quotes-because 
"metaphor" bespeaks an "original" carrying ("..Q!:!Qm"), a carrying beyond (".!!!filg"), the primary 
signifying "field.• 
The Formal Structure of the Sinnsfrage 
Let us begin with the formal structure of the Sinnsfrage. The abyssal question about 
the "sense of sense• or "meaning of meaning,· is posed whenever one attempts to establish a 
privileged Sinn for the mark "Sinn." Asking about the primary or proper Sinn of Sinn already 
presupposes that we know what Sinn as Bedeutung "means." In asking about the Sinnsfrage as 
It operates within Sein und Zelt, we must not only be cognizant of the system of exchange 
between the English "sense," the French "sens" used (and mentioned) by Derrida and the 
German "Sinn" used (and mentioned) by Heidegger; we must also distinguish between the 
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historical sedimentations of "Sinn" in German and Heidegger's attempted rewritings of its various 
acceptations. Heidegger's attempts to rewrite Sinn by privileging some of its acceptations run 
afoul of the Slnnsfraae because "acceptation" (which I here take as equivalent to Bedeutunq) 13 
is also an acceptation of "Sinn.· Consulting dictionaries here is most illuminatin3. Wahriq 
Oeytsches Worterbuch lists under Sinn the following: "Bedeutung, geistiger Gehalt (einer 
Oichtung, Aufgabe, Frage, eines Wortes). • The OED has for #22 under "sense": ".ID.s. (specified) 
~.according to a particular acceptation or interpretation (of a word, phrase, etc.) .. ." And 
Robert has for 111.2 under ·~·: "Ce qu'un signe (notamment un signe du langage) signifie. 
Acceptlon, signification, signifie, valeur ... • 
We might attempt to avoid the Sinnsfrage by unraveling this doubling through the 
use of something like the use/mention distinction of speech act theory developed by Austin and 
Searle and explored by Derrida in Limited Inc. 14 However, the distinction breaks down in the 
case of "sense"; the quotation marks can multiply ad infinitum. Is the second "acceptation· (which 
I have just mentioned, hence the quotation marks) used or mentioned In the sentence: "This task 
Is most complicated because 'acceptation' Is also an acceptation of 'Sinn' "? But then again 
could I not have doubled the quotation marks, since the second "use" is also a "mention"? Then 
the sentence would have to be written: "This task Is most complicated because 'acceptation' is 
also an ' "acceptation•' of 'Sinn.'· Each step up the use/mention "ladder" would then neces-
sitate another set of quotation marks, yet we would still be faced with the question of the sense 
of sense. 
In this chapter I will often use "acceptation,• but I ask readers not to think this solves 
the Sinnsfraqe. Rather it is only a strategically adopted device for the sake of readability. 
What were the acceptations of Sinn that Heidegger could assume in his audiences? 
Obviously I can do no more than begin to answer this question with a brief survey of the use of 
"Sinn" in philosophical German In the 50 years prior to Sein und Zeit. Brenatano's Von der 
mannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seiendes nach Ari§toteles, 15 which, as is well known, played an 
important role in Heidegger's philosophical development,16 does not thematically distinguish 
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between Sinn and Bedeutung. Thus Sinn could here be taken as quite close to the English 
•meaning [of a word or phrase]." As the title indicates, Heidegger changes Brentano's question 
from the Bedeutungen des Seiendes to the question of the Sinn van Sein. 
Sinn and Bedeutung were first thematically distinguished by Frege in his 1892 article 
"Uber Sinn und Bedeutung."17 In this essay Frege discusses his distinction first for what he calls 
"proper names,· that Is, those units of discourse that denominate a single object, and then for 
"declarative sentences." In the case of proper names, the Bedeutung is the object intended in 
the talk, while the Sinn lies between the Bedeutung and the idea in the mind of the speaker; Sinn 
is "indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself.· Frege also uses the 
following analogy: Bedeutung: Moon:: Sinn : telescope image:: Idea: retinal image. 
In the case of declarative sentences, Frege is a bit more clear. Bedeutung is the 
truth-value of the sentence, while Sinn is the "thought" contained in the sentence. The thought 
is not the "subjective performance· to be sure, but "its objective content, which is capable of 
being the common property of several thinkers.• Frege goes on to criticize natural languages as 
containing expressions without a definite Sinn and of allowing for expressions with a Sinn but 
without a Bedeutung. These shortcomings, which can wreak political havoc, as the example of 
the phrase "the will of the people" shows, should not be tolerated in a logically perfect language, 
Frege's famous project of a Begriffsschrift. 
Sinn also plays an important role in Husserl, as Derrida has shown in Speech and 
Phenomena (which analyzes the Logical lnvesigations) and "Form and Meaning• (which analyzes 
Ideas I). I cannot investigate these most complicated analyses here, but will instead show only 
how Sinn is thematized in its relation to Bedeutung. In the Logical Investigations 18 Husserl tells 
us he will use Sinn and Bedeutung interchangeably, and even defends the usefulness of their 
ambiguity against Frege. In the process he inscribes the Sinnsfrage as he uses Bedeutung in the 
definition of Sinn and Sinn in the definition of Bedeutung: 
Bedeutung gilt uns ferner als g I e i c h b e d e u t e n d mit Sinn. . . Einerseits ist es 
gerade bei deisem Beg riff sehr angenehm, parallele Termini zu haben, mit denen man 
abwechseln kann; und zumal in Untersuchungen van der Art der vorliegenden, wo eben 
der Sinn des Terminus Bedeutung erforscht werden soll.19 
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Later in his career Husserl distinguishes Sinn and Bedeutung. In Ideas 1, 20 #124-31 Husserl 
restricts Bedeutung to the "logical" or "expressive" stratum, while Sinn is conceived as the 
determinable noematic matter stamped by the elevation to the stratum of Ausdrucken. 
Heidegger's Inscription of Sinn 
The Introduction to Sein und Zeit 
In moving to discuss Heidegger we should realize that Sinn appears in Heidegger's 
work prior to Sein und Zeit, especially in Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit and Prolegomena 
zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes, two lecture courses immediately preceeding the 1927 
publication of Sein und Zeit. 21 Here Heidegger characterizes the question of the Sinn van Sein, 
the Seinsfrage, as the question of "was besagt Sein, "22 'Was ist Sein,· 'Was heisst Sein"23 or "was 
Sein bedeutet."24 Sometimes Heidegger will also write 'Was besagt 'Sein,'"25 indicating with the 
scare quotes that the Seinsfrage at this time, as it would become again in Introduction to 
Metaphysics, was enmeshed with the question of the meaning of the word "Sein.· As is well 
known, Introduction to Metaphysics addresses the etymology of the word "Sein" as a clue to 
exploring the history of Being. At the time of Introduction to Metaphysics, however, Heidegger 
had not yet completed the move toward an explicit posing of the Seinsgeschichte in purely 
"structural" terms, 26 as he does in "The Anaximander Fragment. "27 
Finally we arrive at the inscription of Sinn in the text of Sein und Zeit. I will attempt 
something of th.e "perverse" reading of Heidegger alluded to in Derrida's Of Spirit.28 That is, I will 
take Heidegger seriously when he commands us to redetermine several key terms of his text, 
especially Sinn and Sicht.29 To do so I will have to take up another of Derrida's strategies in Of 
Spirit, that of paying special attention to Heidegger's use of quotation marks. 
In the rest of this chapter I will first read closely the opening page and Introduction 
to Sein und Zeit, in order to lay out the various mechanisms of the Sinnsfrage. Then, in the first 
part of the section on the existential analytic, I will explore a bit more closely Heidegger's 
struggles with redetermining "sight,• as well as the important discussions of Vorhandenheit and 
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extension in the analysis of Descartes and the analysis of Dasein's spatiality. In the second part 
of the section devoted to the existential analytic I will begin a "structural" reading of the 
Sinnsfrage. beginning with the privileging of Sinn as meaning over Sinn as the senses. Then in 
the section on the "Temporal Recapitulation" I will trace thE' third acceptation of Sinn, that of 
"direction,· as it is at work in the analyses of Zeitlichkeit, the transcendence of world, and 
historicality. We will then finally be in a position to consider Chapter 6 of the Second Division, 
on the genesis of the ordinary concept of time, within which occurs the note that is the object 
of Derrida's ·ousia and Gramme.· 
My major concern with Sein ynd Zeit is its posing of the Being question in terms 
of Sinn. The usual translation of die Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein is ''the question of the 
meaning of Being." However, the English "meaning" is a poor translation of Sinn as it operates 
throughout Sein und Zeit. This is so first of all because Heidegger's text rewrites Sinn from the 
metaphysical notion of intentum--leaving aside the question of the status of the Husserlian Sinn 
as noematic correlate of a sense-conferring act-to "pivot" of an existential projection, and 
secondly because this first rewriting is itself rewritten in the temporal recapitulation of Part I, 
Division 2, Chapter 4. If we wish as well to take Derrida's writings on dissemination into account 
we must concede that Sinn's plurivocity cannot be totally governed by a hermeneusis of 
contexts, so that many acceptations are twisted into each mark, a twisting that broaches the 
abyssal Sinnsfrage. 
Heidegger's struggles with the intertwining of the Sinnsfrage and the Seinsfrage-
-posed in terms of Seinsverstandnis, the understanding which projects upon the Sinn van Sein-
-begin on the first page of Sein und Zeit. Under the Greek quotation from the Sophist Heidegger 
asks us if we today have an answer to the question of what we intend [meinen] with the word 
"Being" lseiend]? Heidegger places in scare quotes "seiend" to indicate he is using it to translate 
Plato's to on. We should notice here the emphasis on the word "Sein,· which will result in a 
doubling of Sinn throughout Sein und Zeit. The metaphysically marginal economy of Sinn in Sein 
und Zeit, the Sinnsfrage, will partially be posed between Sinn as Bedeytyng of the word ·~· 
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and the Sinn van Sein as Heidegger rewrites Sinn as the direction of Dasein's Beweatheit. 
Heidegger will attempt to restrict the range of Sinn as Bedeutung of the word "Sein" to its 
function as a clue to the Seinsfrage. That is, Heidegger wants the level of our awareness of the 
Bedeutung of the word "Sein" --how aware we are about that which we intend by "seiend" --to 
function as a clue to the need to renew the Seinsfrage. As we will see, the answer to the 
question of Being will not come in the form of an acquaintance with the use of a word, but rather 
in the form of a practice, "concrete phenomenological investigation,· that will investigate the 
Bewegtheit of Dasein. Having to conduct this concrete phenomenological investigation under the 
rubric of the single mark "Sinn"-Heidegger's having to hunt, via the analysis of Dasein's 
Zeitlichkeit, forTemporalitat as the Sinn van Sein-is, however, contaminated by the metaphysical 
system in which Sinn as the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" would yield us a concept we could 
use for the regulation of our representations. I call the economy of such contamination the 
"Sinnsfrage, • since its undecidable oscillation could only be stilled by posing the question of the 
sense of sense, the Sinn van Sinn. 
Because we have no answer even here as to what is intended by the word "seiend" 
Heidegger tells us that we must "pose anew die Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein.· Heidegger then 
asks if we even experience the perplexity that engulfs the interlocutors in Plato's dialogue. 
Keineswegs, he answers, "no way,• a literal translation of the Greek aporia, the root of Plato's 
verb eporekhamen which ends the quotation from the Sophist. We thus have no way even to 
reach the Greek aporia; we are confronted with an~ of aporia. 
In response to this double Impasse Heidegger tells us that we must "first of all 
reawaken an understanding for the Sinn of this question." Heidegger's phrase "den Sinn dieser 
..E!:film" is ambiguous. It could mean "Sinn as it operates in the question of the Sinn of Being,· or 
it could very well mean "the Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being." To say that we need to 
reawaken an understanding for the Sinn of the Frage nach dem Sinn van Sein, is thus a first 
posing of the Sinnsfrage in conjunction with the Seinsfrage. Then, Heidegger continues, the 
"concrete working out" of the Sinn of "Sein,• the goal of the text, can proceed. Why does 
Heidegger italicize and place between scare quotes "Sein"? As we mentioned above, our 
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awareness of our use of the word "Sein" is an important clue to the status of the Seinsfraqe, but 
Heidegger wants the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt not to be confused with the Sinn/Bedeutunq of 
the word "Sein,• even though they both are undecidably at work within each iteration of the mark 
"Sinn." 
The first paragraph of the first page ends with Heidegger telling us of the 
"provisional goal" of the work: "The interpretation of time as the possible horizon of any 
understanding of Being.· 
Heidegger's Introduction, entitled "The Exposition of the question of the Sinn van 
~. • begins by explaining the necessity of a explicit retrieval of the question of Being because 
the question of Being, the question of the Sinn of Being, has been today forgotten. Heidegger 
shows that the dogmatic assertions that Being is a) the most universal concept, b) is indefinable, 
and c) is self-evident, do nothing to dismiss the question of Being, even though they serve to 
plunge it into an obscurity that reinforces its having been forgotten. That Being is self-evident for 
Heidegger means only that we "live already in an understanding of Being,• so that precisely 
because this understanding is an enigma, and the "Sinn of Being is still veiled in darkness,· the 
question of the Sinn of Being must be retrieved (4). Not only is an answer lacking to the question 
of Being, the question itself has not yet even been posed correctly: "the question itself is obscure 
and without direction [richtunqlos]" (4). If we recall that Heidegger saw part of his task on the 
first page as calling for a revival of a Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being, and that here the 
question is lacking direction, we see here a first hint of Sinn as "direction," an acceptation of Sinn 
that I will trace in its workings in the text of Sein und Zeit. 
Heidegger continues in #2 by exploring the formal structure of the question of 
Being. Here Heidegger explains the hermeneutic necessity of some already accessible clue for 
guiding our questioning. He claims the question of Being must also have such a clue: "The Sinn 
van Sein must already be available to us in some way" (5). Heidegger then alludes to the results 
of #1 by saying that "we always already animate ourselves [wir bewegen uns] in an understand-
ing of Being.• Here we see a first mention of the "movement• of Dasein. In the rest of this chapter 
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I will show the necessity of the scare quotes as well as the economy within which Heidegger 
attempts a distinction between Casein's Bewegtheit and the Bewegung of present-at-hand 
entities. Out of such a preconceptual understanding, Heidegger continues, uarise both the explicit 
question of the Sinn von Sein and the tendency toward Its concept" (5). 
Next Heidegger reinforces the preconceptual nature of our understanding of Being 
as he tells us that 'We know not, what 'Being' means• ('Wir wissen nicht, was 'Sein' besagt"] (5). 
Heidegger here means to reinforce the distinction between, on the one hand, our~ rcass 
wir je schon in einem Seinsverstandnis leben"] (4) and Bewegtheit30 ["wir bewegen uns immer 
schon in einem Seinsverstandnis"] (5) in an understanding of Being and, on the other hand, our 
lack of an explicit conceptual grasp of the Sinn von Sein. Even though we cannot fix 
conceptually what the "is" bedeutet, even though we do not even know the horizon within which 
such a Sinn can be fixed, Heidegger continues, the vague average understanding of Being is a 
fact In need of investigation. 
Even though our understanding of Being can fluctuate and grow so dim as to move 
itself [sich bewegen] to the border of a mere acquaintance with a word, such a movement needs 
an explanation that the investigation into the Sinn von Sein cannot be expected to give at the 
outset. Here again we see the interlacing of movement, Casein's understanding, and the Sinn 
von Sein. Heidegger here attempts to control the economy of Sinn, the Sinnsfrage, by 
characterizing our knowledge of the Bedeutung of the word "Sein" as a degeneration of the living 
movement that makes up Dasein's full understanding of Being. The investigation of the average 
understanding of Being needs the development of the concept of Being so that it can then work 
out which distortions of an explicit illumination of the Seinssinn are "possible and even inevitable.• 
Next Heidegger alerts us to the preponderance of "theories and opinions" about 
Being. Here we see the necessity of the Destruktion. since these theories hide their role as 
sources of the dominant understanding of Being operative today. Here we can see the fact that 
while the tradition has certainly entertained many determinations of Being, it has never posed the 
question of the horizon of those determinations, the question of the Sinn von Sein. 
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Section #2 continues with the threefold formal structure of the Seinsfrage: Das 
Gefragte, "what is asked about," ..ssilll; das Erfragte, "what is to be found out by the asking," der 
~inn van Sein; das Befragte, "what is interrogated,· das Seiende selbst (6). Being, Heidegger 
explains--that which determines beings-is that upon which [woraufhin] beings are understood. 
Thus the Being of beings "is" not a being, so the "Is" must be used in scare quotes when applied 
to Being. Being thus demands its own mode of exhibition, different from that which discovers 
beings. Likewise, the Sinn of Being, which as we will see is that upon which [woraufhin] Being 
is understood, demands its own conceptuality. We must note that posing the Seinsfrage in terms 
of Sinn is already beyond the metaphysical move of determining a Being for an entity, because 
we have asked about the horizon of such determination. Thus the Seinsfrage always operates 
on the third "level,· has always already made the turn, taken the step back. The move from the 
Marburg period science of Being to a thought of Seinsqeschichte and from there to a topology 
of Being is not the turn in this sense but represents a radicalizing movement (more historical, 
more concrete) on the same "level." 
In determining which being is to be interrogated Heidegger runs up against the 
Aristotelian problem, as repeated by Brentano, that Being is said in many ways, to on legetai 
pollachOs, which Heidegger renders as "Aber 'seiend' nennen wir vieles und in verschiedenen 
Sinne" (6). The scare quotes alert us to the undecidable play within each iteration of the mark 
"Sinn" between our linguistic naming of Being and our living movement in a preunderstanding 
of Being. Heidegger then provides a list of these Sinne: Dass- und Sosein. Realitat. Vorhanden-
heit. Bestand. Geltung. Dasein. "es gibt." and then asks from what entity is the Sinn of Being to 
be read off, and in what Sinn does it have a priority (7)? Thus Heidegger ls forced to ask about 
the Sinn of Dasein's priority in the question of the Sinn of Being, another instance of the 
Sinnsfrage. 
In the next paragraph the Sinnsfrage takes another turn. If the question of Being is 
to be explicitly posed in its full self-transparency, Heidegger writes, then we must explain the way 
of sighting of Being, of understanding and conceptual grasping of Sinn, and the preparation of 
the choosing of and gaining access to the exemplary entity. Here we find a double twisting of 
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~inn. First in the question of the Hinsehen auf Sein: we will soon see (146-47) how Heidegger 
must pose the structure of metaphoricity-which precisely concerns the metaphysical definition 
of metaphor as a transfer from sensible to intelligible-by means of scare quotes and statements 
of authorial intention warning against misunderstanding, in order to subordinate bodily Sinne, 
e.g., the "sight" of the eyes, to the various "sights" of disclosedness. 31 Secondly, in the paragraph 
under discussion here, Heidegger tells us that the role of Sinn in understanding must be clarified 
in order to pose the question of the Sinn of Being, that is, that the Seinsfrage is dependent upon 
the Sinnsfrage in Sein und Zeit (7). 
Such dependency cannot be conceived as a vicious logical circle, Heidegger 
explains, in a famous passage about hermeneutical preconception. Entities can be tactically 
determined in their Being by the various discursive practices that make up our everyday 
movement within a preunderstanding of Being without our having made ready an explicit concept 
of the Sinn of Being. Again Heidegger appeals to a vorgangigen Hinblicknahme auf Sein to show 
that were are not caught in a circle, but in a "noteworthy 'back and forth relation·· of what is 
asked about (Being) to questioning as the mode of Being of an entity (8). The "essential 
pertinence [Betroffenheit]" of the questioning to what is questioned belongs to the Sinn of the 
Seinsfrage, that is, to the Sinn of the question of the Sinn of Being (8). Again we see Casein 
described in directional terms ("back and forth") when it is a matter of clarifying the Sinns-
~/Seinsfrage relation. 
In #3 Heidegger tells us that regional ontologies remain naive in their inquiries into 
various determinations of Sein for entities if they leave undiscussed the Sinn van Sein (11 ). As 
we have mentioned above, Heidegger articulates many modes of Being. As granted a priority 
with regard to the Being question, the Being of Casein is to be explored in an existential analytic 
that will provide a fundamental ontology. However, Heidegger's goal in Sein und Zeit is not so 
much fundamental ontology as "ontology proper: Fundamental ontology is only propaedeutic 
to ontology proper, the working out of the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. As we will see. fundamental 
ontology concludes as Heidegger isolates a Being for Casein, which he will call care, and a Sinn 
for that Being, which he will call Zeitlichkeit. 32 Ontology proper, then, is the search for the Sinn 
69 
von Sein Oberhaupt as Temporalitat. 
Of course we must not gloss over the complexities of Sein und Zeit. In this work 
Heidegger tirelessly repeats that Being is always the Being of beings, and is nothing outside 
Dasein's understanding of Being. The relation of Temporalitat to Zeitlichkeit is then the relation 
of the Sinn von Sein Oberhaupt to the Sinn von Sein of Dasein. Here we see the peculiar 
intertwining, the back and forth implication, of the question of Being and Dasein. In #4 
Heidegger expresses this implication in an extremely contorted phrase that indicates the antic 
priority of Dasein: 
Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship toward that Being--a relationship which is itself one 
of Being .... Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. 
(Zu dieser Seinsverfassung des Daseins gehOrt aber dann, dass es in seinem Sein zu 
diesem Sein ein Seinsverhaltnis hat. ... Seinsverstandnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit 
des Daseins.) {12) 
Some of these intricacies are worked out in #5. Here Heidegger specifies that the ontological 
analytic of Dasein is to serve as a freeing of the horizon for an interpretation of the Sinn von Sein 
Oberhaupt. The preontological understanding of Being will serve as a clue: Dasein has a 
tendency to understand itself from out of the world. Such a world-understanding, Heidegger 
writes, exerts a "backpressure" [ROckstrahlung] on Dasein's self-interpretation {16). In Sein und 
Zeit the difference between scattered inauthenticity and gathered authenticity will be played out 
in the difference of projections. Heidegger will develop this point as the difference between 
spatial, scattered presence-at-hand (accessible to falling temporality) and authentically temporal, 
gathered Dasein. 
Dasein's everydayness is chosen as the access to Dasein which allows it to show 
itself from itself in the way it is "proximally and for the most part" {16). The existential analytic that 
will reveal Dasein's everydayness is of course oriented only toward the working out of the 
question of Being. As such it will be only provisional, bringing out only the Being of Dasein, 
without interpreting the Sinn of this Being. Once the horizon for the most originary interpretation 
of Being is prepared ·the existential analytic will need to be repeated. 
This repetition will reveal the Sinn of Dasein's Being as Zeitlichkeit. This is not the 
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answer to the question of Being--Zeitlichkeit is not the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt--but is the 
ground for the winning of an answer to the question of Being. Heidegger's task is to explain 
time as the horizon of the understanding of Being from Zeitlichkeit as the Being of the entity that 
has an understanding of Being as part of its Being. Doing so, Heidegger explains, presupposes 
that one fulfill the demand to delimit [abzugrenzen] Zeitlichkeit from the vulgar understanding of 
time (17). This delimiting is two-fold: we must explain how the traditional time concept and the 
vulgar understanding of time arise from Zeitlichkeit, and we must restore to the vulgar time 
concept its rights to operate within a limited and derivative domain (18). 
Heidegger opposes this treatment of the vulgar time-concept to Bergson, for whom, 
claims Heidegger, time as intended in the vulgar time-concept is space (die mit ihm gemeinte 
Zeit sei der Raum) (18). Although I will not be able to pursue the point here, we can note that 
this is not quite what Bergson says in the~. where time as we ordinarily conceive it is called 
the phantom lie fantOmeJ of space. 33 Bergson will appear again several times in Sein und Zeit 
as well as in Basic Problems; I will deal a bit more with Heidegger's reading of him in my 
treatment of the latter work. 
Next Heidegger begins a very important, but complicated, paragraph. Again we 
must pay close attention to the way Heidegger uses quotation marks. Heidegger writes: 
"Time" has long functioned as an ontological--or rather an ontical-criterion for naively 
discriminating various realms of entities. A distinction has been made between ''temporal" 
entities (natural processes and historical happenings) and "non-temporal" entities (spatial 
and numerical relationships). (18) 
Here Heidegger introduces quotation marks to help him distinguish between ontological and 
ontlcal. "Time,· in quotation marks, vulgar time, is not the time to which primary reference is 
made, although it is homonymic with original time. "Time" is ontical, and hence derivative upon 
Zeitlichkeit, which Heidegger will later call original time (426). 
Here we can see the importance of the delimiting of the vulgar concept of time. 
Without the assured purity of Zeitlichkeit the entire project of establishing a Sinn van Sein 
Oberhaupt is threatened. That it is threatened precisely by the Sinnsfrage is visible in the 
following sentence from the paragraph under discussion: "The fact remains that time [no 
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quotation marks in original], in the sense of [im Sinne van] 'being in time,' functions as a 
criterion for distinguishing realms of Being" (18). Here we see that time has various senses, one 
of which, "being in time" has served the tradition for the purpose of determining Sein in various 
ways. This determination of Being by a derivative sense of time needs to be replaced in the 
question of the Sinn van Sein Qberhauot by the primary sense of time, Zeitlichkeit. But how is 
the Sinn of time to be decided before the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt, if the very notion of Sinn is 
abysmally reduplicated in a Sinnsfrage? 
We must let the full exposition of the Sinnsfrage wait for a moment. Heidegger now 
distinguishes between zeitlich and temporale, because the Bedeutung of "zeitlich" has been pre-
empted by pre-philosophical and philosophical language use for the sense of time as "being in 
time.• Heidegger wishes to reserve temporale for the "originary determination of the Sinn of Being 
[die ursprOngliche Sinnsbestimmtheit des Seins]." Thus the exposition of the problematic of 
Temporalitat will provide the concrete answer to the question of the Sinn of Being (19). This 
answer will not take the form of mere sentences, since the propositional content is prey to an 
empty passing on. Here we find a first mention of the problem of the author's intention in the 
face of textual dissemination. Heidegger continues that the answer to the question of the Sinn 
of Being will find its most proper Sinn in the form of a concrete ontological investigation within 
the horizon laid bare (19)--time, or more precisely, that Sinn of time we call Temporalitat. 
I now turn to #6, the "Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology,• where 
Heidegger specifies that he is after the possibility of metaphysics when he questions after the 
Sinn of Being. Heidegger first makes clear that the destruction is oriented by the question of 
Being. Its target is not the ontology of the ancients, but the sedimented way of reading these 
texts that results in today's occlusion of the question of Being. Thus the target is the "handed-
down content [Oberfieferten Bestandes] of ancient ontology," which is to be "destroyed" by 
referring it to the "originary experiences" by means of which ''the first and continually guiding 
determinations of Being were made" (22; trans. modified). With even more clarity, Heidegger 
repeats that "Negatively, the destruction does not relate itself to the past [zur Vergangenheit), 
but its critique aims at 'today' and the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology" (22-
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23). 
Heidegger then briefly touches upon Kant and Descartes as problematic texts for 
which the destruction of received readings will lead us onto the path of the question of Being. 
Descartes' dependence on medieval conceptions becomes significant only, Heidegger writes, 
when the destruction leads to the Sinn and boundaries of ancient ontology considered in light 
of the question of (the Sinn of) Being (24). Considering ancient ontology in terms of the 
problematic of Temporalitat will show that the ancient interpretation of Being proceeded in terms 
of "world" and "nature" in its widest Sinn. Thus we can see how the understanding of Being was 
taken from "time" (25). 
The quotation marks, as I have remarked above, indicate that Heidegger will attempt 
to invert the contemporary, sedimented assumption of the primary term involved in these 
homonyms. Thus the everyday, vulgar Sinn of world (totality of present-at-hand entities), nature 
or time (succession of nows) will be considered as derivative upon the originary Sinn of world 
(network of bedeutsam relations), nature or time (Zeitlichkeit). 
Heidegger continues-in a passage discussed by Derrida in "Ousia and Gramme" -
-that the "external document" for the fact that ancient ontology understood Being in reference 
to time is the determination of the Sinn of Being as parousia or ousia, which means (bedeutet), 
when considered ontologically and temporally, "Anwesenheit" (25). In ancient ontology, then, 
entities were grasped (gefasst) in their Being as "presence" ("Anwesenheit"; Heidegger's 
quotation marks), or in other words were understood with regard (mit ROcksicht) to one 
determinate mode of time, the "present" ("Geqenwart") (25; italicized and in quotation marks in 
the original). 
Here we can see that Sinn is used as the pivot of a understanding projection. In this 
passage, however, Heidegger's metaphorics suggest projection as a flashlight rather than the 
movingness of Dasein; hence understanding was largely described in visual terms ("with regard 
to": mit ROcksicht auf). Or at least what seem to be visual terms, those oriented to the bodily 
eyes. As we will see, Heidegger will redetermine the primary term with regard to sight and 
senses. 
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In #7, the "Phenomenological Method of Investigation," only one important instance 
of the Sinnsfrage occurs. In subsection C, "The Fore-Conception of Phenomenology,· Heidegger 
writes that the privileged Sinn of "phenomenon" is that which constitutes the "Sinn and ground" 
of that which shows itself, that is, that which in an extreme Sinn remains hidden {35). And this 
is of course nothing other than the~ of beings, which can remain so hidden that it becomes 
forgotten and the question about it and its Sinn is excluded (35). Here we see that many~ 
of phenomena are to be distinguished so that the Being of beings, which provides many Sinne 
for beings, enabling them to be understood in the manifold ways enumerated above, is itself to 
be questioned with regard to its Sinn, the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. 
The Existential Analvtic 
The Introduction concludes with #8, the outline of the projected treatise. Heidegger 
then moves through the existential analytic. It is most important for us to focus upon his analysis 
of worldhood, because his establishing the term "significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) for the context 
of relations that is the world insures that discourse ~ can remain one of the three-fold equi-
originary constituents of the "there,· the ..Qsl- of Dasein. The characterization of world as 
bedeutsam thus maintains the link with Sinn as meaning. After Chapter 1, which expounds the 
task of the preparatory analytic, Chapter 2 names Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein. 
Chapter 3 then analyzes the worldhood of the world, Chapter 4 analyzes "who" is in the world, 
and Chapter 5 analyzes "Being-in as such.• 
While Chapter 1 does not concern us here, there is one point in Chapter 2 which 
we need to address. In #12, "A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-the-World," Heidegger 
distinguishes, again with the help of quotation marks, the type of spatiality appropriate for 
Dasein, an existential spatiality made possible only by Dasein's Being-in-the-world {56). Since 
Being-in-the-world will ultimately have its Sinn in Zeitlichkeit, Dasein's spatiality will ultimately 
have to be reconceived on the basis of Zeitlichkeit. Heidegger will later make it clear that this is 
not a "deduction" of pure space from pure time (367), but as we will see he will not be able to 
purify the language used to describe Zeitlichkeit from all spatial reference-at least not without 
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posing the Sinnsfrage. 
Chapter 3, which articulates the "World hood of the World, ff requires more detailed 
consideration. Heidegger's world analysis is famous for its precision an".i complexity. It is divided 
into three parts, in which he analyzes environmentality and worldhood in general, contrasts his 
notion of worldhood with Descartes' interpretation of the world, and concludes with a discussion 
of Dasein's spatiality. In its broadest outlines Heidegger's analysis undercuts any relation of 
subject and object by showing Dasein's already-being-in-the-world as the ground for any 
encounter between Dasein and another entity. The analysis of environmentality and worldhood 
in general consists of four sections, # 15-18. The first discusses the Being of entities encountered 
within the world, the second, the manner In which the worldly character of the environment is 
announced, the third, reference and signs, and the fourth, involvement, significance and the 
worldhood of the world. 
In #15 Heidegger shows how a totality of equipment is structured as a network of 
"assignments" or "references" (Verweisungen). The mode of Being of tools is then called "ready-
to-hand" (Zyhandenheit). The ready-to-hand subordinate themselves to the field of references, 
which is accessible to circumspection, Umsicht. As thus subordinated, tools withdraw from 
consideration in favor of the work to be done. In #16 Heidegger then shows how because of this 
withdrawal only a non-assignable tool becomes conspicuous, obtrusive, or obstinant. Since the 
Being of tools ls determined by references, an unusable--hence obvious-tool reveals its 
assignments, as disturbecf. The cluster of disturbed assignments reveals in turn the context of 
the tool <Zeugzusammenhang) as a totality sighted beforehand in circumspection. And, 
Heidegger concludes, with this revelation of the context of tools the world announces itself. 
In #17, then, we learn that signs are addressed to a "spatial" Being-in-the-world that 
is always already "directed" (ausgerichtet) (79). Here we see two important themes we will take 
up In more detail shortly, the necessity of quotation marks and the notion of directionality, 
Richtung. Then, in #18, Heidegger gives his definition of worldhood. He begins by reminding us 
that the ready-to-hand are determined by references; another way of saying this is to say that 
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the character of their Being is "involvement,• Bewandtnis. The totality of these involvements is 
finally oriented by the "for-the-sake-of-which,• the Worum-willen, a possibility of Dasein. Not only 
does Dasein assign its tools to a series of references, but Dasein also assigns itself, that is, a 
possibility of itself, along the paths of the totality of assignments. Now that wherein Dasein makes 
these self-assignments is the upon-which (Woraufhin) of a prior "letting-be-encountered-as-
involved. •This wherein/upon-which is world, and the structure of that upon which Dasein assigns 
itself is worldhood. 0/Je will see Woraufhin at two other crucial points, the definition of Sinn at 
151 and the discussion of the horizonal schemata at 365.) 
Heidegger then gives the briefest of forecasts of the upcoming analysis of 
understanding. Dasein makes its assignments (of itself, thereby letting entities be encountered 
as involved) by an understanding projection into the context of relations. The relation-character 
of the relations that are assignments is that of "signifying,· be-deuten. The totality of relations 
(Bezugsqanze) is then called "significance,• Bedeutsamkeit. This disclosing significance is an 
existential constituent of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Since, as we will see, the articulation of 
these relations is named~. discourse, and Sinn is the terminus or pivot of these projections, 
Sinn will govern Being-in-the-world. 
As we tum now to Heidegger's discussion of Descartes in sections #19-21, we must 
keep in mind that Heidegger enters into his confrontation with Descartes in order to clarify his 
own approach to the phenomenon of. world. I will concentrate on the notion of spatiality 
Heidegger sees in Descartes. Heidegger begins by claiming that "Descartes sees the extensio 
as basically definitive ontologically for the world" {89). Since extension is identified by Descartes 
with spatiality, the Cartesian ontology of the world will be useful as a foil to the notions of 
Dasein's spatiality, which Heidegger will develop later. This spatiality will be shown to be 
grounded not in the extension of entities encountered within the world, but in Dasein's Being-
in-the-world. In #19, "The Determination of the World as res extensa" Heidegger presents textual 
evidence as to Descartes' distinguishing of the ego coqito from the res coroorea. Both are 
substances; the distinguishing characteristic of the res coroorea is extension {90), that which 
maintains itself throughout changes in shape, and motion (Bewequnq) {91 ). In #20 Heidegger 
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takes up the Cartesian determination of world via a discussion of substance--that which is in 
need of nothing--in terms of his own question of the Sinn van Sein. Descartes distinguishes three 
substances, God as the ens perfectissimum and the ego cogito and the res coroorea as the two 
typP.s of ens creatum. The Sinn van Sein held in "common" among these three types of Being 
is left unexplored by Descartes, Heidegger claims (93), and since " 'Being' is not in fact 
accessible as an entity, it Is expressed through attributes--Oefinite characteristics of the entities 
under consideration, characteristics which themselves a r e" (94). Here we see Heidegger's 
posing of the question of metaphoricity that Derrida examines in detail in "White Mythology" and 
''The Retrait of Metaphor." Now, significantly, for Descartes the attribute of an entity that serves 
to express the "unexpressed yet presupposed Sinn van Sein and substantiality" is extensio (94). 
We will soon see the link of extension and presence-at-hand in the metaphysical determinations 
of the Sinn van Sein. 
#21 is Heidegger's "hermeneutical" discussion of the Cartesian ontology of the 
world. Heidegger here shows that the mode of access to the substance characterized by 
extension is that of knowing, Erkennen, lntellectio, in the sense of mathematico-physico 
knowledge (Erkenntnis). This mode of access is dependent upon Dasein's Being-in-the-world; 
it in fact does not allow the entities encountered within the world to show themselves as they are, 
but instead prescribes for them the aspect they will show. (This account of scientific knowing 
forecasts the account in #69b of thematization as a priori projection of the Being of a region of 
beings.) 
The Sinnsfrage appears here in all its problematic complexity. Heidegger writes that 
Descartes remains bound to traditional ontology in deciding the mode of access to entities within 
the world as "noein, 'intuition' in the widest sense (der 'Anschauung' im weitesten Sinn)" (96). 
Thus, according to Heidegger, it is on the basis of a certain Sinn of intuition that Descartes 
presents his "critique" of sensation (sensatio, aisthesis) versus intellectio. The most famous 
instance of that to which Heidegger refers here is the reduction of sensibility via radical doubt 
as Descartes performs it in the Meditations. (As we will see, Heidegger will himself soon be 
caught up in the Sinnsfraqe in deciding the question of the role of the senses, die Sinne.) 
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Heidegger continues his investigation of Descartes by claiming that for Descartes, 
the idea of Being (Seinsidee) is "constant presence-at-hand (standige Vorhandenheit)" (96). If we 
recall the point made above that the attribute of an entity that expresses the Sinn van Sein for 
Descartes is that of extensio, we can see clearty here the link between Vorhandenheit and 
extension. As we will see in discussing #69b, extension can characterize spatiality only in virtue 
of an overturning (Umschlag) of the understanding of Being that lets tools be encountered in 
everyday falling commerce with the entities of the wortd. This will mean Descartes' determination 
of Being takes its bearings from a falling self-interpretation of Dasein in terms of the entities 
encountered within the wortd. This orientation leaps over the phenomenon of the wortd and the 
spatiality of tools as they are encountered on the basis of the spatiality of Dasein, which is 
founded on its Being-in-the-wortd. As a result, the inappropriateness of Descartes' orientation to 
presence-at-hand will become clear only after "we have assigned to the concept of Being in 
general the horizon within which its intelligibility becomes possible" (100). Again the economy 
of the Seinsfrage appears: the question of the Sinn van Sein can harden into an answer in the 
form of the elucidation of a concept, or it can be freed into an investigation of ecstatico-
horizonal Sinn as direction of movement. 34 
Let us now explore Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's spatiality as distinguished 
from the spatiality of the present-at-hand, #22-24. The two key terms for Heidegger's discussion 
of Dasein's spatiality are Ent-fernung and Ausrichtung. The former is awkwardly translated by 
Macquarrie and Robinson as "de-severance,· while the latter is rendered as "directionality." 
In #22 Heidegger tells us that the ready-to-hand has the character of "nearness,• 
Nahe. 35 The near tools do not just cluster about, but belong to various "regions," Geqende. These 
regions are ordered by the concern of Dasein, so much so that even the sun--which will play an 
important role in the relation of primordial time to the ordinary time concept--has its place 
assigned to it by Dasein's concern (103). 36 Eartier Heidegger had determined the Being of the 
ready-to-hand as "involvement,· Bewandtnis. He combines the two definitions when he writes that 
the "discovery of regions beforehand is co-determined by the totality of involvements 
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(Bewandtnisganzheit) for which the ready-to-hand, as something encountered, is freed" (104). 
When Heidegger then moves to discuss space he tells us that space--as discovered 
in circumspective Being-in-the-world as the spatiality of the totality of tools--belongs to entities 
as their "places." He continues: "Bare space itself is still veiled over. Space has been split up 
(aufgesplittert) into places· (104). Bare space, the space within which present-at-hand things are 
encountered in their extension, is founded on Dasein's spatiality, which is itself founded on 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world. 
Next in #23 Heidegger discusses the "Spatiality of Being-in-the-world." In order to 
explain what he means by this properly existential spatiality Heidegger begins with a discussion 
of the term Ent-fernung, which denotes dissolving of distance, the bringing close of something. 
Dasein has an essential tendency to nearness, that is, an essential tendency to bring things into 
the circle of circumspectively close ready-to-hand, oriented by concernful Being-in-the-world 
(107). This nearness does not mean that Dasein is "here"; rather, Dasein comes back (zuri.ick-
kommt) to its "here" from a "there" of circumspective involvement (107-108). Zuri.ickkommen will 
also be used to describe Dasein's ecstatic movement in the discussion of the horizonal schemata 
of temporality. 
Dasein also has the character of directionality, Ausrichtunq. As we noted above, 
Richtung is one of the Sinne of Sinn. One must not forget, Heidegger warns, that directionality 
belongs to Ent-fernung, and is founded on Being-in-the-world. These two characteristics of 
spatiality are needed to pose the question of #24, "Space and Dasein's Spatiality.· Heidegger 
shows here how it is only in virtue of Dasein's spatiality that the ready-to-hand can be 
encountered in their spatiality. And this means that the freeing of a totality of involvements is at 
the same time the freeing of the spatial belonging-together of the ready-to-hand. Thus in 
significance, Bedeutsamkeit, lies an essential co-disclosedness of space (11 O). Here we see Sinn 
as meaning and Sinn as direction brought closely together. As Heidegger will make clear in 
#69b, the space of physics is only discovered in a neutralizing of significant, worldly spatiality. 
Only when significant places become neutral points can calculation proceed with confidence. 
Extension is thus derived from Dasein's spatiality, which is founded on Being-in-the-world, and 
79 
which will be reinterpreted finally in terms of Zeitlichkeit. 
At this point we are finally in a position to discuss the inscription of the Sinnsfrage 
in the structure of the existential analytic. First, I will discuss how Heidegger attempts to quiet 
the Sinnsfrage-to manage its economy-by subordinating Sinn as "the senses• to Sinn as 
existential meaning. Then, in the next subsection, on the -r emporal Recapitulation,• I will discuss 
Sinn as direction as it comes to complicate even further the Sinnsfrage posed between Sinn as 
meaning and Sinn as sensory. 
Heidegger's attempted subordination of Sinn as sensory to Sinn as (existentially 
redetermined) meaning occurs in Chapter 5 of the First Division. The course of the existential 
analytic takes us-after Chapter 4, the investigation of the -Who" of everyday Dasein--to Chapter 
5, the analysis of "Being-in as such.• Here I explore #29 on Befindlichkeit, #31 on understanding, 
and #32 on understanding and interpretation. I will use two John Sallls essays to focus my 
discussion of the relation of Sinn as meaning and Sinn as sensory. The most recent of the two, 
-Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible"37 traces an undecidability between the first two 
acceptations, those of meaning and sensation. Sallis shows a Platonic investment in Heidegger's 
analyses of the tool as granted a Sinn by a system of relations determined as a system of 
meanings, that is, a Verweisungsganzheit determined as Bedeutsamkeit. As Sallis succintly puts 
it: "the operation of the senses is founded, primarily upon disposition, more generally upon 
disclosedness as such. "38 ·Sallis concludes his analysis in a way pertinent to my point here: 
If the sensible Is freed from the yoke of meaning, if it is not assimilated to disclosetiness, 
then the simple unity of the Heideggerlan question cannot but be disrupted, ... It will not 
be possible then, to enclose the Heideggerlan question within the compass of time, which 
as temporality extends no further than disclosedness. 39 
In an otherwise insightful analysis Sallis makes no mention of a possible third sense 
of Sinn, that of directionality, which would complicate the matters under discussion even further. 
He splits Sinn into two "senses• (the necessity of these quotation marks should be well-
established by now) "existentially determined meaning• and •an irreducibly sensible shining• and 
speaks of their being twisted together in a way that would fracture the unity of the attempt to 
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isolate time as Sinn in the sense of "existentially determined meaning." As I will show, this latter 
sense of the Sinn van Sein is even further fractured by Sinn as directionality. Here I refer to the 
problem raised in one of Sallis' earlier essays, "Language and Reversal,"40 where he writes: "the 
connection of the arialytic of Dasein to the question of the meaning of Being remained largely 
implicit . .<1i The following extended quotation outlines my discussion: 
... (our movement within language) is ... that ground-movement through which 
intelligibility is already delivered up to our understanding, always already granted. But what 
is this understanding that is always already granted? Sein und Zeit gives the answer: 
"Understanding of Being has always already been taken for granted in projecting upon 
possibilities." This understanding ... is taken for granted, however, not in the sense that 
man as a subject is always in possession of a representation of Being, but rather in the 
sense that it is always granted to man in that he "stands in the openness of the project 
of Being. "42 
Here Sallis distinguishes between two interpretations of Sinn as that upon which Seinsverstandnis 
is projected. The first is what could be called the metaphysical interpretation of Sinn as meaning, 
one in which the "meaning of Being• is a representation expressed in a statement. The second 
interpretation would be that of Sinn as the direction of Dasein's Beweqtheit constitutive of the 
"openness of the project of Being." At stake here is Heidegger's "temporal" rewriting (Sinn as 
direction) of the existential rewriting (Sinn as "pivot" of a existential self-projection) of the 
common acceptation of Sinn (Sinn as intended meaning of a "flashlight"-projection). The 
necessity felt by Sallis of indicating the proper sense of Sinn in order to still the oscillation 
between Sinn as direction and Sinn as meaning in the question of the Sinn van Sein will be the 
topic of my next sub-section. There I will show that yet another sense of sense is twisted into 
the mark Sinn. This third acceptation, that of directionality, comes to operate as Heidegger 
rewrites Sinn in the temporal recapitulation from existential meaning to Dasein's Bewegtheit. 
With these questions in mind, let us pick up the thread of Sein und Zeit as 
Heidegger privileges Sinn as meaning (albeit rewritten as "pivot" of a self-projection) over the 
Sinnlichkeit of "the senses.• In #29, "Being-there as State-of-mind" (Befindlichkeit) Heidegger first 
grounds the senses on Befindlichkeit and then determines Befindlichkeit as a mode of disclosure 
(Erschlossenheit). Heidegger writes: 
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And only because the "senses" (die "Sinne") belong ontologically to an entity whose kind 
of Being is Being in the world with a state-of-mind (die Seinsart des befindlichen ln-der-
Welt-seins hat) can they be "touched" by anything or "have a sense for" ("Sinn haben fOr") 
something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. .. Existentially. 
a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world (eine erschliessende 
Angewiesenheit auf Welt), out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. 
(137; Heidegger's italics) 
We must pay special attention to Heidegger's use of quotation marks here. In placing ·~· 
between quotation marks Heidegger broaches, without thematizing it, a reverse metaphorics. He 
implies that the use of Sinn to mark the "senses• is dependendent upon Sinn as intelligibility--
"intelligibility" that has, to be sure, been rewritten as "disclosedness." Positing such dependency 
amounts to a reversal of the classic determination of metaphor as a transfer of a name drawn 
from the sensible realm to an entity of the intelligible realm.43 This move is even more 
complicated than a reverse metaphor based on an etymological claim-such as claiming that 
conceptual grasping is primary with regard to physical grasping44 --for the attempted reverse 
tranfer is directed at the very markers used to make the distinction from which "metaphor" 
derives its traditional "sense" (and of course here my own discourse is under suspicion.) 
Heidegger's becoming enmeshed in the problematic of metaphoricity, as Derrida 
would call it, is even more pronounced a few pages further in #31 "Being-there as understand-
ing." Let us note only in passing here what will become more important to us later, namely that 
Dasein projects itself. Heidegger tells us that • ... any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected 
itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting• (145). Dasein's understanding is thus best not seen 
with the image of a flashlight projecting a ray outward from a fixed point, but as a self-
movement. Here, however, I am not so much concerned with the best images for understand-
ing, as I am with Heidegger's wrestling with the metaphoricity of the Sinnsfrage. Let us follow 
what he has to say about the sense of sight. He writes: "In its projective character, understanding 
goes to make up existentially what we call Dasein's 'sight' (Sicht)" (146). We must note here that 
Heidegger does not place quotation marks around his word "Sicht" at this point in the text--as 
Macquarrie and Robinson do--although he does italicize it. Heidegger then claims that Dasein 
.1§ its various "sights," as they are existentially In Daseln's disclosing: 
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With the disclosedness of the 'there' (no quotation marks in original) this sight is 
existentially; and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in each of those basic ways of its 
Being which we have already noted: as the circumspection of concern (Umsicht), as the 
considerateness of solicitude (ROcksicht), and as that sight which is directed upon Being 
as such (Sicht auf das Sein als solches), for the sake of which any Dasein is, as it is. (146) 
Although Dasein is purported to be the various sights of its disclosedness, the description of 
Dasein in terms of sight Is confusing. Sight requires light, yet Dasein's movement-which 
functions as Lichtuna-is that which lets (antic) light appear to Dasein through the sense of 
vision, by granting the open space for play of light and dark. And this self-movement of Dasein 
as Lichtung conditions even "intuition," the "sight of the mind," as we see when the quotation 
marks soon reappear around "Sicht": 
We must, to be sure, guard against a misunderstanding of the expression "sight" CSicht"; 
Heidegger's quotation marks). It corresponds to the "clearedness" (Gelichtetheit; no 
quotation marks in the original) which we took as characterizing the disclosedness of 
the "there" (Qg; no quotation marks in the original). "Seeing" (Das "Sehen"; Heidegger's 
quotation marks) does not mean (meint) just perceiving with the bodily eyes, but neither 
does it mean pure non-sensory (unsinnliche) awareness of something present-at-hand 
in its presence-at-hand.(147) 
heidegger's attempt to avoid identifying "sight" with either vision or intuition by positing its 
correspondence with Gelichtetheit refers us to an Important passage from #28, "The Task of a 
Thematic Analysis of Being-in." Here Heidegger touches upon the problematic of metaphoricity, 
just as he did earlier in the discussion of Descartes. Heidegger has recourse to the notion of 
figurative language when he confronts the necessity of naming-across the antic-ontological 
difference-the relation of, on the one hand, access to antic entities, to, on the other hand, the 
ontological disclosedness that makes such access possible. Heidegger writes: 
When we talk in an ontically figurative way (die ontisch bildliche Rede) of the lumen 
naturale in man, we have in mind (meint) nothing other than the existential-ontological 
structure of this entity, that it .§ in such a way as to be its "there.• To say that it is 
"illuminated" ("erleuchtet") means that .M Being-in-the-world it is cleared (gelichtet) in 
itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing (Lichtung). 
Only for an entity that is existentially cleared (gelichteten) in this way does that which is 
present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, 
Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there,· it is not tactically the entity 
which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness. 
(133) 
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What is it of Dasein that is expressed metaphorically as lumen naturale? Just as (physical) light 
allows for the vision of the eyes, Heidegger must here be identifying "natural light" with that which 
allows Dasein to "see," in other words, with the clearing self-movement that opens the "there." 
Several questions arise here. If "natural light" is a metaphor when applied to the condition of 
Dasein's "sight" --which as I have just shown Heidegger leads us to think in an inverted 
metaphorics--what would be the metaphoric status of "natural light" in its opposition to the 
"super-natural light,• the divine illumination, of the Augustinian tradition? Further, what of the 
rewriting of "natural light" as Dasein's being "illuminated" (".er1euchtet")? Is the relation of condi-
tioned ("illuminated") to condition (Lichtung and "clearing") thinkable as a metaphoric relation? 
If we allow the condition-conditioned relation to be expressible by metaphor, then it is Lichtung-
-the condition for (sensory) access to things in (antic) light-that ultimately allows Dasein's 
"illumination" ("natural light") to be metaphoric with relation to everyday "light.• Then if one 
wished to say further that this "illumination" is in turn metaphoric with relation to Gelichtetheit and 
Lichtung45 one would have to posit that the classical determination of metaphor as transfer of 
name from sensible to intelligible is transformed into a transfer from antic phenomena to 
ontological condition.46 
To return to the determination of "sight" we should recall that Heidegger explicitly 
denies that "sight" means a "pure unsinnliche apprehension," or "intuition" (Anschauen). 
Heidegger makes this distinction, removing sight from the sinnlich/unsinnlich determination, so 
the sense of sight is here not merely a reversed metaphor, but instead inverts the very terms 
used to determine the sense of "metaphor"-as I have called it, an "inverted metaphorics. • 
Heidegger continues: 
In giving an existential signification (Bedeutung) to "sight," (Sicht; no quotation marks in 
original) we have merely drawn upon the ~; italicized in original) peculiar feature of 
seeing, that it lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in 
themselves. Of course, every "sense" (jeder "Sinn") does this within that domain of 
discovery which is genuinely its own. (147) 
Here Sinn must be put in quotation marks, for as we have seen above (137) Sinn as sensory has 
been grounded upon Sinn of disclosedness-"sensory sense" is now a transfer of Sinn from its 
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primary sense as disclosedness. Heidegger next appends a fascinating few sentences that will 
play an increasingly important role in my interpretation. He writes: 
But from the beginning onwards the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily 
toward 'seeing' as a way of acce~s to entities and to Being. To keep the connection with 
this tradition, we may formalize 'sight' and 'seeing' enough to obtain therewith a universal 
term for characterizing any access to entities or to Being, as access in general. (147) 
This forma[ization, as we have seen, broaches the Sinnsfrage, for it necessitates the privileging 
of Sinn as meaning, which controls disclosedness, over the Sinnlichkeit of the senses. Such 
privileging becomes more explicit later, in #70c "The Zeitlichkeit of Falling." There Heidegger 
writes: 
Like the concept of sight, 'seeing' will not be restricted to awareness through 'the eyes of 
the body.' Awareness Nernehmen) in the broader sense (im weiteren Sinne) lets what is 
ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand be encountered 'bodily' in themselves with 
regard to the way they look. (346) 
Here we see that a privileged Sinn must be indicated for the awareness that subordinates the 
senses to disclosedness. Heidegger had earlier played out these distinctions in The History of 
the Concept of Time. At p. 80 of that lecture course he distinguishes categorial intuition from 
sensory perception (sinnliche Wahrnehmung), and at p. 95-96 spatiality is termed a sinnlich 
concept. Here is the key for my interpretation. If spatiality is sinnlich--even tt in the sense of a 
Kantian form of intuition, as is the case here--it must be subordinated to disclosedness, which 
is ultimately to be grounded in temporality. These subordinations will not be complete however, 
as spatial reference will be irreducible in the terms used in the description of temporality. This 
irreducible spatial "reference" occurs because terms iterable in discussions of space are also 
iterated in the description of temporality, thus inscribing a "haunting" whose formalization I call 
the "economy of time." 
Heidegger's #32, "Understanding and Interpretation," contains the only thematiza-
tion of the acceptations of Sinn that will be twisted into each iteration of the mark. Sinn here is 
a component of the existential understanding, which is Heidegger's first way of rewriting Sinn as 
"meaning": Heidegger has already moved from Husserl's scheme of intenti~nalityto the condition 
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of possibility of that intentionality, what he calls Being-in-the-world. 
Sinn is that wherein the intelligibility (Verstandllchkeit) of something maintains itself. That 
which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, we call "Sinn.• ... Sinn 
is the "upon-which" (Woraufhin) of a projection in terms of which something becomes 
intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-
conception. . . . Sinn must be conceived as the formal-existential framework of the 
disclosedness that belongs to understanding. Sinn is an existentiale of Casein ... (151) 
Here we encounter Sinn as the "terminus· or "pivot• of a projection (in John Caputo's felicitous 
phrase from Radical Hermeneutics): this is Heidegger's first, existential rewriting of Sinn as 
•meaning.· We should read here Vorsicht In the redetermination given it above. 
Heidegger then discusses the Sinn von Sein in these terms (152), as not what is 
profound (tiefsinnig) or standing behind Being, but Being itself in so far as it enters Into the 
understandability of Casein. The Sinn of Being can never be opposed to beings or to Being as 
the "ground" of beings, because any "ground" is only accessible as .filnn, even when Sinn has 
dissolved into the Abgrynd of Slnnlosigkeit. Here Heidegger once more distinguishes between 
the metaphysical search for grounds and the destructive investigation of the Sinn of Being, 
which first makes possible any positing of grounds, or Indeed for any nihilistic giving up of the 
search for grounds. 
Heidegger then discusses the hermeneutic circle at 152-53. Understanding has an 
existential Sinn that must be properly determined. The circle in understanding belongs to the 
structure of Sinn, which Is grounded in the existential constitution of Casein. Casein itself has an 
ontological circle-structure. 47 
The Temporal Recapitulation 
In this section my reading Is oriented by the little-known acceptation of Sinn as 
"direction."48 I will discuss the way Sinn as direction functions in the Sinnsfrage/Seinsfrage 
economy to disrupt the purity of the description of temporality by installing an irreducibly spatial 
haunting.49 Sinn will take on an acceptation as the direction of Casein's ecstatic contortions as 
it moves back and forth from its horizonal schemata. Insofar as the existential analytic has 
revealed Casein as thrown projection, Sinn in its acceptation of "meaning• is repeated here as 
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the "pivot" of a self-projection is temporally retreived to become the direction of Dasein's 
movement. 
On the third acceptation of Sinn, note Reiner SchOrmann's treatment of this point 
from his Heidegger on Being and Acting: 
If this is the case [that Heidegger's late writings attempt to elaborate the traits of a plural 
economy of presencing], it is clear that the "phenomenological destruction of the history 
of ontology" promised in Sein und Zeit, can be fully understood--and carried out--as a 
deconstruction only from the standpoint of Heidegger's last writings. Only then does it 
become apparent how time can be "der Sinn des Seins•: not the "meaning" of being, but 
its directionality: the "sense" as the direction in which something, e.g., motion, takes place 
(this acceptation of both the English and the French sens-'sense' of a river, or of traffic-
-stems, not from Latin, but from an Inda-European verb that means to travel, to follow a 
path). Not the "signification" of being for a man and hence "a human accomplishment" (a 
misunderstanding that Heidegger says threatened the deconstruction in its first phase, that 
of a destruction in Sein und Zeit), but the directionality of the orderings by which 
constellations of presencing produce themselves. Not the sens unique, the one-way street 
of the epochs unfolding across the ages either (a misunderstanding that threatened during 
the phase of "the history of being"), but the multiple presencing in which things present 
emerge from absence .... 50 
One should note here SchOrmann's use of "not ... but ... • constructions designed to protect a 
proper meaning for Sinn in the phrase "der Sinn des Seins. • My questions here are: how can one 
accomplish such prescription--in this case, literally a "writing down beforehand"? Doesn't this 
amount to a writing down before writing, for is it not writing that we have to consider in order 
to take into account the possibility of misunderstandings and their threats? Can one keep the 
Latin and Inda-European heritages separate as they merge in the single mark "Sinn''? What 
happens when we no longer look for the regulation of a polysemy (for wouldn't this be the 
question about a Sinn van Sinn Oberhaupt?) but for the articulation of a disseminative economy? 
In Part One, Division Two of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger breaks off the existential 
analytic to ask if the foregoing interpretation, which culminated in the analysis of care as the 
Being of Dasein, was adequate. He answers that it was not, for it could not guarantee the 
authenticity and totality of the entity under discussion. To remedy this, Heidegger undertakes the 
analyses of guilt and death, and determines that the authentic totality of Dasein lies in its 
"anticipatory resoluteness, [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]." 
87 
On the basis of this last set of analyses Heidegger then sets out to determine 
Zeitlichkeit as the "ontological Sinn" of care, the Being of Dasein.51 #65 begins with the warning 
that the "unbroken discipline" of the existential analytic must be brought to bear to keep the 
mode of BeinQ of Dasein from becoming perverted [verkehren] by being sighted in the ''wholly 
indifferent mode of Vorhandenheit" (323). This reference to "indifference" points back to an earlier 
passage in which-In the discussion of jQgQ§ as misinterpreted as present-at-hand-Heidegger 
says of Vorhandenheit: 
this Sinn of Being is left undifferentiated and uncontrasted with other possibilities of Being, 
so that Being in the Sinn of a formal Being-something becomes fused with it simultaneous-
ly, and we are unable even to obtain a clear-cut division between these two realms. (160) 
If we recall the Vorhandenheit-extensio relation developed in Heidegger's analysis of Descartes, 
we see here that the issue is one of distinguishing Dasein's mode of Being from that of the 
spatial. Dasein's Being is care, and as we will see, the Sinn of that Being is Zeitlichkeit. The 
overall goal of Sein und Zeit is to exhibit the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt as Temporalitat. The 
descriptions of these temporal phenomena must be kept separate from that of the spatial. Now 
spatiality is three-leveled, including the spatiality of Dasein, of the ready-to-hand, and of the 
present-at-hand. The spatiality of Dasein grounds that of tools, while Dasein's spatiality is 
grounded in its Being-in-the-world, which is in turn grounded in temporality. Tools are accessible 
to falling temporality, while for authentic temporality tools fall away as anticipatory resoluteness 
holds itself in the mode of anxiety. Finally, as #69b points out, presence-at-hand is derived from 
a certain Umschlag of falling temporality (361). As thus several steps removed from original 
temporality, Vorhandenheit would fatally corrupt or pervert descriptions of the phenomenon of 
original temporality. 
Heidegger asks, in #65, 'What are we seeking ontologically with the Sinn of care? 
What does Sinn signify [Was bedeutet Sinn; Heidegger's italics]?" (323). He gives three answers: 
first, he refers us to the analysis of understanding, and repeats the definition first given at 151: 
"Sinn signifies the Woraufhin of a primary projection" (324). Then Heidegger develops the second 
answer to the Bedeutung of Sinn as he tells us that Sinn is that which makes possible the 
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phenomenon to be understood. The projected in this case is the Being of Dasein, and that upon-
which the projection is made is that which makes possible the constitution of Dasein's Being as 
care in the unity of its articulation. 
For his third answer Heidegger discusses .$inn and the understanding of Being, 
repeating the definition of Sinn as •upon-which,· but this time putting the priority on ~ 
verstandnls. "Taken strictly [Streng genommen]; Heidegger writes, "Sinn means [bedeutet] the 
Worauthin of a primary projection of the understanding of Being" (324).52 Heidegger here 
spends a few paragraphs on Sinn as an existential of Casein. He concludes that the question 
about the Sinn of the Being of a being thematlzes the Worauthin of the understanding of Being 
that grounds the Being of beings (325). 
How can one understand that upon which the Being of Casein is projected? In other 
words, the question is, what Is the Sinn of the Being of Casein? The Being of Daseln is care, and 
the Seinssinn of Casein is the self-understanding Casein Itself, Heidegger concludes (325). To 
answer the question of the enabling of the Being of Dasein in more detail, Heidegger then 
discusses SeinkOnnen in its reliance on Zukynft, Being-guilty as grounded in Gewesenheit, and 
the situation as grounded In Gegenwartigen. Care is the unity of "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-
in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered withing-the-world)" (192). The authentic 
mode of care is anticipatory resoluteness. The temporal elements of Zukunft, Gewesenheit, and 
Gegenwartigen make the separate elements of care, ·ahead-of-itself,• "Being-already-in,• and 
ffBeing-alongside• possible, while the unity of these three temporal elements, Zeitlichkeit. which 
Heidegger defines as a "gewesend-gegenwartigende Zukunft einheitliche Phanomen" (326), thus 
makes care possible as a unified phenomenon. 
After having shown how temporality makes care possible, Heidegger turns to the 
Bedeutung of the mark "Zeitlichkeit. • This Bedeutyng must be kept clear from the vulgar time-
concept by a rigorous policing of the terminological use of these expressions (326). Violence is 
unavoidable here (327). Why? Because of sedimented Bedeutyngen. Heidegger writes 
concerning the expressions "before" and "already" as they function in the definition of care: 
"ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside {entities encountered within-the-
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world).• If these expressions are taken solely in their vulgar senses. in which time is conceived 
on the basis of the flow of nows, the Being of Dasein would be conceived in vorhanden terms. 
If the expression 'before' and 'already' were to have a time-oriented signification [zeithafte 
Bedeutung] such as this (and they can have this signification also), then to say that care 
has temporallty would be to say that it is something which is 'earlier' and 'later,' 'not yet' 
and 'no longer.' care would then be conceived as an entity which occurs and runs its 
course 'in time.' The Being of an entity having the character of Dasein would become 
something present-at-hand. (327) 
Terminological vigilance will keep vulgarity and originality separate, Heidegger hopes. Yet, as we 
will see, Heidegger must use a language oriented to the ready-to-hand from which, via an 
Umschlag, the present-at-hand is accessible. In this regard, it Is important to note here that 
Heidegger concedes that the terms he wishes to redetermine do also carry these vulgar 
,emporal significations.· I am concerned here with the economy of this "also.· It seems the 
marks "ahead" and "before• can operate on both sides of the boundary separating vulgar from 
originary. Heidegger's attempted redetermination is thus limited by the sedimentation which 
thereby yields possibilities of non-fully-controllable iteration. Because of this. an economy of 
interpretation is set up that can account for the possibility of misunderstanding positively, in 
terms of dissemination, or that attempts to fix terminology by means of the metaphysical 
distinctions of vulgar versus originary. 
If the terminological distinctions that express the conceptual distinction between 
originary temporality and vulgar time were to collapse, the entire project of fundamental ontology 
would be threatened. If this is not to be so, Heidegger writes, the ,em poral signification [zeithafte 
Bedeutung] of these [orlglnary] expressions must be different feine andere]" (327). The "ahead" 
and "before" indicate the future, Zukunft, which grounds the self-projection that constitutes 
"existentiality." Of existentiallty Heidegger then claims: "Its primary Sinn is the future, Zukunft" 
(327). Clearly the Sinnsfrage is at work here. Only by distinguishing between Sinne of temporal 
expressions can Heidegger clarify existentiality and thus kept the description of temporality clean 
of vulgarity. Yet here Sinn must not only be read as the Bedeutung of the mark "existentiallty," 
but must also be read as "directionality." so that Zu-kunft is taken literally, as "coming toward.• 
But if this is so, then the spatiality of direction must be taken into account in the determining of 
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temporality, and not as derivative upon temporality-as Heidegger implies when he grounds 
Dasein's spatiality on its temporality. 
Heidegger next broaches once again the question of metaphoricity. He tells us that 
Zeitlichkeit "is" not a being. It is not, but it iemporalizes itself [zeitigt sichJ (328). The question 
that concerns my project in this dissertation then is: How describe temporality, which is not a 
being. with a language oriented to beings? Indeed, how describe it with a language oriented to 
the spatiality of those ready-to-hand entities accessible in falling temporality? At this point 
Heidegger describes how the directional characteristics denoted in the prefixes~ (from the· Auf-
.§km-:6.!J" of the authentic future, ~-kunft), auf (from the "ZurOck auf of the authentic having-
been. Gewesenheit), and bei (from the "Begegnenlassens van• of the present, Gegenwart) reveal 
Zeitlichkeit as the ekstatikon pure and simple (329). Here Heidegger's analyses are perhaps at 
their most radical, showing how any notion of the subject as self-identical substance must be 
completely rethought on the basis of an ecstatic "outside-itself.· Now this "itself does not pre-
exist the ecstases, but is precisely constituted by the unity of their "movements.• Heidegger tells 
us first that Zeitllchkeit is the "originary 'outside-itself' in and for its very self [an and fOr sich 
~· (329). He continues that Zeitlichkeit is not a being, that "first steps out of itself, but its 
essence is temporalizing in the unity of ecstases [Sle ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus 
sich heraustritt, sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ecstasen]" (329). The "itself 
of the "outside-itself thus comes to be through the temporalizing of the ecstases; since the issue 
here is the constituting of temporalitv, it would make no sense to postulate an entity that, pre-
existing, spins time out of its already constituted "self." And because of this delay, a language 
oriented to supposedly-present entitles can only be metaphoristically used in describing that 
which renders entities accessible. 
In Chapter I we have seen how Derrida calls espacement, one of the workings of 
differance, the "opening to the first exteriority in general . ..s3 Does not Heidegger himself inscribe 
such an opening in the Ausser-sich of temporality? Of course. To what then does Derrida 
object in Heidegger's description? It must be Heidegger's refusal to name the Ausser-sich a 
spatiality in order to safeguard a privileging of time over space. Let us see how Heidegger 
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attempts such safeguarding. 
Continuing his discussion of temporality, Heidegger tells us that vulgar time is the 
result of a levelling off of this originary ecstatic temporalizing (329). This levelling is nonetheless, 
in its existential Sinn, grounded in a specifically determinate temporalization, that of inauthentic 
temporality. If this is so, continues Heidegger, then we are justified in naming Zeitlichkeit as 
"originary time [ursprQnaliche Zeit]" (329). Now precisely this equation seems to evoke Derrida's 
severest strictures. If Heidegger himself holds that "time" is a vulgarly understood metaphysical 
concept, why would he turn around and assimilate his most radical analyses to this concept? 
The addition of the adjective "originary" to "time" in the equation of Zeitlichkeit and originary time, 
Derrida seems to say-since "originary" is caught in a metaphysical opposition to "derivative" --
is not enough to wrench Zeitllchkeit from the system governing the mark "time.• Let us recall his 
words in "Ousia and Gramme": 
Time is that which is thought on the basis of Being as presence, and if something-which 
bears a relation to time, but is not time-is to be thought beyond the determination of 
Being as presence, it cannot be a question of something that could still be called time. 54 
In Chapter 11 claimed Derrida was here referring to his notion of differance. However, Derrida's 
strictures are obviously also applicable to Heidegger's "temporality. • Of equal concern to me in 
this dissertation is the fact that Derrida also writes about the metaphysicalness of posing the 
question of Being in terms of Sinn. How is Heidegger's definition of Zeitlichkeit as the Sinn of 
Dasein and Temporalitat as the Sinn van Sein Qberhaupt related to Derrida's strictures on both 
Sinn/~ and the mark "time"? I can answer this question only after the discussion of the 
horizonal schemata in #69c. 
The finitude of originary temporality is the final topic of #65. This finitude is not a 
breaking off [Aufhoren], but a character of temporality itself. Heidegger tells us here that 
"Primordial and authentic coming-toward-oneself is the Sinn of existing in one's ownmost nullity" 
(330). Here we find a preview of the reading of Sinn as direction that I will pursue in more detail 
in the discussion of #69c. The sentence must be read both as "Primordial and authentic coming-
toward-oneself is what existing in one's ownmost nullity means" and "Primordial and authentic 
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coming-toward-oneself is the direction which the movement that is existing in one's ownmost 
nullity takes." 
Chapters 4-6 of Division Two attempt to develop the full contours of Dasein's 
temporality by exploring temporality and everydayness, historicality, and within-time-ness as the 
origin of the vulgar concept of time. Chapter 4 discusses the temporality of disclosedness in 
general, of Being-in-the-world and the problem of transcendence, of Dasein's spatiality; and 
concludes with the zeitliche Sinn of Dasein's everydayness. Section 68 is divided in four sub-
sections, dealing with the temporality of understanding, Befindlichkeit, falling, and discourse. I 
cannot enter their analyses here. Section 69 is entitled "The temporality of Being-in-the-world and 
the Problem of the Transcendence of the World.· #69a, "The temporality of circumspective 
concern,• cannot detain us here. #69b "The zeitliche Sinn of the way cicumspective concern is 
modified into theoretical discovery of the present-at-hand within-the-world" contains an important 
discussion of the way the understanding of Being that reveals the ready-to-hand must undergo 
an Umschlag in order to reveal the present-at-hand. 
Heidegger begins #69b by announcing that the discussion of the ontological 
genesis of the theoretical comportment will investigate science as a mode of existence, that is, 
of Being-in-the-world (357). Asserting a mere disappearance of praxis will not do, Heidegger 
continues, but one must begin by acknowledging the subordination of circumspection (Umsicht) 
to the primary understanding of the totality of involvements (Bewandtnisganzheit) (359). After a 
discussion of the grounding of the as-structure in the temporality of understanding, Heidegger 
sets out to analyze an "elementary assertion• and its modification. To understand the genesis of 
the theoretical comportment, he continues, we must understand that the change from a sighting 
of the ready-to-hand to a sighting of the present-at-hand is the result of an Umschlag of the 
understanding of Being involved therein. This Umschlag not only overlooks the tool-character 
of the ready-to-hand, it also overlooks the "place· that belongs to each ready-to-hand tool (361). 
The place becomes the "spatio-temporal position lRaum-Zeit-Stelle]," a·"world-point ["Weltpunkt"; 
Heidegger's quotation marks]" (362). Such a dissolution of the tool-place connection means the 
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entities of the environment are "released [entschranktJ," and the totality (8!!) of the present-at-
hand becomes thematized (362). Heidegger concludes by showing how the transcendence of 
Dasein must underlie both the objectifying thematization of the present-at-hand and that of which 
it is the Umschlag, circumspective concern. The transcendence of Dasein is then to be shown 
as grounded in temporality, the object of the next sub-section, #69c. 
When we tum to #69c, "The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World,• 
we see the problem is the ground of the unity of world and Dasein, that is, the way significance 
holds together the "for-the-sake-of-which" and the "in-order-to." The unity of significance is 
grounded in temporality, so that the "existential-temporal condition for the possiblity of the world 
lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon· (365). At this 
point Heidegger introduces the concept of horizon as providing a direction55 for Dasein's ecstatic 
movement: 
Ecstases are not simply raptures In which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs 
to each ecstasis a 'whither' [Wohin] to which one is carried away. This 'whither' of the 
ecstasis we call the horlzonal schema· (365). 
The ecstases are given paths, are set upon tracks; Dasein is not a simple ripping open. An 
undirected rapture, an EntrOckung without a schema, would be too close to a maddening, a 
VerrQckung. Zeitllchkeit would have no sense, in both the senses of meaning and direction. 
Indeed, horizon will now be linked to Sinn via the notion of "terminus· or "pivot" [Woraufhln]: "The 
horizon of .Z:eitlichkeit as a whole determines that whereupon [Woraufhln] factically existing 
entities are essentlally disclosed" (365). We must remember here the movement beneath 
intentionality to Being-in-the-world. Dasein is its projects, Heidegger constantly reminds us; we 
cannot understand Dasein's projections in terms of intentions issuing from a subjectivity, but 
must see Dasein's Being in Its ecstatic movement. We should recall here the definition of Sinn 
just given: 'Taken strictly, Sinn means the Woraufhin of a primary projection of the understanding 
of Being" (324). The understanding of Being discloses beings by a self-projection of Dasein. Such 
a project--considered temporally-involves Dasein ecstatically projecting itself upon Sinn as its 
ecstases take the paths laid out for It in advance by the horizonal schemata. How do the 
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schemata provide for such disclosure? They provide a point from which Dasein can rebound and 
come back to entities. Heidegger explains: 
Factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world ecstatically in the unity of the 'there' 
comes back from these horizons to the entities encountered within them. Coming back 
to these entities understandingly (Das verstehende Zuruckkommen auf ... ) is the 
existential Sinn of letting them be encountered by making them present. (366) 
Here we can see most clearly the doubling of Sinn as meaning and Sinn as direction. One must 
read the last sentence both as "coming back to entities from horizons is what letting them be 
encountered means" and as "coming back to entities from horizons is the direction of Dasein's 
movement that lets entities be encountered.• 
At this point we can see most clearly the spatiality that inhabits Heidegger's 
descriptions of temporality. Zuruckkommen, which is here used to describe Dasein's temporality, 
was previously used to describe Dasein's spatiality in its achieving of a "here" from its ''there." 
Heidegger writes: "Das Dasein ist gemass seiner Raumlichkeit zunachst nie hier, sondern dart, 
aus welchem Dort es auf sein Hier zurOckkommt ... • (107).56 When we compare this passage 
from the discussion of Dasein's spatiality to the preceding from the discussion of Dasein's 
temporality we can clearly see the spatial-temporal undecidable economy of zuruckkommt, its 
irreducible possibility of iteration in both spatial and temporal contexts. 
The ZurOckkommen corresponds to one of the features of Dasein's spatiality, Ent-
fernung. The "Wohin" and "Woraufhin" we noticed in the descriptions of the temporal schemata 
install a directionality, an Ausrichtung--the second feature which Heidegger has developed in 
the analysis of Dasein's spatiality-at the heart of temporality. 
As iterable in spatial contexts, ZurOckkommen and Wohin/Woraufhin show that the 
supposed purity of temporality is haunted by spatiality. We must not leap to the conclusion that 
this haunting is accomplished in the name of the spatiality of the present-at-hand. Heidegger's 
descriptions of temporality disrupt metaphysical, Vorhanden, notions of the subject via its 
ecstatics; the schemata direct the ecstatics, providing a unitary out and back movement. Now 
this "out" (to the schemata) and "back" (to entities) Is a movement without a fixed starting point. 
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Strictly speaking, it "is" not a "movement" but a "temporalizing" of ecstases along a certain path. 
However, such ecstatics cannot be conceived purely temporally. The descriptions of 
temporalizing cannot totally reduce the spatiality of movement,57 for the ecstases must be given 
a direction, made to make sense. They must have something to bounce off and come back to 
entities in disclosing them, for Dasein is essentially with the entities it discloses. Without 
schemata to direct the ecstases, Dasein could not be alongside other entities. It would not then 
be Dasein, essentially falling. But the necessity of providing directions for the ecstases provides 
an additional threat to the attempt to isolate the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt as Temporalitat, as 
terms iterable in spatial discussions find their way into the description of temporality. 
The haunting of temporality by terms iterable in spatial contexts doubles the 
haunting in which Sinn as Bedeutung threatens the radicality of Sinn as direction. Here we must 
consider Derrida's strictures on the mark Sinn/sens. As we remarked above, he writes in "Ousia 
and Gramme" that Sinn/sens is irreducibly bound to the system of presence: 
... ~ (in whatever sense it is understood: as essence, as the meaning [signification] 
of discourse, as the orientation of the movement between arcM and telos) has never been 
conceivable, within the history of metaphysics, otherwise than on the basis of presence 
and as presence. 58 
Has Derrida exhausted all the ways Sinn works in the text Sein und Zeit? Sinn as direction 
orienting Dasein's ecstases is haunted by Sinn as meaning, it is true, but is Sinn as direction 
inherently metaphysical? Is the direction provided by the schemata thinkable as "orientation of 
the movement between~ and ..m!.Q§"? When Dasein exists authentically, it is its projects .M 
possiblities; realizing a telos is precisely reducing possibility to actuality, is bringing a being into 
its entelecheia. Dasein's keeping alive the possibility-character of its projected possibilities, 
especially when it concerns Dasein's "ownmost possibility,· cannot be thought within the system 
of arcM and telos. Do not the resources of the mark Sinn thus allow it to disrupt metaphysical 
conceptuality? Consider here Mer1eau-Ponty, who, in the section of temporality of The 
Phenomenology of Perception, sees sens as inherently ecstatic: 
In all uses of the word sens, we find the same fundamental notion of a being orientated 
or polarized in the direction of what he is not, and thus we are always brought back to a 
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conception of the subject as ek-stase, and to a relationship of active transcendence 
between the subject and the world.59 
Sinn reins in the ecstases, tames them, makes them make sense, yet all the while in an economy 
marginal to metaphysics. For Bataille's nobles, it may be so, any check on expenditure would 
be vulgar, any making sense metaphysical. But Derrida is not Bataille, and surely neither is 
Heidegger. Would Heidegger not reply that Dasein must find its way among beings, and for that 
it needs to encounter them by making sense? Can this not be described in a way that avoids 
madness as well as total vulgarity? Is not Heidegger's project that of making some new sense? 
Does it then finally make sense to see Sinn in the system of arche and telos? 
I have maintained that Sinn as direction-as it functions in the description of 
temporality--is a haunting of time by space as predicted by the "formal rule" of "Ousia and 
Gramme.· I have called the articulation of such irreducible haunting "the economy of time.· 
What does Heidegger himself have to say about the relation of time and space in Sein und Zeit? 
#70 concerns the temporality of Casein's spatiality. Heidegger is concerned in the beginning 
of the section that the analyses of spatiality seem to want to impose themselves as co-originary 
with those of temporality. Heidegger writes, obviously disapproving such pretension on the part 
of spatiality: 
Thus with Casein's spatiality, existential temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that 
this entity which we call "Dasein" must be considered as "temporal" "and also" as spatial 
co-ordinately finder Nebenordnung). (367) 
Why the disapproval? What happened to the praise of analyses that preserve the Gleich-
ursprunglichkeit of phenomena and deride the desire for an origin? Preparing the way for the 
analyses of Das In-Sein als solches Heidegger writes: 
The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of consititutive items has often been disregarded 
in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and 
anything from some simple "primal ground." (131) 
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Granted that temporality, due to its ecstases, could never have been a "simple" Urgrund, 
Heidegger must still explain why spatiality is consigned the status of a pretentious Nebenordnung 
rather than that of an authentic Gleichur-sprunglichkeit.60 
Rather than admit the equality of Dasein's spatiality with that of its temporality, 
Heidegger states that we must ground the "specific" spatiality of Dasein in temporality: "Dann 
muss aber auch die spezifische Raumlichkeit des Daseins in der Zeitlichkeit grunden" (367). Now 
this does not mean a "deduction· of space from time, he clarifies, nor does it mean the 
"dissolving" (auflosen) of space in pure time {367). Dasein can only be spatial as care in the Sinn 
of tactical-falling existence, Heidegger writes, and thus only because Dasein as Zeitlichkeit is 
ecstatico-horizonal can it take along with itself a space. Thus Dasein's spatiality is to be 
grounded in ecstatic temporality. To repeat our earlier question: Why does Heidegger refuse to 
grant the Ausser-sich of ecstatic temporality the status of a spatiality, and why does he insist on 
calling ecstatic temporality an "originary time"? 
The ecstatic temporality of Dasein's spatiality, Heidegger continues, renders 
understandable the independence of space from time, but it also renders understandable the 
"dependence" of Dasein on space. This dependence is visible, Heidegger tells us, in the "well-
known" phenomenon that Dasein's self-interpretation and the stock of significations [Bedeutungs-
bestand] of .language are dominated by "spatial representations ["raumlichen Vorstellungen"; 
Heidegger's quotation marks]" (369). Such a priority of the spatial in the articulation of sig-
nifications [Bedeutu.ngenl and concepts, Heidegger tells us, is grounded in a mode of Being of 
Dasein: 
Temporality is essentially falling, and it loses itself in making present; not only does it 
understand itself circumspectively in terms of objects of concern which are ready-to-
hand, but from those spatial relationships which making-present is constantly meeting in 
the ready-to-hand as having presence [als anwesend], it takes its clues for Articulating that 
which has been understood and can be interpreted in the understanding in general. (369) 
The spatial relationships of the ready-to-hand, we recall, are those of nearness, place, and region 
(#22). These are grounded in Dasein's Being-in-the-world, whose spatiality is directional (#23). 
Now if "spatial representations" are linked to falling temporality, and falling is a necessary 
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structure of Dasein, then we must ask that Heidegger give a positive account for the spatiality 
in the descriptions of Dasein's temporality. Heidegger attempts to ground Dasein's spatiality on 
its temporality, yet we find the very description of temporality using terms iterated in the analysis 
of Dasein's spatiality. Evan if one grants that Heidegger has avoided the encroachment of 
Vorhandenheit into the description of Dasein, we must claim that he cannot reduce all spatial-
ity. As such, his discourse is haunted. He has attempted to isolate a notion of originary time from 
any "spatial" descriptions, but they will not be kept out. 
The following schema thus seems to be In place: falling, scattered, spatially-
dominated Dasein is gathered to itself in authentic temporality. But the "itself is an "outside-
itself that Heidegger refuses to call a spatiality, refusing thus to recognize an originary time-
space. At this point we can partially conclude that Derrida in "Ousia and Gramme" was not 
as nuanced as he could have been about the economy of Sinn/sens. However, he did predict 
the haunting of temporal descriptions by spatial terms we have unraveled with the help of the 
economy of Sinn and that we have called the economy of time, in which we have seen 
Heidegger is enmeshed. 
To finish our discussion of the Sinnsfraqe at work in Sein und Zeit let us consider 
Heidegger's treatment of historicality. Providing an interpretation of historicality, Heidegger writes, 
will be a "more concrete working-out" of Zeitlichkeit (382). In beginning the descriptions of 
historicality Heidegger tells us the preceding analyses of temporality depended on grasping 
Dasein in its authentic totality. Yet death, which provides for Dasein's totality in its "Being-
toward-the-end, • provides only one "end" of Dasein. Birth is the other end that must be taken 
account of. The question is, how is Dasein "between" its two ends, birth and death?61 Heidegger 
considers the vulgar response, that the connectedness of Dasein "consists" of a sequence of 
experiences (373). Heidegger then proposes the notion of Dasein's unique Being as the 
"between" that connects birth and death as Dasein's "stretching" [Erstreckunq] (374). Heidegger 
writes at 375: 
The movement [Bewegtheit] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something 
present-at-hand. . . . The specific movement fBewegtheit] in which Dasein is stretched 
alone and stretches itself along [erstrecken Sicherstreckens] we call its historizing ~ 
hehenJ.62 
Historizing, like the analyses of temporality of which it is the concretion, must be kept clear of 
terms derived from Vorhandenheit. Yet is Bewegtheit clear of all spatiality? Does not the Weg 
mark a Being-on-the-path?63 Such a path need not be a straight line, of course. Heidegger soon 
differentiates the directionality of Dasein's happening from the direction a movement along a 
straight line takes, that of arriving, lingering and departing: 
The movement of historizing [Bewegtheit des Geschehens] In which something "happens 
to something• is not to be grasped in terms of motion as change of location [Bewegung 
als Ortsveranderung] .... And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being 
understands "Being" as presence-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the 
wor1d-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand 
which comes along, has presence, and then disappears [wird das Sein des Welt-
Geshichtlichen im Slnne des ankommenden, anwesenden und verschwinden Vorhandenen 
erfahren und ausgelegt]. (389) 
The Sinn of Bewegtheit is not that of a straight-line, but of a self-stretching-between two ends· 
-which, at each encounter with entities, moves out and back along the paths of its ecstases. The 
Weg of Bewegtheit is not that of the hands of a clock. But, we may ask, is the essentlality of -
heit the price Heidegger must pay to make such a distinctlon?64 
Vulgar and Primordial Time 
We are now in a position to investigate Heidegger's analyses in Division Two, 
Chapter 6. Heidegger has set up his treatise in such a way that he must redetermine the 
significations oriented to vulgar time so that the descriptions of originary temporality be kept 
clear. At this point in his text Heidegger sets out to show the derivation of vulgar •t1me· from 
originary temporality. Vulgar time is to be shown as a "genuine• f echtesJ temporal phenomenon; 
although derivative, it is not a spatializing of time, but is temporal through and through. Despite 
its temporal nature, vulgar time understands itself in terms of Vorhandenheit, whose spatiality is 
one of extension. 
Chapter 6 of Division Two has the following structure: #78 details the incomplete-
ness of the analysis so far; #79, Dasein's temporality and our concern with time; #80, this 
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concernful time and within-time-ness; #81, withln-time-ness and the genesis of the vulgar 
concept of time; #82, the contrast with Hegel; and the concluding section of Sein und Zelt, #83, 
the question of fundamental ontology and the Sinn van Sein Oberhaupt. 
#79 details three structures of concernful time: datability, spannedness, and 
publicness. In this section "time" is defined as "the making-present which interprets Itself-that is, 
that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the 'now' • (408). Heidegger explains that 
such self-interpretation is made possible by ecastico-horizonal temporality, which consitutes the 
"there.· As thus constituting the "there" temporallty is always Interpretable and thus familiar to us 
in the "there· (408). However, our familiarity with "time" does not preclude that primordial 
temporallty, and its temporalizing the origin of expressed time, remain unknown and unconceived 
(408). 
How does this definition of "time" relate to that of Derrida, who sees "time" as the 
mark of the limits within which the trace has been determined? Derrida sees "time• as the mark 
of the effacement of the trace; Heidegger sees "time" as a derivative self-understanding of 
temporallty as originary time. For Derrida, "time• cannot but be metaphysical, for it is conceived 
in terms of the present, which, as consituted by the arche-trace, can only be seen "as such" by 
an effacement of the trace. For Heidegger, "time" is vulgar, for it is understood on the basis of 
the now as present-at-hand, a conception only possible in an Umschlag from the falling 
temporallty that allows the ready-to-hand to be encountered. Falling temporallty, while genuinely 
temporal, is inauthentic compared to the authentic temporallty of anticipatory resoluteness. Both 
inauthentic and authentic modes are ways in which temporallty temporalizes itself, but inauthentic 
temporallty understands itself in terms of what it allows to be encountered, while authentic tem-
porallty should understand itself only on its own terms. However, since temporallty is not a being, 
but temporalizes itself, its description broaches the problem of metaphorlclty since it must 
proceed with a language oriented to the ready-to-hand. 
Derrida focuses on the equation of temporality and originary time. Why this 
equation? If falling temporallty is essential, the question goes, why call Its self-interpretation 
vulgar? Why attribute originarlty to that which must, essentially, be supplemented by a falling 
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temporality which "genuinely" misinterprets itself? Why not cast mis-interpretation as metaphor-
icity?65 
Now the three structures of falling temporality-datability, spannedness, publicness-
-are tied to Dasein's ecstatics, historicality, and Being as Mitdasein, respectively. Datability 
reflects (is the Widerschein of) the ecstatic constitution of temporality, in that temporality is for 
the most part falling into a making-present of entitles within the wortd, thus allowing for the 
dating of a time by its relation to an occurence. Spannedness involves the ecstatic stretching of 
historical temporality, which I discussed above. Publicness is grounded in Mitdasein; here we use 
the time that Is there for everyone. 
In #80, on time-reckoning, we learn that the sun, the natural clock, provides an 
Mhour" that is ready-to-hand (413). Eventually, through a discussion which is not to be confused 
with a historiography of time-pieces, Heidegger shows that the movement of the clock is inter-
preted as a present-at-hand manifold of nows. The saying •now" of telling the time, Heidegger 
maintains, is a dating with the character of measuring. As such, it reveals time as a vorhandene 
Jetzt-mannigfaltigkeit (417). The move from the sun to the clock completes the publicness of 
time. Now, temporality makes the disclosure of space possible, so that concernful time is bound 
up with an place (Ort). In this way, dating is possible, so that, regarding the alleged spatialization 
of time, Heidegger claims that making-present and measurement make accessible the change 
of location of a spatial thing (417). Thus the temporality of disclosure is prior to the time revealed 
in the measuring of motion-hence the necessity of distinguishing Bewegtheit from Bewegung. 
Now the final question becomes: How does the everyday conception of time block an 
understanding of primordial temporallty? The everyday concept, Heidegger answers, understands 
time from out of entities encountered within time. 
#81 explores "Wlthin-time-ness and the genesis of the vulgar concept of time.· 
Heidegger begins by showing that the understanding of time that develops from clock-time is 
that expressed in Aristotle's definition of time. He continues to claim that all subsequent 
philosophies of time conform to Aristotle. Now the ordinary understanding of time conceives time 
as a stream of nows. Such an understanding is possible only when datability and significance 
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are covered-over, so that the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality is levelled-off (422). 
The now becomes understood as present-at-hand (423). In doing so, inauthenticity shows itself 
as a looking-away from finitude, and so grounding the misunderstanding that is vulgar time (424). 
Such inauthentic looking away also explains the covering-over of the genesis of vulgar time. 
Casein falls in among entities and eventually comes to understand itself in the terms offered by 
these encounters. 
I have dealt sufficiently with #82, the object of ·ousia and Gramme," in Chapter I. 
#83 describes the breaking off of the project of Sein und Zeit. How is the disclosive 
understanding of Being possible in a way suited to Casein, asks Heidegger? Casein's originary 
temporality must make possible the ecstatic project of Being, Heidegger reminds us, but how 
is this to be interpreted? Is there a way from originary time to the Sinn of .12.@ing? (437) Does time 
reveal itself as the horizon of Being? What is the trouble with the system of Sinn/time? We have 
seen how Sinn as direction is haunted by Sinn as meaning; we have also seen how Sinn as 
direction is a spatial haunting of the description of Casein's temporality. Such doubling, or 
haunting, prompts the Sinnsfrage so that the question of a Sinn of Being in general is haunted 
by Casein's temporality being implicated In the metaphoricity of Casein's "movement.• This 
haunting Is accompanied by another: Sinn as the Bedeutung of the word "Sein· threatens to 
provide a hardened, metaphysical answer to the question of Being in terms of a concept that can 
control our representations, that can give a meaning to "Being.· Because of these intertwinings, 
Casein's Zeitlichkeit is described in irreducibly spatial terms, despite the attempt to ground 
Casein's spatiality on its temporality. Just as Derrida had predicted, the attempt to provide a pure 
temporal description of Casein's Zeitlichkeit prior to the posing of the question of Temporalitat 
as the Sinn von Sein uberhaupt is haunted by the repressed member of the pair "time/space,• 
a haunting indicated by the spatiality of direction. 
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NOTES 
1.Heidegger distinguishes between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitit. The English convention is 
"temporality" for Zeitlichkeit and "T emporallty" for T emporalitat. Because capitalization in English 
is often used for emphasis this convention runs the risk of thinking Temporalitit is somehow 
more important than Zeitllchkeit, which Is not the case. In this dissertation I will retain the 
German word Temporalitat, but translate Zeitlichkeit as "temporality." 
2.See here David Krell's Intimations of Mortality. 
3.Sallis, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible," Research in Phenomenology, XVII (1987), 
p. 4. 
4.Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics, pp. 172-73. 
5. This acceptation does not come across very strongly in English. According to JQwm 
Etvmoloqisches WOrterbuch the contemporary German Sinn combines the Bedeutungen of two 
separate roots, that of the Latin sensus and the neuhochdeutsch sinnan. The OED tells us that 
the English "sense" is derived from the Latin sensus. while JSlyg§, claims sinnan has the same root 
as the germanlsch .fil!:!p§, "Reise. Weg. • 
For Sinn as directionality compare the French sens unigue and Italian senso unico for "one-
way street." I will discuss all these acceptations of Sinn later in this chapter. 
6.See the "The Double Session,• in Dissemination. as well as "Signature Event Context" and 
"Limited Inc,• in Limited Inc. 
7.Heidegger, Wegmarken p. 325. Heidegger complains about the understanding of Entwurf as 
vorstellendes Setzen. 
8.Derrida, Maraes, 58-59/51-52; translation slightly modified. 
9.See here also the conclusion of "Form and Meaning" (Marges 206/172), where the sense of 
Being and the form of presence are linked, with the economy of their circulation seen as able 
tv be disrupted by a notion of the trace, such as it Is inscribed in the text of Plotlnus. Derrida 
also devotes a note to Plotlnus at the end of ·ousia and Gramme.• 
10.Derrida, Marges, pp. 392-93/328. David Wood uses this point to structure his The 
Deconstruction of Time. 
11.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 36. 
12.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 369. 
13.See Cassell's German-English Dictionary under Bedeutung: "3. sense, acceptation (of a 
word)." 
14.J.L Austin, How To Do Things With Words (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); John 
Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1970). 
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15.Franz Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg 
im Breisgau, 1862). See page 25: "In eir:iem andem Sinne spricht man van Wahrheit, wenn man 
van dem urtheilenden Verstande, in einem andrn, wenn man vond der Wahrheit einfacher Vorstel-
lungen und Deflnitionen redet, oder wenn man die Dinge selbst wahr nennt. • 
16.See Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography" 
in Heidegger: The Man and 
the Thinker. ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981). 
17.Gottlob Frege, "Uber Sinn und Bedeutung: Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophiche 
Kritik, Vol. 100 (1892), 25-50. Translated as "On Sense and Reference· by Max Black in Geach 
and Black, eds. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1970). 
18. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersychungen. Hussertiana XIX/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1984). 
19.Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, p. 58. 
20.Husserl, ldeen zu einer reinen Pha.nomenologie und Pha.nomenolgischen Philosophie, Erstes 
Buch: Allegemeine EinfOhrung in die reine Phanomenologie, Husserliana Ill (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1950). 
21.Thomas Sheehan, "Time and Being 1925-2T in Thinking about Being, ed. R.W. Shahan and 
J.N. Mohanty (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984). 
22.Heidegger, Loglk: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, GA 21 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), p. 191; 
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes, GA 20 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), p. 190. 
23.Heidegger, PGZB, p. 193. 
24.Heidegger, PGZB, p. 196; Heidegger's italics. 
25.Heidegger, PGZB, p. 194. 
26.That is, Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics still constructs narratives of a pre-
metaphysical origin victimized by the hardening terminology of Plato and Aristotle. These 
narratives are undercut within the text of Introduction to Metaphysics, however, by the analyses 
that show that~ contains always already within it~. 
27.I touched upon the latter essay in discussing Derrida's treatment of it in "Ousia and Gramme• 
(Chapter I). 
28.This mention of the perverse reading appears in the long footnote concerned with the way 
affirmative Zusagen undercuts the privilege of the question. Of Spirit, p. 153 /134. 
29.Sein und Zeit operates with the hermeneutic strategy thematized within it. That is, Heidegger 
will, in using several terms, rely upon the vague preunderstanding of the words he can assume 
to be at work in his audience. Heidegger will then in the course of the work rewrite, redetermine 
thematically, these terms. A tension is then set up between the received meaning and the 
redefined term. As we will see, this tension between received and redefined meaning is especially 
severe when the term to be redefined is Sinn itself, one of whose received meanings is of course 
"meaning." 
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30.David Krell has pointed out in an unpublished class lecture the relation between Heidegger's 
interchangeable use of the verbs leben and sich bewegen and Aristotle's definition of entities by 
~ as those having the arche of their kinesis within themselves. See Physics 81 and 
Heidegger's commentary on that text. 
31.See here Sallis, "Twisting Free: Being to an Extent 
Sensible.· 
32. Heidegger is not totally consistent here. In the table of contents he calls Zeitlichkeit the 
"ontological Sinn,• while care is called the "existential Sinn" of Daseln. Of course, care is also, 
as the Being of Dasein, an ontological determination. 
33.Bergson, Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (Paris: Felix Al can, 1938), p. 75. 
34.See here Heidegger's marginal note: "Verstandlichkeit: sic! wobel freilich 'Verstandlichkeit' auf 
Verstehen als Entwurf und dieser als ekstatische Zeitllchkeit." 
35.This is the key term in a discussion of time/space at the end of the essay "Das Wesen der 
Sprache" in Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfulllngen: Neske, 1959). English translation "The Nature 
of Language" in The Way to Language. tr. Peter Herz and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1971 ). See also Emil Kettering, Nahe: Das Denken Martin Heidegqers (Pfullingen: Neske, 
1987). 
36.ln Chapter Ill I discuss the role of the sun in the Aristotelian economy of time. 
37.Research in Phenomenology. XVII (1987). 
38.Sallis, "Twisting Free," p. 8. 
39.Sallis, "Twisting Free,• p. 17. 
40.ln Martin Heidegger in Europe and America, ed. Edward G. Ballard and Charles E. Scott (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973). 
41.Sallis, "Language and Reversal," p. 141. 
42.Sallis, "Language and Reversal,• p. 146. Emphasis added. 
43.There is a long history here, starting with Aristotle's Poetics and continuing through Cicero, 
Ouintillian, Donatus, Augustine, and Aquinas, to name only the most prominent. 
44.See here the etymologies of Begriff and con-cipere. 
45.See here Sein und Zeit, pp. 350-51 for the equation of original light and Zeitlichkeit. 
46.See here Derrida's "The Retrait of Metaphor." 
47.See Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics here. 
48.See Kluge: Etymologisches Worterbuch where the corresponding neuhochdeutsch sinnan 
means "reisen. streben. qehen. • See also the French "sens unique· and the Italian "senso unico" 
for "one-way street.· Littre list "direction" under the 21st definition of~· See note 5 above. 
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49.Heldegger himself never thematizes the acceptation of Sinn as direction in Being and Time. 
although he does make it the object of several fascinating paragraphs in the 1953 essay on 
Georg Trakl, "Die Sprache im Gedicht, • in Unterwegs zur Sprache. See also Derrida's 
commentary on this passage in De !'esprit. 
50.SchOrmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, p. 13. 
51.Richardson at this point equates Sinn and Being, no doubt taking his lead from SZ 31, where 
the Being of a being is seen as constituting, although as hidden, the Sinn and ground of that 
which does show itself. 
52.See Caputo's Radical Hermeneutics for the distinction between primary and secondary 
projections. 
53.Derrida, Of Grammatology. p. 70. See above, p. 56. 
54.Derrida, Marges, p. 69/60. 
55.See here Richardson, p. 88. 
56.See also the following passage setting up the attempt to ground Casein's spatiality on its 
temporality: "Es [DaseinJ bestimmt je seinen eigenen Ort so, dass es aus dem eingeraumten 
Raum auf den 'Platz' zurOckkommt, den es belegt hat" (Sein und Zeit, p. 368). 
57.1 will show In Chapter Ill how In the Aristotelian text any movement refers to spatial movement 
as the key term of its economy. 
58.Derrida, Marges. p. 58/51. 
59.Maurice Mer1eau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge and Paul, 1962), p. 430. 
60.See here Nietzsche's strictures on levelling of Rangordnungen in Beyond Good and Evil. 
61.Heldegger is careful to place "between" [Zwischen) in quotation marks so that he might use 
sous rature a "spatial" term. 
62.Heidegger does not make this distinction at 147 of Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, 
although he does express some hesitancy about the use of Bewegung: "Und dleses Sich-
vorweg-sein als ZurOckkommen ist eine eigentOmliche Bewegung, wenn ich so sagen dart, die 
das Dasein selbst standig macht. • 
63.Here we come to the dissemination of semantic kernels. Derrida will even come to discuss 
the dissemination of letters in "The Double Session.· 
64.See here Derrida's interrogation in De l'esprit of Heidegger's statement that "the essence of 
technology is nothing technological.• 
65.Derrida's "Retrait" essay shows Heidegger moving toward such an understanding. To 
complement the analyses of "Retrait" one could compare the self-evisceration of the end of wzeit 
und Seinw ("Ein Hindernis dieser Art bleibt auch das Sagen vom Ereignis in der Weise eines 
Vortrags. Er hat nur im Aussagesatzen gesprochen.· [Zyr Sache des Denkens, p. 251) with the 
discussion of "ontlschen Modelle" In the "Protocol to a Seminar" CZur Sache des Denkens, p. 51 ). 
CHAPTER Ill 
THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
AND THE ECONOMY OF TIME 
Introduction 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 1 is the text of a lecture course given by 
Heidegger in Summer Semester 1927, just after the publication of Being and Time.2 It was the 
first release of the Gesamtausgabe, volume 24, in 1975. Thus, although typescripts of the course 
may have been available prior to publication, Derrida most likely had no idea of its contents 
when he wrote "Ousia and Gramme• in 1969. This is unfortunate, for we could have expected 
many interesting comments had he had the chance to read Basic Problems. since Heidegger 
devoted a substantial portion of the course to a detailed analysis of Aristotle's text on time in 
Physics IV 10-14.3 
In this chapter I will continue with the articulation of the economy of time by 
presenting a reading of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle. I will show how the very same spatial 
haunting I have called "the economy of tlme"-articulated by Derrida's "formal rule"-is at work 
in Basic Problems. I will do so by showing how Heidegger's attempt to purify Aristotle's time 
discourse of any spatial elements necessitates his overturning of three Aristotelian economies 
of m~anlng, those of proteron kai· husteron, metabole, and kinesis.4 All these overturnings 
attempt to reduce space, but the allegedly purified discourse on time is haunted by the possible 
iteration pf its key terms (in Heidegger's case, Obergang) in the economy of spatial motion, 
.J2b.Qrg, that Aristotle shows is primary in the economy of kinesis. Heidegger attempts to regulate 
these economies by distinguishing between the proper (formal and non-spatial) and improper 
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(spatial) Sinn of key terms, but I show how this attempt is caught up in the Sinnsfrage, the 
economy of which itself contains an irreducible spatial moment. As I have claimed in Chapter 
I, the formal rule of the margin is one of "submission (to) and subtraction (from)" the system of 
Being as presence. The formal rule can thus be said to articulate the submission to the self-
effacing of the trace (which allows for presence) and the subtraction from that system (the 
hollowing out of presence by the trace that must be able to be read from the inscription of [the 
desire for] presence). The self-effacing of the trace-which, as differance, articulates time/space-
-allows for time to appear, but as always haunted by the repressed member of the pair, space. 
In showing how Heidegger's attempt to purify Aristotle's time discourse of spatial elements is 
haunted by space I will have shown that the reading of Aristotle in Basic Problems fits Into what 
Derrida calls "the epoch of Sein und Zeit, • since I will have shown that its key terms-as capable 
of iteration in an economy with an irreducible spatial moment-are undecidably spatial/temporal. 
In other words, I will have shown that Basic Problems falls under the sway of the "formal rule" 
of the occlusion of "the problem of the written trace" that governs the project of the question of 
the Sinn of Being. 5 
I will round out the chapter with a short comparison of the reading of Aristotle in 
"Ousia and Gramme· and Basic Problems. 
The Outline of the Course 
As Heidegger's note on the first page of Basic Problems tells us, the course was 
intended as a "new working out of the third division of the first part of Being and Time· (1 ). As 
such, it was to work out "Time and Being,· and thus provide the concrete answer to the question 
of the Sinn of Being. 6 The outline of the course calls for three parts. The first lays out four 
traditional theses about Being; the second was to have tied them to four fundamental problems, 
but Is cut off after the discussion of the first problem. The third, which never appeared, was to 
have laid out the scientific method of ontology and the idea of phenomenology. 
The four traditional theses are those of Kant, the medievals via Aristotle, the 
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moderns, and logic. According to Heidegger, the four theses may be expressed by the following 
propositions: Kant says Being is not a real predicate, the medievals via Aristotle that essence and 
existence belong to the Being of beings, the moderns that res extensa and res cogitans are the 
divisions of Being, and logic that the copula may be usRd to address all beings (20). The basic 
problems corresponding to these are those of the ontological difference, the fundamental 
articulation of Being, the unity of the modes of Being, and the truth-character of Being (22-25). 
The four theses are discussed in depth, but only the first of the corresponding 
problems, that of the ontological difference. Is discussed. It is in the discussion of the problem 
of the ontological difference that the analysis of Aristotle's text on time appears. How does 
Heidegger manage to reach Aristotle in Basic Problems. when Being and Time is cut off before 
the historical dlscussions?7 Let us consider the starting point of the two investigations: In Being 
and Time Heidegger starts from the oblivion of the question of Being, 8 while in Basic Problems 
Heidegger sets out to investigate the possibility of phenomenological ontology as scientific 
philosophy, as the science of Being (#3). Being and Time thus aims at awakening the question 
of Being via phenomenological investigation of the entity that has the Being question as a mode 
of its Being. After the phenomenological task is completed, Being and Time was to have 
attempted an historical destruction. Basic Problems, in contrast, includes destruction as one of 
the moments of Its phenomenological investigation from the beginning. It investigates the 
question of Being with three moments of phenomenology that are at work simultaneously. 
Heidegger calls them reduction, construction, and destruction (31). Reduction moves from a 
being to Its Being (29); construction is the •projecting of the antecedently given being upon Its 
Being and and the structures of Its Being• (29-30); while destruction [Destruktion] is "a critical 
process In which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are de-
constructed [ein krltischer AbbauJ down to the sources from which they are drawn• (31). Such 
destruction is necessitated by the way traditional concepts pervade philosophy. Thus in Basic 
Problems the confrontation with the tradition, which is certainly not lacking in Being and Time, 
even though it is deferred, Is brought to the forefront and is part of the investigation from the first. 
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What of the unity of the project of Basic Problems? How are the two parts 
connected to each other and how are the four problems related to each other? Heidegger writes 
in Basic Problems that the four problems basic to the science of Being cannot be seen as 
unified, nor cannot even be seen as problems, if the "fundamental question [Fundamentalfrage] 
of the whole science of being has not been put and answered: the question of the Sinn of Being 
in general" (21). This is the question to which the second part of the course will be devoted. At 
this point Heidegger also reminds us that the question of the Sinn of Being is tied to the 
possibility of the understanding of Being, that is, the horizon upon which the understanding of 
Being is projected (21 ). The investigation of this horizon presupposes an analytic of Dasein which 
has revealed that temporality makes possible the understanding of Being (22). From this 
conclusion grow the four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, 
the unity of Being's modifications, and the truth-character of Being (22-25). The unity of the these 
questions thus is tied to the question of the Sinn of Being, the "fundamental question• of ontology 
as science. Heidegger here projects a continuation of #4 of Being and Time that would show 
how ontology has an "antic fundamenr (26). Such a project opens the path that will eventually 
result in the overturning (Umschlag) of ontology in(to) metontology, as sketched out in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. 9 The problem of metontolgy is the problem of the irruption 
of Dasein in the midst of beings as a whole, das Seiende im qanzen. Heidegger's radicality here 
belies Herman Rappaport's claim that Basic Problems is ·a conservative version of Being and 
Time."10 
The Analysis of Aristotle's Text on Time 
That Heidegger construes the four basic problems as grounded in the question of 
the Sinn of Being is made clear by the title of Part Two of Basic Problems of Phenomenology: 
"The Fundamental Ontological Question of the Sinn of Being in General.• The subtitle of Part Two 
is "The Basic Structures and Basic Ways of Being.· Chapter One, the only one to appear, is "The 
Problem of the Ontological Difference [Differenz]." It is important to clarify the order of grounding 
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Heidegger lays out here if we are to understand how the analysis of Aristotle fits into the text of 
Basic Problems. Heidegger shows in the introduction to Part 2, Chapter 1 how the possibility of 
ontology, that is, philosophy as science, "stands and falls" with the possibility of a carrying 
through of the difference [Unterschiedyng] of Being and beings (322). The Unterschied in turn 
depends upon the conceptualizing of the understanding of Being [in den Griff bekommen]. 
Here we see the problem of (sclentifically) objectifying that upon which (everyday) 
projections project. This entails the objectifying of that upon which Being is projected, or in other 
words, a rendering explicit of what had served as the Implicit term of the projection that makes 
up our vague everyday understanding of Being. Heidegger explains that "It is in the object-
ification of Being as such that the basic act constitutive of ontology as a science is performed" 
(398). The problem is this: since objectifying is scientific understanding, upon what is one to 
project the objectifying projection that seeks to understand everyday projection (437)? Heidegger 
will deny an infinite regress and refer us to the problem of the finitude of time: that is, death.11 
Understanding the understanding of Being means clarifying how understanding 
belongs to the being who understands, that Is, Dasein. Thus the •ontological analytic of the 
existential constitution of Dasein" is third in the series of grounding analyses necessary for the 
possibility of ontology as scientific philosophy, the science of Being (322). Heidegger reminds 
us that such an analytic is subject to the demand that it ground the ground-structures of Dasein 
in their "unity and wholeness. "12 Heidegger now tells us we must presuppose the essential result 
of the existential analytic as an "already established result" (323). The result we are to take up 
is that "the constitution of Dasein's Being is grounded in temporallty [ZeitlichkeitJ (323). But 
precisely because we are simply taking the term over as a result, we have no guarantee that we 
will hear it correctly. Here we see the problem of floating assertions, cut off from grounding 
intuition, as analyzed by Heidegger In Sein und Zeit.13 So, Heidegger continues, we must find 
a way to win an understanding of what temporallty means [besagt] (323). This way is to take up 
the vulgar concept of time and show that it presupposes temporallty. This will show that the 
ontological condition of possibility of the understanding of Being is temporality, which also makes 
possible the other problems of ontology (323). When temporallty [Zeitlichkeit] is explicitly shown 
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as the ground of ontology Heidegger calls It Temporalitat (324). 
The order of groundings is then as follows: Ontology is grounded on ontological 
difference, which is grounded on the understanding of Being, which is grounded in Zeitlichkeit. 
Zeitlichkeit in its turn is both presupposed as the result of the existential analytic and is to be 
seen again from the reading of the vulgar time concept. Heidegger adds that the whole project 
is one of seeing Being in its temporal [temporalenJ determination (324). Following this pattern 
of grounding Chapter 1 has four sections, #19-22, that work their way from (19) vulgarly-
understood time to temporallty [Zeltlichkelt] to (20) temporallty as the ground of Casein's 
transcendence to (21) temporallty [Temporalitat) as the ground of the understanding of Being 
to (22) the ontological difference. Thus #19 is entitled "Time and Temporallty [Zeit und 
Zeitlichkeit],· #20 Zeitlichkelt und Temporalitat, #21 Temporalitat und Sein, and #22 ·seing and 
beings. The Ontological Difference.• 
#19 contains the analysis of Aristotle, as subsection a) ·Historical orientation 
regarding the traditional concept of time and a delineation of the common understanding of time 
that lies at the basis of this concept.• Subsection a) has two further subdivisions, (alpha) •outline 
lAufriss] of Aristotle's treatise on time,• and (beta) ·111terpretative exposition [Auslegung] of 
Aristotle's concept of time." Subsection b) then deals with "The common understanding of time 
and the return to original time,· with 4 subdivisions dealing with clock time, expressed time, the 
derivation of expressed time from existential temporallty, and finally the "derivation of the 
structural moments of now-time from ecstatic-horizonal temporallty. The mode of being of falling 
as the reason for the covering up of original time.• The analysis thus proceeds from the common-
-time-to the original-temporallty-the opposite path from that taken in Being and Time.14 
In chapter 19 Heidegger distinguishes between the vulgar understanding of time and 
its conceptual expression in philosophy. He does not so much here mean to emphasize the 
difference between a vague projection and the scientific objectifying of the Sinn of that projection 
as he means to claim that the conceptual expression retains the vulgarity of the experience it 
articulates.15 Its vulgarity would consist in its missing the originality of the phenomenon of which 
it is a derivative. To articulate this claim Heidegger has recourse to a very traditional schema 
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of expression. He writes that the conceptual expression is a stamping [Pragung] of the 
phenomenon of time (326). Heidegger will also claim that the ancients (Aristotle and Augustine) 
have already put forth the essentials of the content of the traditional concept of time (327), and 
that they have said the essential that can be said from within the vulgar 11nderstanding of time 
(329). He then asks whether the interpretation we find in the traditional concept of time has been 
to the measure of the phenomenon, and whether the originality of the phenomenon has been 
grasped (326). The ordering here Is: 1) vulgar understanding of time; 2) traditional concept of 
time (the expression of the vulgar understanding); 3) the phenomenon of time; 4) the original 
phenomenon of time; 5) original time (327). 
After these distinctions Heidegger moves on to #19a, "Historical orientation to the 
traditional time concept and the characteristic of the vulgar understanding of time that underlies 
1t.• He mentions Plotinus, Simpllcius, Thomas Aquinas and Suarez as having provided classic 
commentaries on Aristotle's time discourse, or as having provided treatises on time in their own 
right. Heidegger then discusses Bergson, in what we have come to recognize as his cavalier 
way. He claims Bergson misunderstands the Aristotelian understanding of time in his attempted 
confrontation with Aristotle's concept of time (328-29). We wDI come back again to the 
way Heidegger attempts to control the economy of undecidably spatial/temporal terms with just 
such a recourse to a distinction between proper interpretation and misunderstanding. I should 
make clear here once again that I do not believe one can or should always avoid the attribution 
of a misunderstanding. I only wish to account positively for the possibility of the so-called 
spatializlng of time. In my own terms, I wish to account for the Irreducible spatial moment of the 
economy of time, the way supposedly purified discourses about time or temporality (when it is 
equated with original time) operate with terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in 
spatial contexts. This does not mean one who simply equates time with space (as Heidegger 
claims Bergson does, but, as we have seen in Chapter II, he is far from doing) is not 
misunderstanding when attributing such an understanding to Aristotle. Such an equation--of time 
with space-would amount to a discourse of space purtfied of all temporal terms, and would 
simply be the mirror image of a discourse that attempted to purify time of all spatial terms. What 
114 
is needed, and what I attempt to do in this dissertation, is to articulate the economy of time. 
We must note at the outset that Heidegger denies himself a detailed interpretation 
of Aristotle's treatise. He proposes at first a brief presentation of the outline of Aristotle, then to 
illustrate the concept with a selective reading of Aristotle. Thus in the encounter with Aristotle 
Heidegger will only "select a few characteristic propositions In order to illustrate by them the 
traditional time concept" (329). He will preface his interpretation with a "short account of the 
structure of the Aristotelian treatise on time· (329), to which we now turn. 
Heidegger's Aufriss of Aristotle's Time Treatise 
At first, it Is Important to note that Heidegger provides no context for the time 
chapters, dealing neither with its place in the Physics nor with the relation of the Physics to the 
rest of the Aristotelian corpus. This is strange, since Heidegger scrupulously provided the context 
for his discussion of the historical doctrines in the first part of Basic Problems.16 Later I will 
suggest that Heidegger must ignore or overturn several of Aristotle's economies of meaning in 
order to read the Aristotelian treatise on time as a clue to Dasein's temporality. Perhaps the 
failure to provide a context is related to the violence of these overturnings. In any case, I shall 
give a bare sketch of the context of the Aristotelian discussion of time. Ross claims the following 
structure for the Physics: 
What we find, then, Is two main parts of the Physics. (1) books I-iv, referred to as .!SJ 
phusika or ta peri physeos. (2) books v, vi, viii, referred to as ta peri kinese¢s, but also 
included in ta physika in a wider sense of that term. There is also (3) a comparatively 
isolated book, book vii.17 
Following this outline, the first four books deal with the concept of phusis. The first book sets the 
method of study as that of the study of principles, specifically matter [hule or hupokeimenon], 
privation {antikeimenon or steresis]. and form [morpM or eidos or arche Ms ho logos].18 The 
second defines the relation of physics to mathematics and first philosophy by defining the field 
as studying those beings with the~ of their kinesis or stasis within themselves.19 The second 
book continues with the doctrine of the four causes, upon which Heidegger will comment many 
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times in the course of his writings. 20 The third book shows how the study of kinesis involves the 
study of the infinite, place, the void, and time, and undertakes the study of kinesis and the 
lnfinite.21 The fourth book takes up the study of place, the void, and time. According to Ross' 
schema, book four concludes the discussion of~. while books five, six and eight discuss 
klnesls. Book five discusses the different types of change (metabole), essential and accidental. 
It is Important here at the outset to make clear how Aristotle sets up these economies. Fuller 
discussion with textual references will follow. Aristotle specifies three types of essential changes: 
generation {genesis], destruction [phthora), and motion [kinesis]. Motions are understood 
according to the doctrine of the categories. Substances (first category) move, according to three 
succeeding categories: quality (alteration), quantity (increase or decrease), or place (locomotion) 
fphora]. Books 6 and 8 then discuss problems in the theory of motion involving continuity and 
divisibility, infinity, contact and the doctrine of the unmoved mover. As we noted above, Ross 
considers Book 7 an ear1y, immature effort that moreover does not fit the flow of the discourse-
-an "excrescence" in his words. 22 
Heidegger, as we noted above, does not provide any context for the time treatise, 
but begins with Physics 4.10. Heidegger's outline proceeds by way of the division of Aristotle's 
time text into chapters. Heidegger's first treatment is straightforward and unexceptional, except 
for one strange assertion we will discuss shortly. Since many detailed commentaries are available 
on Aristotle's time treatise23 I will not attempt to duplicate them, but will only sketch out 
Heidegger's sketch. These few pages provide a most useful overview of Aristotle's discussion 
before plunging Into the details. Heidegger points out first that in the first chapter under 
consideration (Chapter 10: 217b 29-218b 20) Aristotle devotes unequal attention to his two 
guiding questions, whether time belongs among beings or non-beings, and what the physis of 
time might be. This is true enough, but then, after Heidegger notes that the form of the 
discussion is that of the aporia, 24 he most oddly claims that a positive answer is given by 
Aristotle in the last chapter at 223a16-224a17. What is strange about this claim is that Physics 
4.14 does not seem to offer anything like a "positive answer" to the question of time's Being or 
non-Being. Chapter 14 certainly does answer the question of time's dependence on the soul, but 
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it does not address the question of the Being of time arising from the non-Being of its parts. 
Martineau notes his perplexity at this point: "But I have never succeeded, in reading and 
rereading this passage, and all of chapter 14, in all its senses, in finding anything which 
resembles such a 'positive answer,' nor even anv sort of answer, even indirect."25 We should 
recall here that Derrida also denies such an answer is ever given; in fact he uses this lack to set 
up his analysis of the "evaded question: 
To what could Heidegger be referring? Why would he say such a thing? At 335 
Heidegger will only say Aristotle picks back up again the first problem: "Where and how is time?" 
Why this way of putting Aristotle's question whether time belongs to beings or non-beings? As 
we will see Heidegger uses Aristotle's question of the relation of time and the soul as a bridge 
to discussing the grounding of oridinary time in Dasein's temporality (350). 
Heidegger very briefly explores the way Aristotle sets up the two aooriai (330-32). 
In discussing the way Aristotle sets up the first~ we should note that Heidegger uses the 
equation of ein Vorhandenes and~ first set up in Being and Time #6: 
With reference to the first question, whether time is a being [etwas Vorhancienes] or a me 
on, the latter determination appears to suggest itself. How should time exist as a whole 
[als Ganze vorhanden sein}, an~. if the parts that go to make it up are non-existent 
[nichtseiend sind] and are so in different ways? (330-31) 
Here we see the ambiguity of !Q..QQ and~ which Heidegger will explore in Introduction to 
Metaphysics, "Hegel's Concept of Experience; and elsewhere.26 Heidegger exploits the 
ambiguity of ~ by showing how it can be iterated In contexts that intend either a being, or 
the Being of that being. Here we see an undecidability of a term across the ontico-ontological 
difference. 27 
At this point it might be helpful if I give here a bit more of Aristotle's detail on the 
first~. that of time's Being as threatened by the non-Being of its parts (217b 30-218a 30). 
As both Derrida and Martineau note, but Heidegger does not, the discussion is "according to the 
exoteric doctrine" [dia tOn exOterikOn logOn]. The discussion of whether or not time belongs to 
beings seems to indicate that it does not, or at best hardly does. The discussion centers on the 
determination of the now as a part of time. Three possibilities ensue from this determination: the 
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now can be considered as a part of time, as not a part of time, and as both same and different. 
Each of these ways of considering the now, however, leads to its own paradox. If one takes the 
now as a part of time three consequences follow: first, the parts of time, past and future, are not; 
second, any time would have to be composed of past and future, but that which is composed 
of non-beings cannot share in ..Q.Yfil§; third, a thing with parts must have existing parts, and time 
is with parts, yet the past and future are not. If one takes the now as not a part of time, we find 
that, since the part measures the wh.ole, and the whole is composed of parts, then time does not 
seem to be composed of wholes. Considering the now as same or different, Aristotle says about 
the now as different: that two different parts cannot exist hama, 28 but the earlier one must be 
destroyed. Yet it cannot be destroyed in itself, nor in another now. One cannot consider the now 
as same, though. No divisible and finite thing has only one limit, yet the now is a limit, and a 
limited time can be taken. Furthermore, if to be hama is to be in the same now, prior and 
posterior would not be different. 
The next discussion concerns the phusis of time. Heidegger runs through the 
historical answers which Aristotle considers and rejects. They need not concern us here. The 
upshot of the consideration of the tradition for Aristotle is that time is not a motion, but is equally 
not without motion. Thus he concludes, time must be something in connection with motion. 
Aristotle uses the genitive, ti kineseos. Two terminological notes should briefly detain us here. 
One is Heidegger's use of Bewegung to translate Aristotle's kinesis. We should recall here Being 
and Time's distinction between the Bewegung of a thing and the Beweatheit of Dasein as I 
discussed it in Chapter II. Second, Heidegger here tells us of the Aristotelian equation of kinesis 
and metabole. He writes, "For kinesis Aristotle says equally metabole" (332). Metabole, Heideg-
ger continues, is the most general concept of motion, literally [wortlich] Umschlag. Umschlag 
is an extraordinarily rich term for Heidegger. He had used it in #69b of Being and Time to 
describe the change from Zuhanden to Vorhanden projection, and he will come to use it in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic to describe the self-collapse of ontology into metontology, 
as the question guiding his research moves of its own weight from Dasein to that of Dasein in 
the midst of Beings as a whole, das Seiende im ganzen. 29 The equation of kinesis and meta bole 
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we note in this passage will be crucial for Heidegger in attempting to skew the economy of 
kinesis and hence purify the economy of time of its spatial moments. 
Heidegger merely records the result of Aristotle's second chapter on time (Chapter 
11: 21 Sb 21-220a 26), the famous definition of time, touto gar estin ho chronos. arithmos 
kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron (219b 1-2). In its standard English translation, this line 
reads "this then is time, the number of motion according to the prior and posterior.• Heidegger's 
German reads "das namlich ist die Zeit: ein Gezahltes, das im Hinblick und !Ur den Hlnblick auf 
das Vor und Nach an der Bewegung sich zeigt; oder kurz, ein Gezahltes der im Horizont des 
FrOher und Spater begegnenden Bewegung" (333). Hofstadter renders this as: "time is this, 
namely, something counted which shows itself in and for regard to the before and after In motion 
or, in short, something counted in connection with motion as encountered in the horizon of 
earlier and later.• We will see how the translation of proteron kai husteron by "before and after" 
and "earlier and later" will be a main focus of Heidegger's Auslegung of Aristotle and how this 
double translation allows Heidegger to skew the economy of kinesis. 
For Heidegger, Aristotle's third chapter (Chapter 12: 220a 27-222a 9) defines in 
greater detail the connection between motion and time. Here arises the phenomenon of "being 
in time,• or "intratemporality. • The numerical character of the now is discussed here as well as 
the phenomena of rest and that which is outside time (334). The fourth chapter (Chapter 13: 222 
a 10-222b 29) then sets out "the unity of time in the manifoldness of the sequence of the nows.• 
Here the now is seen as constitutive of time's continuity. The fifth chapter (Chapter 14: 222b 30-
2248 17) concludes the Aristotelian treatise on time by discussing the relation of the "earlier and 
later" to the "before and after." In addition to this question the relation of time and the psyche. 
the problem of simultaneity, and the purest measure of time in the circular locomotion 
[kuklophoria] of the outermost heaven are also addressed here. Significantly for us, Heidegger 
does not follow up in his Aus!egung on the last topic he mentions here in the Autriss, that of 
circular locomotion. We will come to explore fully the consequences of the role circular 
locomotion plays In Aristotle's economy of time when we discuss the privilege of phora in the 
last book of the Physics. 
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Heidegger closes the sketch with his standard claim about Aristotle's paradigmatic 
role for the tradition of metaphysics: 
all the central problems which were thereafter discussed in the course of the further 
development of philosophy are already marked out. It can be said that subsequent times 
did not get essentially beyond the stage of Aristotle's treatment of the problem-apart 
from a few exceptions in Augustine and Kant, who nevertheless retain in principle the 
Aristotelian concept of time. (336) 
As we have seen in Chapter I, Derrida takes issue with this move, by demonstrating the 
marginality of all texts, Aristotle's included. The margin is articulated by the formal rule-all texts 
have exceptions (are subtracted from) the system of presence governing what Heidegger calls 
"the Aristotelian concept of time.• One might even say Derrida articulates the way exceptions are 
the rule. 
Heidegger's Auslegung of Aristotle's Time Treatise 
Next Heidegger embarks on his Aysleguna of Aristotle's treatise on time. He 
remarks that he will not keep strictly to the text, but by a "free discussion· and by "carrying the 
interpretation somewhat further, we shall try to focus more clearly on the phenomenon as 
Aristotle sees it" (336). In this sub-section I shall trace the overturnings of three Aristotelian 
economies licensed by this freedom with the text. Those three are the economies of proteron 
kai husteron, metabole, and kinesis. It is Important to note at the outset that Aristotle sees these 
economies, like the all-important economy of Being centered on the phrase to on legetai 
pollakhOs, 30 as regulations of a polysemia. As Derrida shows in distinguishing polysemia from 
dissemination in 'White Mythology, "31 Aristotle's conception of signification in the Metaphysics' 
discussion of the principle of non-contradiction assumes that "not to mean one thing is not to 
mean at all. "32 Thus univocity is the telos of the regulated polysemia, 33 even if, as Aubenque 
claims, such univocity is never to be reached in the science of Being qua Being. I will be pointing 
to the dissemination resulting from the possibility of Iteration in contexts other than the one an 
author might attempt to designate as governed by a proper Sinn. Let me stress that dissemina-
tion does not entail the loss of all meaning, but the proliferation of meaning. Instead of no 
meaning we find ourselves faced with too much meaning to be fully controlled by intentions 
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made possible by inscription within a text-but this does not entail no control whatsoever. 33 
Heidegger starts the Auslegung by citing Aristole's definition of time: touto gar estin 
ho chronos. arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kal husteron. Martineau notes here that 
Heidegger skips the Interpretation of the way Aristotle sets up the aporial. This is a crucial 
difference with Derrida, which we will explore later. In the body of his Interpretation Heidegger 
discusses six topics: 1) the example of the moving pointer, 2) the translation of proteron kal 
hysteron by "before and after" and by "ear1ier and later,• 3) the experience of motion, 4) the 
identity and difference of the now, 5) the numerical character of time and the now as transition, 
and 6) time and the soul. I will show the way the overturning of the three Aristotelian economies 
undergirds Heidegger's interpretation as he moves through these six points. 
Heidegger first takes up the connection of time with motion via the example of the 
moving pointer. I will not discuss in detail Heidegger's points in this passage, since they will 
come up again later. By means of his own phenomenological descriptions, Heidegger shows that 
time is not a property of the pointer. Heidegger here reminds us that Aristotle distinguishes 
between the moving thing and motion, and that time belongs to motion [Bewegung], even 
though it is certainly not identical to motion {337). Heidegger next reminds us that Aristotle has 
specified that time is a number, and precisely the number as counted, not as counting. 34 He then 
calls upon us to attempt an experiment, asking, "What can I count about the motion of the rod?" 
(339) After some patient investigation Heidegger concludes that time is •read off [ablesen] from 
the motion of the pointer" (340). Heidegger bolsters this conclusion with the the example of the 
sun attended to by the human being in "natural, everyday existence [der Mensch im nat0r1ichen-
alltaglichen Dasein]." 
Here I must mention the extraordinary role played by the sun in Aristotle, even 
though I will not be able to explore completely the circle of the heliotrope and its role in the 
economy of time. For Aristotle, the sun, along with the moon and planets, Is moved by the first 
heaven, which is in turn moved by the prime mover. The movement of the sun, as analyzed in 
De Generatione et Corruptlone, causes generation and destruction (336a 32-33; 336b 17-18). In 
the Physics Aristotle will even say that "both man and the sun beget man" (194b 13-14). We 
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should also recall here that Heidegger tells us that the path of the sun lays out "regions of life 
and death" for Oasein. 35 I will return to discuss the sun when I analyze the role of circular 
locomotion in the economy of kinesis and hence of time later in this chapter. 
The second topic discussed by Heidegger is that of the translation of oroteron kal 
husteron. This is the first Aristotelian economy in which we shall have to trace Heidegger's 
Intervention. The importance of the proteron kal husteron devolves upon the question: What is 
the horizon for the telling of time? Heidegger translates Aristotle's definition of time as saying that 
"time is something counted in connection with encountered motion with a view to the before and 
after [Vor und Nach], in the horizon of the earlier and later [FrOher und Spater]" (341). The 
looked-for horizon is thus that of the "earlier and later." We must carefully note here that 
Heidegger has translated proteron kai husteron with two phrases: "before and after" and "earlier 
and later." Webb points out Heidegger's unique choice of the temporal "earlier and later," 
claiming that the standard English translators Barnes, Wlcksteed and Cornford, and Hussey all 
use "before and after.• Apostle, on the other hand, has "prior and posterior.• 
Heidegger claims that it is "not necessary" to translate proteron kai husteron by the 
"indifferenr set of terms "before and after" (342). Now Aristotle himself sets up an economy for 
proteron kai husteron at Metaohysics 5.11, 1018b8-19a 14. Things are said to be prior when they 
are: 1. things nearer some beginning [archel; 2. things prior in knowledge; 3. the attributes of 
pr:ior things; 4. things prior by phusis or .QYfilsl. Within the first area, "things nearer some~• 
Aristotle will name: a). place [!QRQ§]; b). time; c). movement [kinesis]; d). power [dunamis]; and 
e). arrangement [taxis]. The economy as Aristotle lays It out thus shows, among others, both 
spatial and temporal moments. We can thus call proteron kai husteron undecidably spa-
tial /temporal. However, Aristotle does not leave the economy just as he lists it, but he attempts 
to determine a primary "sense"36 for proteron: the prior sense of prior, we might say. In the 
Metaphysics Aristotle claims that the primary sense of proteron kai husteron is 4). things prior 
by phusis or .QYfilsl (1019a 11 ). However, in the Physics' time treatise Aristotle will say that 
croteron kai husteron is primarily [proton] in !@.Q§ (219a 15). Thus we can say that in the 
determination of kinesis the order of relata is accomplished primarily by reference to some arche, 
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and that that arche is a .!ru2.Q§-or better, in some .!ru2.Q§. 37 
In Heidegger's terms then, "before and after" represents ordering by reference to 
topos and "earlier and later" ordering by reference to time. Heidegger will go against Aristotle's 
aconomy by privileging the temporal sense of "earlier and later" over the topos-directed, or 
"lndifferenr sense of "before and after.• However, could not one show that even "before and after" 
[Vor und Nach] is not •indifferent: but "undecidable" with regard to space and time? Surely 
common usage testifies that "before• IYQr) can be used to mean "prior" or "in front or while 
"after" [Nach] can mean both "posterior" and "In back of.938 Now Heidegger cannot bring himself 
to completely censure the translation of proteron kai husteron by "before and after.· Such a 
translation does have its "specific rights in accordance with the phenomenon [bestimmtes 
sachliches Recht]" (342; translation modified). Thus Heidegger has set up what he will later call 
a "wavering" (349) in Aristotle's text between these two meanings of proteron kai husteron, i.e. 
"before and after" and "earlier and later." I will show how such "wavering,• despite Heidegger's 
explicit intention, acknowledges the undecidability of proteron kai husteron and hence the 
irreducible spatial haunting in the economy of time. 
For now let us follow Heidegger as he notes that the translation by "earlier and later" 
appears impossible, for "earlier" and "later" are themselves "determinations of time· (341). 
Aristotle's time definition thus seems tautologous, defining time by means of two sets of temporal 
determinations, so that in essence the formula reads "time Is time." For Heidegger, however, this 
is not tautologous, as is shown by a comparison of what Is intended by "earlier and later" [was 
sie meinen] with what is intended by the subject of the definition (341). "Perhaps," Heidegger 
continues, "the second term 'time' means [ggtJ something different and more original 
[UrsprOnglicheres] than what Aristotle means [meintJ in the definition itself" (341). This seeming 
tautology in not in fact a tautology, but "betrays the inner coherence of the Aristotelian time 
phenomenon, that is, of time as commonly understood, with the original time which we are 
calling temporality" (341 ). Here we can clearly see Heidegger's recourse to assertions about 
Aristotle's intention-obviously a strategy caught up in the Sinnsfrage-to regulate the 
undecidability of proteron kai husteron. I will return to this point shortly, but for now, let us 
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continue following Heidegger's text. 
Heidegger continues by noting that if we understand the way "earlier and later" 
refers to temporality as original time, then we can allow "earlier and later" to translate proteron 
kai husteron. Such a translation, the result of our more authentic [einigermassen] understanding 
of Aristotle, is also the result of our Interpreting Aristotle's definition "In conformity with its original 
approach [gemass ihrem Ansatzr (342). It Is this Insistence on the propriety and originality of 
only one moment of an economy of Interpretation that one could confidently predict would have 
attracted Derrida's strictures had he read Basic Problems at the time of his writing of "Ousia 
and Gramme.• 
Heidegger concludes this section of the discussion by demanding that the origin 
of vulgar time In temporality should be revealed (342). He approaches this by investigating the 
way proteron kai husteron directs our vision in the counting of time. He first takes up the 
translation by "before and after" to allow this to justify the translation by "earlier and later.• 
With the question of translation as his bridge Heidegger moves on to discuss his 
third point, how time becomes visible in the experience of motion. Here the second of our three 
Aristotelian economies come into play, that of metabole. Heidegger here assimilates two 
concepts Aristotle rigorously distinguishes, kinesis, "motion,• and metabole. "change. "39 
Heidegger writes: "To motion [Bewegung] in general, kinasis or metabole. there belongs 
kinoumenon kinetai: a moving thing is moving, is in motion" (342-43). What is the economy of 
metabole In the Physics? For Aristotle, kinasls, change "from a subject to a subject" (225b 2), 
is itself a species of metabola. change. The other species of metabole are genesis. "generation,• 
the change "from a nonsubject to a subject,• and phthora, "destruction,• the change "from a 
subject to a nonsubject • Aristotle provides an extended discussion at Physics E 1, 225a 1-b9. 
A key phrase that clearly shows the subordination of kinasis to metabole occurs at 224a 35: 
"Since every motion [kinasis] is a kind of change (metabole tis)." 
To be sure, Heidegger's assimilation of kinasis and metabola in the time discussion 
is not entirely without foundation in Aristotle's text. Aristotle does claim that "in the current 
discussion it is not necessary to distinguish klnesis and metabola" (218b 19-20). For Heidegger, 
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such an equation removes the reference to space in the discussion of time, leaving us with only 
the formal sense of change. However, Aristotle does use kinesis almost exclusively in his 
discussions of time; and--as we will see in exploring the economy of kin$sis-.Q!:1Qm is the primary 
term in the economy of both kinesls and metabole. one to which all other terms for motions and 
changes make reference as subordinate in one way or another. In other words, Aristotle will 
make clear that all other motions and changes depend upon phora. a type of motion, for their 
existence. Thus the attempted assimilation does not hold once one takes Into account Aristotle's 
other texts on the economies of kinesis and metabole. Now if one would wish to bring the 
ontico-ontological difference to bear at this point, by saying, as Heidegger will say in the 1931 
lecture course on Metaphysics Theta, that kinesis refers to the Being of beings as well as to 
specfflc antic motions, one would be forced to address the issue of a term undecidable across 
the ontological difference. The only way to decide such undecidability would be by recourse to 
an ostensibly proper Sinn for the term, and this would fall prey to the Slnnsfrage. In any case, 
I will show that the reference to phora as the primary term in the economies key to the definition 
of time is irreducible. 
We should also note here that although Aristotle seems to use kinesis generically 
in the time discusssion at 223a 32, a closer examination of the latter quote reveals things are not 
that clear. Aristotle writes, using the middle voice throughout, which renders the verbs 
undecidably active/passive, and necessitates orthographic gymnastics in English translation, that 
"and indeed [is] generate[s/d] in time and [is] destroy[s/ed] and [is] grow[s/n] and [is] 
alter[s/ed]. In so far as these are kinesis. in that respect there is a number of each motion [kai 
gar gignetai en khronOI kai phthelretal kai auxaneitai kai alloioutai kai pheretai; Mi oun kinesis 
esti, tautei estin hekastes kineseOs arithmos]." Now this "in so far" makes problematic the claim 
that kinesis is intended as a genus here. Rather. Aristotle seems to be indicating that to some 
extent the other forms of metabole can be seen as similar to kinesls in this particular field. 
Why would Heidegger, normally the most careful of readers, assimilate the species-
-kinesis-to the genus--metabole-or at best, privilege the assimilating text (218b 19) over the 
distinguishing one (225a 35)? In order to answer this question we must discuss ·our third 
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economy, that of kinesis. In discussing time, Aristotle, and Heidegger too, for that matter, almost 
always interprets kinesis in terms of Its primary instance, J2l::!Qr.e, "motion with respect to place.· 
Why is this? What is the privilege of .Q.!:JQ.m? What is its role in the economy of kinesis? For 
Aristotle, there are four types of kinesls: locomotion [phora], growth, decay, and alteration. 
Locomotion is for Aristotle paradigmatic: he says in the discussion of topos at Physics 4 1, 208a 
31-32 that "the most common and most important motion, which we call 'locomotion,' is a 
motion with respect to place [kal tes kinese0s h0 koine malista kai kuriotate kata topon estin, Mn 
kaloumen phoran] . ..40 See also in this regard 243a 39 where J2!:lQ.m is called "first of motions 
[prOte tOn kineseonr; 260a 28 where J2bQ!§ is called "the motion that is necessarily first [tauten 
anagkaion einal protenr; 261a 28 where phora is called "first among motions [ton kineseon M 
phora prOter; and 266a 1 where kinesis kata topon is called .kY.d.Q§. We will return to consider 
Aristotle's arguments for the primacy of JlbQ!§. If we would follow them, these arguments would 
lead us into the circle of the heliotrope. Unfortunately, this path must remain untrodden for us 
in this dissertation. For now let us rejoin the Heideggerian text. 
As we have seen in our exposition of the context of the discussion of Aristotle, 
Heidegger needs to read the Aristotelian time treatise in a way that will enable him to elucidate 
a clue to the ecstatic temporality he names original time. Furthermore, as we have seen in 
Chapter II, Heidegger needs to ground spatiality on temporallty in order to safeguard his project 
of investigating the question of the Sinn of Being in general. The key here is this: the Aristotelian 
economies, with their emphasis on the primacy of .QbQm, make plain the Irreducible reference 
to space In the measurement and experience of time because any Iteration of kinesis contains 
a reference to the primacy of ..Qb.Qm. The discourse that seeks to define and describe time uses 
terms haunted by the possibility of their Iteration in spatial contexts. These defining and 
describing terms are inscribed in economies with irreducible spatial moments-irreducible 
precisely because the possibility of iteration in spatial contexts cannot, de jure, be completely 
controlled. Heidegger attempts such control, but can do so only by trying to determine the 
proper Sinn of kinesis as completely formal. But this recourse to Sinn founders on the spatialify 
inscribed in the Slnnsfrage. 
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Let me expand on how this point can be seen in terms of the Sinnsfrage. Here we 
will come upon the key term in Heidegger's analysis: Obergana. He will use this term both 
generically, to indicate pure change-Over rumschlag) and specifically, to indicate locomotion, 
.Q..l:lQ.ra. He will als" use It to indicate the characteristic of the now as •open on both sides,• as an 
Obergehendes (352). Heidegger finds himself compelled to distinguish the proper Sinn for kinesis 
as non-spatial by assimilating It to metabole. He writes: "The most general character of motion 
[Bewegung] is metabole, that is, a tum or change [Umschlag], or better, a transition [Obergang] 
from something to something" (343). Previously Heidegger had used Oberaang in the discussion 
of motion with regard to place: locomotion; in Greek, .Q..l:lQ.ra. He writes at 337: "We say: Its 
change of place [Qrstveranderung], that Is, the transition [Obergang] from a position [Stelle] to 
another." Obergang also appears in discussions of locomotion at 338 and 343 Qine 15). Let me 
be clear: I do not mean to claim that Obergang Is "spatial" -I.e., that It "has a primarily spatial 
sense" -but that it is used both generically as equivalent to Umschlag--metabol0-and specifically 
with regard to locomotion-phora. It can be iterated in either context: it is undecidable. The only 
way to decide this generic/specific undecidability is by claiming to identify a proper, non-spatial, 
Sinn. But Sinn, as we have shown, cannot reduce the spatiality of direction. The irreducibility of 
spatiality in the economy of Sinn will be of the utmost importance in the discussion of now as 
transition, where Heidegger will also use Obergang. 
Heidegger continues: "The simplest form of motion [Bewegung], of transition 
[0bergang] and the one most frequently used by Aristotle in his analysis of motion, is ..12.!JQ.m, 
transition [0bergang] from one place (!QpQfil to another, change-over [Umschlag], change of 
place [Ortsveranderyngr (342; translation modified).41 Here Heidegger uses Obergang both 
generically and specifically. He also says ..12.!JQ.m is the "simplest.• This characterization of phora 
is not strong enough to do justice to the Aristotelian economies. We have seen how Aristotle has 
called ..12.!JQ.m the "most important" kinesis. I will return to this point in discussing circular 
locomotion. 
Let us trace the way the Slnnsfrage limits Heidegger's discourse In this passage. 
Of the remaining three types of kinesis we have isolated In Aristotle's economy, allolOsis, 
127 
qualitative alteration, auxesis. quantitative increase or growth, and phthisis, quantitative decrease 
or decay, 42 Heidegger mentions only the first, to reinforce the point that their common ·charac-
teristic is that of change ek tines eis ti. "from something into something (else)" (343). Heidegger 
calls alloiOsis merely "another form of motion,• not mer'ltioning Aristotle's showing of its 
dependence on J2.t:l.Qm later in the Physics. Heidegger remarks that alloiOsis does not have the 
Sinn of transition of place: 
Another form of motion [Bewegung5form] is, for example, alloiosis, becoming different in 
the sense [Qas Anderswerden in dem SlnneJ that one quality changes [umschl8gtJ to 
another, one particular color to another, and here too there is an advance ek tinos eis ti, 
away from something toward something. But this "away from something toward 
something." does not have the sense of transition from one place to another [hat nicht den 
Sinn des Uberqanqs von einem Ort zum anderen]. (343) 
Thus ek tines eis ti is "not necessarily to be grasped spatially" (343). Heidegger calls the 
structure of motion named by Aristotle as ek tines els ti "dimension,• and he reminds us to 
''tak[eJ the concept in a completely formal sense, [in einem ganz formalen Sinn] in which spatial 
character is not essential. Dimension expresses [meint] a general notion of stretch [Dehnung]; 
extension in the sense [im Sinne] of spatial dimension [Ausc!ehnungJ then represents a particular 
modification of stretch" (343).43 Such recourse to Sinn obviously falls under the purview of the 
Sinnsfrage as I have articulated it in Chapter II. 
Two terminological notes must be made here. First, Heidegger tells us that the 
determination of ek tinos els ti must be kept clear of "spatial representation• [raumlichen 
Vorstellung]. as Aristotle himself had done (343). This is the very phrase Heidegger used in Being 
and Time to describe the way falling temporality dominates everyday language. Heidegger writes 
in Sein ynd Zeit that "die Selbstauslegung des Daseins und der Bedeutungsbestand der Sprache 
Oberhaupt weitgehend von 'raumlichen Vorstellungen' durchherrscht ist. .M In a way, this 
dissertation is an extended commentary on that single phrase. Second, Heidegger uses a term, 
Erstreckynq, he had reserved in Being and Time for Dasein's Geschehen. to describe the 
complete formality of ek tines eis ti. In reading Heidegger's text, it is most disconcerting to 
realize that Heidegger does not stay with the Dehnung / Ausdehnung distinction developed here 
as the discussion progresses. At 344 he uses Ausciehnyng in two places where Dehnung would 
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have been more appropriate. First: "When we experience motion in a moving thing, we 
necessarily experience along with it suneches, continuity, and in this continuity itself ek tinos eis 
.!!. dimension in the original sense, stretching out (extension) [Dimension im ursprOnglichen Sinn. 
Erstreckung (AusdehnungU- (344). Second: "Extension [Ausdehnung) and continuity are already 
implicit In motion" (344). Heidegger has set up Dehnung as the genus and Ausdehnung as the 
specific modification. But here he uses Ausdehnung genertcally, so that we are led to read it as 
another example of a term undecidable across a generic / specific economy, just as we had 
previously read Obergang. Here as well, as we might expect, the Sinnsfrage arises. Heidegger 
tells us that only a completely formalized Sinn of •dimension" will remove spatiality. But this 
appeal to a formal Sinn presupposes a determination of which Sinn of Sinn is pre-eminent. As 
we have learned, the economy of interpretation set up by each iteration of the mark Sinn 
includes an irreducible moment of the direction of Casein's self-projective movement. Indeed. 
as we recall from Chapter II, Heidegger claims this is the primary acceptation of Slnn.45 Since 
Sinn as direction is Irreducibly spatial, that Is, each iteration of Sinn contains an irreducible 
reference to its possible inscription in a spatial context (such as Heidegger himself had inscribed 
it in the discussions of Richtung), then at least some aspect of spatiality will come to haunt the 
notion of "dimension,• even if, concesso non date, it Is only in the way we attempt to purify the 
concept of space by projecting it upon a formalized~. 
Heidegger next discusses the Aristotelian concept of suneches, continuity, which 
also belongs to stretch. Meaethos. extendedness, is not primarily spatial, we learn. 46 I must note 
here In passing what I will shortly discuss in detail, that Aristotle insists that only phora is 
continuous (261a 32), and indeed, only circular phora (265a 11-2). But the infinite circular .Q.!:!Qm 
(of the sun) is caused by the prime mover, ousia as pure self-presence. We will thus have only 
come to see the full contours of the Aristotelian economy of time when we have examined the 
heliotrope. 
Heidegger reminds us that the Aristotelian concepts are linked in a specific relation 
Aristotle names "following,· akolouthein, which "expresses the foundational a priori connection 
of motion with continuity and extendedness" (344-45). Recognizing this relation, Heidegger tells 
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us, is the key for avoiding "defective interpretations" such as those of Bergson, "who said that 
time as Aristotle understands it is space.• Earlier, Heidegger had said that missing the formality 
in the formal sense of meaethos led Bergson into his misunderstanding of Aristotle, for he took 
the dimension-character of motion in tenns of spatial dimension f raumliche Ausdehnung) (343-
44). We have already remarked, in Chapter II, that Bergson says clearly that time as ordinarily 
conceived is the phantom of space. In the discussion of akolouthein Bergson is said to have 
"[taken] continuity in the narrower sense of the extensional magnitude of space" {343-44). I would 
say Bergson's phrase implies that time is haunted by space; Bergson's phrase thus articulates 
the economy of time, and Is as such marginal to the system of presence. Even if one were to 
take Bergson's text vulgarly-as stating that time is equal to space--as Heidegger does, the 
possibility of (mis)interpretlng time as space is an Irreducible possibility which follows from the 
Aristotelian economy of time, given the role of~ in the economy of kinesis. The articulation 
of that irreducibility is the formal law of the haunting of time by space, the articulating of the 
economy of time. As I have previously insisted, recognizing such haunting does not entail the 
complete abandonment of all distinctions between proper and improper senses, but it does 
require the recognition that the spatiality of Sinn in the Sinnsfrage marks the final, irreducible 
haunting of time by space. 
Let us return to Heidegger's text. He continues his discussion by noting that the 
motion from which time is read must be ordered, from there to here in the horizon of the prior 
and posterior. At this point he sketch~s the grounding of Aristotle's time understanding in 
ecstatic temporality by showing how it is precisely the retention of the prior and the expectation 
of the posterior which enables us to see transition as such. Saying "now" assigns time to the 
clock; the clock gives us the how-many of the nows. A note at this point reads "Vorgabe ist im 
Grunde die dreifach ekstatisch horizontale Struktur der Zeitlichkeit. Sie gibt sich die Zeit var" 
(348). Expectation, retention, and enpresenting are to be seen as original (even if not authentic) 
temporality. I will not be able, given the constraints of the dissertation format, to pursue this 
thematic at this point. Let me simply note that the fact that Heidegger attempts such grounding 
is not as important for my project here as the fact that, as I have shown, the discourse of 
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ecstatic temporality is composed of terms haunted by the possibility of their iteration in spatial 
discussions. We need only recall here the definition of ecstatic temporality as "ursprunglich 
'Ausser-sich' an und fOr sich selbst."47 
At this point Heidegger picks up his second topic again, that of the translation of 
proteron kai husteron. As he laid out for us, the translation by "earlier and later" interprets the 
translation "before and after" (349). He explains this relation of interpretation by adding that the 
first translation (before and after) is literal [.die wOrtllche Auffassung]. while the second (earlier 
and later) already includes a large element of Interpretation [die zweite schliesst schon 
weitgehend eine lnteroretation in sich] (349). Here Heidegger admits that Aristotle states that 
proteron kai hysteron means primarily sequence of places (219a 15). This determination has a 
"non-temporal sense· runzeltlichen Sinn], Heidegger claims, but he also claims that "the 
experience of before and after in a certain manner presupposes the experience of time 
[Zeiterfahrung], the earlier and later" (349). Heidegger then mentions the economy of proteron 
kal hysteron as developed by Aristotle In the Metaphysics. He then writes an astounding 
sentence to which we have referred earlier: "Aristotle wavers in the time interpretation in the 
conceptual determination of proteron kal husteron lln der Zeitabhandlung schwankt er in der 
Bedeutungsauffassung des oroteron-husteront (349). With this acknowledgement of "wavering• 
Heidegger admits that the economy of proteron kai husteron includes a spatial moment and is 
thus undecidably spatial/temporal. To reduce this undecidability Heidegger once again has 
recourse to the determination of a proper Sinn. He writes: "Most often he takes it directly as 
earlier and later and not so much as before and after rMeistens nimmt er es direkt als FrOher und 
Seater und nicht so sehr als Var und Nachi- (349). I have had to modify Hofstadter's translation. 
Hofstadter's version reads: "Most often he takes it directly as earlier and later and not so much 
In the sense of before and after.· It would have made my task easier if Heidegger had in fact 
written "Im Sinne" but he writes only "als. • Nevertheless, the recourse to Sinn is implied by the 
phrase "he takes" [nimmt er], as well as by Heidegger's previous claim that "before and after" has 
an "unzeitlichen Sinn.· 
At this point it may be useful to recall that Heidegger needs to keep Aristotle's time 
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pure of space, because Aristotle's understanding of time is to serve as the vulgar self-expression 
of temporality and hence as a clue to the temporality which can be read off of Aristotle's treatise. 
As we recall from Sein und Zeit, Casein's spatiality is to be grounded on temporality, so spatial 
terms are to be kept out of the discussion of temporality. Yet In discussing Aristotle Heidegger 
acknowledges that the translation of proteron kai hysteron as "before and after" in sequence of 
places Is both set forth by Aristotle and has Its "specific rights in accordance with the 
phenomenon Cbestimmtes sachllches Recht]" (342). Although he acknowledges this wavering he 
attempts to regulate its undecidability and thereby reduce its spatial moment via a determination 
of proper Sinn. 
To see the full implications of this attempted regulation and reduction we must here 
complete our exploration of the Aristotelian economy of kinesis and phora. Aristotle is far more 
insistent than Heidegger lets on about the primacy of 12.!:!.Qm in kinesis. As we noted earlier, at 
243a 1 O Aristotle calls 12.!:!.Qm the "first• ~ among motions, and at 260a 28 Aristotle says 
12.!:!.Qm Is "necessarily first.• In the latter passage, in the context of examining continuous motion, 
Aristotle presents several arguments why 12.!:!.Qm Is presupposed in all other types of kinesis, how 
it Is prior in time and in nature, and how the prime mover Is the principle ~] and causes the 
motion that Is first among motions (260a 20-261a 31). One could object here that Aristotle's 
privileging of 12.!:!.Qm depends on the demonstration of ontic dependence and that Heidegger is 
after the ontological Sinn of kinesis. But here Heidegger is caught by the undecidability of 
kinesls. as iterable in contexts Intending both antic motion and the Being of beings. If one 
attempts to regulate this undecidability by means of distinguishing the proper (ontological) Sinn 
for kinesls one is caught in the Sinnsfrage; if one calls kinesls an antic metaphor one Is caught 
in the metaphorlcity of meta-pherein. 48 
At this point let us take up Aristotle's arguments about the primacy of phora in the 
economies of kinesis and metabole. I will focus on Physics Book a (Theta) Chapters 5-1 o. 
Aristotle is here looking for continous motion, that caused by the first (unmoved) mover. Theta 
5 (2568 4-258b 9) gives an argument for the unmoved mover. Aristotle distinguishes three 
moments of a motion: that which is in motion, that which moves another, and that with which 
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the mover moves another (256b 15-16). That which moves another without being an instrument 
of motion must be immovable (256b 22). Aristotle then turns to consider self-movers (257a 32ff), 
showing that •it is impossible for that which moves itself to move itself in its entirety" (257b 3). 
Thus, even within a self-mover there must be division into moved and mover (257b 14), and that 
which causes a motion must be In actuality (257b 10), since a motion is an incomplete actuality 
of the movable (257b 8). Thus self-movers must be split, containing both that which is moved 
and that which, being unmoved, Is the mover of that which is moved (258a 19). 49 It would be 
very interesting, though far beyond the scope of this dissertation, to begin here to analyze this 
splitting In terms of auto-affection. Such a possible analysis will come up again In Heidegger's 
reading of the famous hama gar klneseos aisthanometha kai chronou (219a 2-3). 
We turn now to Theta 6 (258b 10-260a 19), where Aristotle tells us that the first thing 
moved by the unmoved mover must also be eternal (260a 2). Ross at this point claims that 
Aristotle here has proven only the eternity of successive generation, but presupposes the 
unquestionability of the observation of the unceasing rotation of the heavens. 50 Now the 
unmoved mover always causes one and the same motion and in the same manner (260a 5). This 
brings us to Aristotle's cosmology. The order of causation is: prime mover, unmoved movers, 
first heaven, sun/moon/planets, generation (260a 1-19). We have already had cause to mention 
the role of the sun in generation. 
In Theta 7 (260a 20-261 b 26) we finally tum to the economy of kin0sis. Aristotle 
presents three arguments for the primacy of J2!:!Qm in the economy of kinesis: 1) there can be 
no increase without a previous alteration (260a 29), but there must be something that causes the 
alteration (260b 1 ). This something must move to come closer in space to the altering thing 
(260b 3-4). For example, alteration from potentially to actually hot presupposes locomotion, the 
bringing nearer of the actually hot (260b 3). 2) The next argument concerns condensation and 
rarefaction as principles of change of quality. Aristotle claims that Ncondensation and rarefac-
tion are, respectively, coming closer and going further" (260b 11 )--and these are obviously 
locomotions (260b 13). Aristotle further maintains that the magnitude of that which is Increasing 
and decreasing Is change with regard to place (260b 14). 3) The final arguments contain a 
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reference to the economy of proteron kai husteron we explored above. Aristotle reminds us that 
priority is granted when the following conditions are met: a) independence b) priority in time c) 
proximity to ~. Regarding each condition, Aristotle argues that locomotion must be 
considere!i prior to other changes a) if other changes cannot exist without locomotion, but it can 
without them. And this is precisely what Aristotle shows, arguing that: 
For there is no necessity for an object in locomotion to be increasing or to be in the 
process of generation or destruction, but none of these [changes--Apostle's addition] can 
exist if there is no continuous motion, which Is caused by the primary mover. (260b 26-
29) 
The continuous motion caused by the prime mover is the locomotion of the heavens, as Aristotle 
will show shortly. Aristotle has thus shown here that .Q.!::!Qm serves as the prime term in the 
economy of metabole, via its primacy In the economy of kinesls. 
Secondly, regarding b) primacy in time: Aristotle claims that the only motion 
possible in eternal things is locomotion, so there is an obvious priority of time in that case (260b 
29). Aristotle here also brings up the example of generation.51 Locomotion appears last in the 
development of generated things, but generation itself requires the previous locomotion of the 
parents (261a 4). Thirdly, c) although locomotion appears last in generated things, this is so 
because it is closer to the substance toward which the generated thing is developing (261 a 15). 
Also, locomotion is the least departure from ..QY§Ja-that Is, the thing moving with regard to place 
changes itself less than the thing changing its qualities or magnitude (261 b 22). But finally, 
Aristotle says the clearest proof that locomotion is prior to other causes because of its proximity 
to ousia is that self-movers cause locomotion above all: "malista de delon hoti to kinoun auto 
auto malista tauten kinei kurios, ten kata topon• (261 b 24). Recalling here the split nature of self-
movers-into that which is moved and that which is the (unmoved) mover-we can understand 
the relation of the previous claim to the next sentence: "the self-mover is the principle of things 
in motion and of movers and that among things in motion it is the self-mover which is first [kaitoi 
phamen touto einai ton kinoumenon kai kinounton arcMn kai proton tois kinoumenois. to auto 
auto kinoun]" (261a 25-26). The self-mover referred to here would be the first heaven, which 
provides the principle of motion for the sun/moon/planets, and which is moved by the unmoved 
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movers that provide the principle of motion for the self-movers; all this system is of course 
oriented toward the prime mover. 
Next Aristotle moves to show which of locomotions is primary (261 a 29). This 
demonstration will show the primary locomotion t0 be both continuous and eternal (261a 31). 
Two arguments appear here: 1) All motions other than the locomotion caused by the prime 
mover move from opposite to opposite (261a 34); these will come to rest in a contrary (261b3). 
2) Similarly with changes, Aristotle shows that things cannot change in opposite directions at 
the same time (261 b a). Thus the motion caused by the prime mover, that of the first heaven, 
the primum mobile, is the primary term in the economy of .Qb.Q.m, which is in turn primary in the 
economies of kinesis and metabole. 
We now move to Book Theta chapter a (261b27-265a 12) where Aristotle discusses 
the infinity of continuous circular locomotion. He first spells out three types of locomotion: 
circular, rectilinear, and the combination of the two. Now rectilinear continuous motion is 
impossible, since it must turn back along the line, and it must stop before turning back (262a 15) . 
.bQ.gQ§ can be used here, Aristotle continues, not just sensation. The~ is this: any middle is 
one numerically, but two in formula; that is, the middle is the beginning of one segment and 
the end of the other (262a 22). The scheme of potency /actuality emers here: any point is 
potentially a middle, but the act of division implies stopping one motion and beginning another, 
so using the middle point as an end and a beginning implies a stop {262b 7). This argument 
about the potentiality of divisive limits and the necessity of a stop when actuating such limits will 
come up again In the discussion of the ldemity and difference of the now, to which Aristotle turns 
in his discussion of Zeno's paradoxes. Similarly to a point, a moment as dividing limit is 
numerically one but two in logos, the end of one segment of time and the beginning of another 
(263b 15). As we saw in Chapter I, Derrida deals at some length with these arguments; we will 
pick up the discussion later when we return to Heidegger's discussion of the now. 
We return to the question of circular locomotion as infinite and continuous (264b 
9-29). In Book Theta Chapter 9 (265a 13-2668 9) Aristotle comes to address how it is that of 
locomotions the circular Is primary~ (265a 14). Circular locomotion Is simpler and more 
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complete than other locomotions, Aristotle claims (265a 17). In rejoining itself in completing the 
circle such locomotions eliminate the need for a stop, as we saw was necessary for rectilinear 
motions. 
The discussion of Theta 1 O shows that the prime mover is unmoved, and also hac; 
no parts and no magnitude-hence it is not in a !QJ2Qi; it has reduced space (267b 18-25; see 
also Metaphysics 1073a 5). Now the motion caused by the prime mover-that of the first heaven, 
the primum mobile-must obviously have a magnitude that is single and continuous (267a 22-
25). Since circular locomotion is regular its mover (the prime mover) is unchanging, provoking 
movement as the object of desire (267b 2-5; see also Metaphysics 1072b 4: kinei de hos 
eromenon). Aristotle continues that the prime mover operates at the circumference of the 
universe, although not in a place (267b 9). 
Two things are shown by the primacy of J2bQm in the economy of kinesis. First, one 
cannot reduce the reference to space in the Aristotelian discourse on time: any iteration of 
kinesis or metabole refers to J2bQm as the prime instance that regulates its economy. Thus in the 
Aristotelian text time Is haunted by space. Secondly, any iteration of .QbQm refers to circular 
.Q!J.Q.ra, and through it to the prime mover. Thus the economy of kinesis is oriented to the prime 
mover so that .Q!J.Q.ra, which installs an irreducible spatial moment in the economy of kinesis, 
and hence of time, is in turn oriented to the reduction of space in pure self-presence outside 
space (and time). In Derrida's terms, time is here submitted to the system of presence oriented 
to the prime mover. Time and space are as desirous of being reduced. 
To return to Heidegger after this long excursus, we see that he acknowledges the 
economy of translation of proteron kai husteron by acknowledging the "wavering" in Aristotle, yet 
he tries to regulate the undecidability by means of a scheme which opposes the original to the 
vulgar, the properly understood to the misunderstood. As we have pointed out repeatedly in this 
chapier in referring back to Chapter II, this attempt is caught up in the Sinnsfrage. The "wavering" 
which Heidegger finds in Aristotle allows him to enter the discussion of the time-line analogy. The 
economy of kinesis as directed to the primary term .QbQm seems to set up an analogy of the. now 
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to a point: phora is continuous along a line, with points dividing the line. Similar1y, time, as 
number of kinesis, would seem to be continuous and divided by the now. As Derrida shows in 
"Ousla and Gramme,• this relation between continuous and divided can only be settled by the 
dynamis-energeia scheme. Here division by points is only potential (thus an infinity of points, the 
bad infinite, exists only potentially; this is Aristotle's answer to Zeno's paradox of the tortoise and 
Achilles). The good infinite is the circular motion caused by the prime mover, as we saw in our 
discussion of Theta 8. Similar1y, time is analogous with the line only accidentally. 
This is the crucial argument for Derrida. That the now is limit only accidentally 
means that the gramme is captured as gramme in act. Thus time is submitted to system of desire 
for presence, but is of course also subtracted in that very gesture, for the effacement of the 
trace that allows for presence-the prime mover is here seen as a mark that has separated itself 
in theological illusion52 --can also be read from the inscription of presence. 
At this point in the text Heidegger moves to discuss briefly his fourth topic, that of 
the now as same and different {349). Now as we recall from Chapter I, Derrida makes a great 
deal of the auto-affective structure of the now. Heidegger, on the other hand, brushes over this 
topic in little over a page. I will deal with the importance of this difference In emphases later. 
Briefly, Heidegger shows how the now can be seen as a limit only accidentally. Nows are both 
different, and as now, the same (350). Heidegger explains this via a distinction of essence and 
existence whereby the essence of the now is to be always the same, while its existence is 
different (350). 
We now move to the fifth point, concerning the numerical character of time. As we 
recall, this Is also one of Derrida's foci. Here Heidegger asks: Why does Aristotle stress the 
numerical quality of time? He answers his own question: To avoid the misunderstood analogy 
of time with the line. According to Heidegger, the spatial interpretation-that is, time understood 
as a line-is a misunderstanding: "This talk of time as a sequence of nows should not be 
misunderstood and transferred (Obertagen} to the spatial in the sense (in dem Sinne] by which 
one says time is a line, a series of points" (351; translation modified). According to the by now 
well-known strategy Heidegger here tries to manage the economy by identifying some Slnne as 
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proper, others as misunderstandings. The Sinnsfrage. of course, arises here, but so does the 
structure of the metaphor re-mark in Heidegger's use of Obertragen. Now, Ober-tragen is a 
possible German translation [Obersetzung] of meta-pherein. As of course is "translation" or 
"0bersetzung. • 
Heidegger establishes his ruling out of the simple application of the time-line 
analogy by his Interpretation of the now. The now Is not a point, he claims, because it is both 
beginning and end: ·seinem Wesen nach Anfang und Ende 1st" (351). Thus the now as such 
refers to the no-longer and not-yet: "In the now as such there is already present [liegt schon] a 
reference [Verwelsung] to the no-longer and the not-yer (351 ). Because of this reference to what 
it is not the now has dimension within Itself, Heidegger claims: •Es hat in sich selbst die 
Dimension, die Erstreckung nach elnem Noch-nicht und Nicht-mehr" (351) Now Webb claims 
Heidegger's characterization of the now as transition anticipates Derrrida's inscriptions of "trace" 
or "differance . .s3 To be sure, the way the now is described as constituted by reference to what 
it is not is the first step in Derrida's discussion of the trace in Hussert. But this negativity is still 
understood with reference to presence. The past and future are understood as negative modes 
of presence.54 Derrida's point is that this understanding is only possible by the erasure of the 
trace of radical alterity, of absolute past and future, a past and present that could never be 
understood by reference to the present, and hence could never be called "not-yet" or •no-
longer. • 
As we rejoin Heidegger we see a crucial terminological choice that will pull the 
discussion of the now into the same sort of (haunted) economy of undecidability we have 
explored above. Heidegger wants to purify the now of spatial understanding and thus 
delegitimize the time-line analogy. In the process of doing so he elucidates the dimension-
character of the now, and thus claims the now has the character of transition: "Because of this 
dimensional content [Dimensionsgehaltes) the now has within itself the character of a transition 
[in sich den Charakter eines Oberganges]" (352; Heidegger's italics). With the use of Obergang 
we are led to see here a spatial /temporal undecidability. The mark Obergang, as we have 
seen, is "spatial"-that is, it can be Iterated within a generic/specific undecidable economy of 
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metabole and ..Q.!J.Qm. Now in this passage Heidegger also iterates it in the "temporal" economy 
of the now. The possibility of its iteration in both economies haunts any iteration of Obergang. 
Let us follow the way this haunting makes possible the analogy of time and the line that 
Heidegger tries to rule out via his use of Obergang. 55 
As transition, the now Is both beginning and end. Time is a number as determining 
as transition the point's extremes (354). Here we run into a textual controversy: Heidegger's note 
four says simply nRoss. • But the Ross edition of Aristotle's Physics was first published in 1936. 
Hofstadter speculates Heidegger may have used Bekker or Pratl.56 The difference is this: At 220a 
16 Ross reads tes grammes while Bekker and Prantl read tes autes, referring to 220a 15 hos tes 
autes stigmes. Ross writes in his commentary that the reading of tes autes, as referring to .!IDi 
stigmas, point, "makes no sense. •57 
The measurement of motion [ObergangJ by time is made possible by time's (now's) 
Obergangscharakter (357). Here again we see Obergang as undecidably spatial and temporal. 
Such undecidability is the condition for the analogy of time and the line. The time discourse 
cannot be purified; the analogy asserts itself ever and again. As one can read in Kant, In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic.58 We must acknowledge In the mark Obergang an irreducible reference 
to possible inscription in spatial use. 
The sixth topic can now be addressed, that of time and the soul (357). Here the 
lnterpretatioi:i focuses on the famous phrase: hama gar kinesees aisthanometha kai chronou. 
Heidegger discusses this relation of time and the soul in terms of an opening to the discussion 
of Casein's temporality as grounding ordinarily-conceived time. We can perhaps see an opening 
to space in general in the splitting of self-affection here. Heidegger writes of the passage of 
subjective states: "The actions are not intrinsically spatial but they pass over into one another, 
one changes into the other" (358). The German needs to be read in its entirety: "Die Ver-
haltungen sind in sich nicht raumlich, aber sie gehen ineinander Ober, eine schlagt in die andere 
um.• Here we might begin to see Obergang and Umschlag as undecidable-or haunted--terms 
betraying the opening to space in general in the self-affective sphere of pure subjectivity. These 
hints would have to be rigorously read against the Derridean analyses in Speech and 
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Phenomena to which I refer in Chapter I. 
At the end of his interpretation Heidegger stresses that the key to properly 
understanding Aristotle is the proper understanding of akolouthein: ontological connection of 
founding which subsists among time, motion, continuity, and dimension. Aristotle approaches 
the mode of measuring time in just the way it is prescribed in the natural understanding of time 
and In the natural experience of time Itself. Because of this, Heidegger hopes to be able to pass 
from his interpretation of Aristotle to a discussion of ihe original concept of temporality" (361 ). 
Comparison of Heidegger and Derrida's Readings 
of Aristotle 
We have seen how Heidegger concentrates on two major points among the six 
topics he discusses. Those two are the proper understanding of akolouthein which grants the 
proper ontological order of concepts, and the economy of translation of proteron kai husteron 
as "before and after" and "earlier and later" which reveals the relation of original temporality to 
vulgar time. Making these points entails overturning three Aristotelian economies, overturnings 
themselves limited by the Sinnsfrage. 
Derrida, on the other hand, focuses upon the aporetic structure of Aristotle's 
treatise. For Derrida, Aristotle does not solve the aporia of time's Being, nor does he thematize 
the determination of Being as ousia that sets up the aporia, although he does solve the aporia 
of time's~. However the solution to the latter aporia, via the dynamis/energeia schema, is 
governed by the prior determination of Being as .2Yi!a., that is, by the evasion of the question of 
the determination of time's Being that precisely sets up the first, unsolved, aporla of time's 
Being. 
The major difference in the two interpretations occurs at 220a 16. Derrida's reading 
of "line• enables him to go on to define time as the name of the limits within which gramme (the 
possibility of the trace) is effaced by its determination via the system of potentiality /actuality as 
the gramme in act. Heidegger's reading of "point• enables him to exploit the extra-metaphysical 
moment of the now's openness, but only on the basis of determining a proper Sinn for certain 
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expressions. Heidegger insists on the proper understanding of Aristotle's time terms as non-
spatial--thus leading us· to see original temporality as extra-metaphysical-as opposed to the 
misunderstanding of these terms as spatial, which would set up a metaphysical spatialized time. 
Nevertheless, he does set up the "wavering· in Aristotle's thesis. Derrida, on the other hand, tries 
to articulate the economy of possible interpretatipn on which a metaphysical interpretation might 
draw, but which also includes that which will disrupt the metaphysical interpretation. Hence 
Derrida articulates the full economy of time, and thereby predicts the haunting of time by space. 
Conclusion: The Basic Problems of Phenomenology and 
The Eooch of Being and Time 
Let us return at this point to the question implicitly posed In Chapter I. As we recall, 
Derrida sets up "Ousia and Gramme· as an interrogation of Being and Time in terms of its 
"epoch(e). • At this point we might ask in what sense Basic Problems falls under the constraints 
operative in the epoch of Being and Time, that is, to what extent does it fail to pose the graphic 
of the trace? Can one not claim, as Webb does, that the now as transition poses the question 
of the trace and hence of time/space? Perhaps. But here one might have to have recourse to 
a distinction developed by Derrida in "Vio-lence and Metaphysics" --discussing a similar point with 
regard to Levinas-between inscription of a trace and thematization of the trace (a thematization 
that ends up thematizing the withdrawal of the trace from thematization). In beginning an 
inscription of the trace in the Obergang-character of the now, a character which we have seen 
is haunted by its possible iteration in spatial contexts (thus broaching the problematic of 
time/space), Heidegger still insists on the primordiality of time, of calling ecstatic temporality 
"original time.• So even though the key term, Obergang, is undecidably "spatial" and ''temporal" 
Heidegger attempts to manage its economy or settle the undecidability. We have seen how such 
undecidability can only be settled by appeal to a proper Sinn; but we have also seen how this 
poses the Sinnsfrage. So we have demonstrated the functioning of an irreducible spatial moment 
in the economy of time in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology as well as in Being and Time. 
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NOTES 
1.All references in this chapter to Basic Problems will be made in the text, with the German 
pagination only, since Hofstadter's translation carries the German pagination as well. 
2."Nachwort des Herausgegebers; Grundprobleme. pp. 471-73. See also the Translator's 
Preface to Hofstadter's translation. 
3.1 use W.D. Ross' Greek text of the Physics in the Oxford aassical Text series (1950). Many 
English translations are available; I use Aristotle's Physics by Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinnell, 
Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1969). The only published text that addresses at any length Heideg-
ger's reading of Aristotle in Basic Problems is that of E. Martineau, "Conception vulgaire et 
conception aristotelicienne du temps: Note sur 'Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie' de 
Heidegger(@ 19)," Archives de Philosophie, 43 (1980), 99-120. David Webb has produced an 
unpublished MA thesis from the University of Essex entitled Time and the Trace: Aristotle: 
Heidegger: Derrida that is the only detailed treatment of the relation between the readings of 
Aristotle in Basic Problems and "Ousia and Gramme.· 
4.Due to the typographic limitations of my word-processing system I must transliterate Greek 
terms. I shall use an • e • to indicate an §!§ as opposed to • e • for an epsilon, and an • 6 • to 
indicate an omega as opposed to • o • for an omicron. 
5.Herman Rappaport, in his Heidegger and Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language, claims 
Basic Problems is •a conservative version of Beina and Time• (p. 5). I will show that Basic 
Problems and Being and Time operate under the same formal constraints: what I call the 
Sinnsfrage as it instanciates Derrida's "formal rule: Rappaport's analysis of Basic Problems 
occurs in Chapter 2 of his book. Some of his observations overtap my own, but since our 
projects are so different I will not mark every time we agree or disagree on a particular point in 
Heidegger's treatment of Aristotle. See my Introduction, note 21, above. 
6.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 39. See Thomas Sheehan, "Time and Being, 1925-27," and John 
Sallis, "Radical Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology,• Research in Phenomenoloay VI 
(1976), 139-49, and "Imagination and the Meaning of Being,• Heidegger et l'idee de la pMnomen-
oloaie. ed. F. Volpi (Kluwer, 1988). 
7.Tina Chanter brought these questions to my attention at the Heidegger Circle at Notre Dame 
in May 1989. 
a.See the untitled first page of Sein und Zeit, as well as Heidegger's later statement in his letter 
to Richardson. 
9.Heidegger, Die Metaphysische AnfangsgrOnde der Loaik im Ausqang van Leibniz. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978); English translation by Michael Heim, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). 
10.Rappaport, Heidegger and Derrida, p. 5. 
11.Sallis points out that Basic Problems avoids repeating the death analyses of Being and Time 
where the finite {endlich) nature of authentic temporallty is sketched out. See "Radical 
Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology.• 
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12.0ne might very well ask here about the relation of this demand to Heidegger's desire to 
ground Dasein's spatiality on its temporality. See p. 168 above. 
13.I discussed the difference between the Heideggerian treatment and the Derridean notion of 
dissemination in Chapter II. 
14.Sallis, "Radical Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology." 
15.Martlneau notes the way Derrida calls attention to Aristotle's phrase dia ton exoterikOn logon 
which precedes the laying out of the aporiai. Both Derrida and Martineau suggest that Aristotle 
may not have been so caught up in the vulgarity he analyzes as Heidegger might seem to 
suggest at times. 
16.See, for instance, Basic Problems, p. 37. 
17.W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 4. 
18.See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 22-23. 
19.ln 1939 Heidegger will compose a detailed reading of Physics 8, 1 entitled "Ober das Wesen 
und Begriff der Phusls. Aristoteles, Physik B, 1 "; reprinted in Wegmarken; English translation by 
Thomas Sheehan "On the Essence and Concept of Phusis. Aristotle, Physics B, 1," Man and 
World, 9, no. 3 (August 1976). 
20.See, inter alla. the "Origin of the Work of Art," Nietzsche. "Letter on Humanism," and "The 
Question Concerning Technology.• 
21.At this point in the text kinesls and metabole are not yet distinguished, although they will 
becomes so later In the Phvsics. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 45-48. 
22.See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 15ff, for his discussion of book 7. 
23.Perhaps no other work of antiquity has provoked the amount of commentary surrounding the 
Physics. Among the most quoted classical commentaries are those of Slmplicius and Thomas 
Aquinas. Among twentieth-century commentaries see among others J. F. Callahan, Four Views 
on Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cmabridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948); J. Moreau..!,& 
temps et l'espace selon Aristote (Padua: Atenore, 1965); V. Goldschmidt Temps tragigue et 
temps physique chez Aristote (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982); D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics; H. Apostle, 
Aristotle's Physics; P. Aubenque, Le probleme de l'~tre chez Aristote. A useful short treatment 
from the analytic tradition Is David Bostock, "Aristotle's Account of Time; Phronesis, 25 (1980), 
148-69. Other analytic treatments include F.D. Miller, "Aristotle on the reality of time,• Archiv fur 
Geschichte der Philosophle, 56 (1974), 132-55; G. E. L Owen, "Aristotle on Time,· in Motion and 
Time. Space and Matter: Interrelations in the History of Philosophy and Science, ed. P. 
Machamer and A. Turnbull (Ohio, 1976), pp. 3-25; and S. Shoemaker, "Time without change," 
Journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969), 363-81. 
24.I noted in Chapter 2 how Heidegger sets up Being and Time with the evocation of an aporia 
of an aporia, as he repeats the term Keinesweg on the first page. 
25.Martineau, p. 101. My translation. 
26.Heldegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung,• Holzwege; tr. Hegel's Concept of Experience (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1970); See also Werner Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition. 
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27.Heidegger will also claim a similar status for kinesis in his lecture course on Metaphysics 
Theta. Heidegger, Aristoteles Metaphysik Theta 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, GA 
33 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981 ), p. 81. See also Walter Brogan, "Heidegger's 
Interpretation of Aristotle: The Finitude of Being," Research in Phenomenology. XIV (1984), 249-
58. 
28.As Derrida shows in "Ousia and Gramme," and as I have discussed in Chapter 1, the Greek 
hama, as undecidably spatial/temporal, is best left untranslated. 
29.See Kelly Mink's unpublished PhD dissertation. 
30.See Pierre Aubenque, Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote, for the problems with a 
straightforward bringing of this phrase under the rubric of the "analogy of Being." Aubenque 
claims the analogy of attribution used by Scholastics to discuss the pros hen relation of 
categories is a later imposition that has no counterpart in Aristotle, and tends to efface the 
aporetic tension of Aristotle's text. Aubenque claims to show an irreducible plurality of categories 
that can neither be brought under a genus, nor ordered by an analogy of attribution. Thus 
ontology is an impossible science, or at best an infinite task. 
31.Derrida, Maraes, pp. 295-96/247-48. 
32. Metaphysics 4, 1006b 8. 
33.See Leonard Lawlor's fine discussion "Dialectic and lterability: The Confrontation between Paul 
Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida," Philosophy Today (Fall 1988). 
34.Derrida explores these issues in "Signature Event Context" "Limited Inc" and the "Afterword: 
Toward an Ethic of Discussion" all found in the new edition of Limited Inc. 
35.See here Jacob Klein Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1969) for a detailed analysis of the Greek concept of number and its relations to the 
operation of counting. Briefly stated, for the Greeks a number was always the number of 
counted things. 
36.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 104. 
37.And here my discourse falls prey to the Sinnsfrage. 
38.Topos, as we can read in Physics IV.4, is the Immediately surrounding envelope of a thing. 
See 21 Ob 34-211 a 1: "axioumen de ton topon einai proton men periechon ekeino au tapes esti, 
kai med en tau pragmatos. • 
39.Here I rely on the Derridean distinction between "indifference" or "indeterminacy" and 
"undecidability." What is undecidable oscillates between two definite possibilities. See the 
"Afterword" to Limited Inc. 
40.Ross notes that although Aristotle uses kinesis and metabole interchangeably through Book 
4, he later distinguishes between them. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 7-8. 
41.Apostle translates kuriotate as "most independent.· One of its meanings lets kurios means 
"lordly." I prefer "most important." See here Udell and Scott. 
42.Hofstadter has: "The simplest form of motion, and the one most frequently used.by Aristotle 
in his analysis of motion, of transition, is phora, transition from one place (tapes) to another, 
change of place." The original reads: Die einfachste und van Aristoteles meistens in der 
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Bewegungsanalyse beigezogene Form d~.r Bewegung, des Obergangs, ist der Umschlag, die 
Ortsveranderung. • Hofstadter misplaces Ubergang and omits Umschlag. 
43.Physics B 1, 192b 13-1S. 
44.Heidegger uses Ausdehnung to translate extensio in the discussion of Descartes in Sein und 
Zeit. E.g., p. 90. 
45.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 369. 
46.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 324: •streng genommen bedeutet Sinn das Woraufhin des 
primaren Entwurfs des Verstehens von Sein: 
47.Ross speaks of a •quasi-megethos• of generation and destruction, as well as alteration. Ross, 
Aristotle's Physics, p. 64. 
48.Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 329. In italics in the original. 
49.Derrida, "White Mythology,• Margins. p. 301/2S2-S3. 
SO.The psuche is a unmoved mover for living things as self-movers, according to Ross' reading 
of 2S9b 2. See Ross, Aristotle's Physics, p. 91. See also Plato's text on the psucM as self-
moving In the Phaedrus. 
s1.Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 91-2. 
S2.Here we might, with much additional work, begin to see something like an irreducible 
reference to space in the being-generated of the thing by physis. This brings us to a preliminary 
sketch of a huge issue to which I can only allude. Is Heidegger hert1 overlooking the irreducible 
spatiality of Dasein's life with others? Here we would have to investigate Heidegger's later essay 
on ..PhY.§1§ in Aristotle's Physics B 1. There he shows how the being by ..PhY.§1§ is ·on the way" to 
another. But for Aristotle this birth is a re-production of the same {ftidos=species) with all the 
male privilege of Aristotle's semenology as developed in De Generatione Animalium. In the 
Physics we read how eidos is motionless, the first mover in the case of generation (2S7b). But 
generation as well is referred to space via the heliotrope in the economy of time. Aristotle insists 
that~ is necessary for generation-and not just the movement of the parents: he writes that 
"both man and the sun beget man• (194b 14). We should recall here the sun's role at~ 
Generatione et Corruptione 11.10 336a 1Sff. Could we not here hazard the notion of another 
stretching, crossing the temporal Erstreckung of Dasein, a reference to another in the field of 
natality, that is, a reference to the (m)other? Here we would have to discuss Levinas' notion of 
fecundity and radical alterity in Totality and Infinity. as well as Arendt's discussion in The Human 
Condition of human plurality and politics as conditioned by the radical novelty brought about by 
each birth. Here we might begin a reading of the irreducibility of space as a trace of radical 
alterity. 
S3.See Derrida's "Double Session," in Dissemination as well as Gasche's discussion in The Tain 
of the Mirror. 
S4.David Webb, unpublished MA thesis, University of Essex. 
SS.Recall here the epigraph to ·ousia and Gramme: as I discussed it in Chapter 1. 
56. "With the aid of the now I can mark a limit ... [butJ The now Is not limit, but number, not~ 
but arithmos" (353). Number is not bound to what it numbers. This non-boundedness was later 
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interpreted by Kant as "form of intuition" (353). See here Rappaport's analysis. Here Heidegger 
says just what Derrida says: that Aristotle anticipates Kant. 
57.Hofstadter note in his translation, p.233, note 4. 
58.Ross, Aristotle's Physics, Commentary, p. 602. See also Webb's discussion. 
59.Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Derrida points out this passage in a note to "Ousia and 
Gramme." 
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